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 2 
Introduction 
 
 
The history of Latin America was for a long time seen predominantly as one of authoritarian 
rule, repression and extreme inequality. The legacies of colonial rule and of the oligarchies 
that came to power after independence reached far into the 20th century, seemingly capable of 
persisting for a much longer time if not disturbed. However, in the first half of the 20th 
century the South American continent started to stir, and while Europe was still dealing with 
authoritarian and totalitarian systems, many countries already produced a tradition of 
democratic government of civilian rule comprising regular elections, the separation of powers, 
and the regulated transfer of power between governments. Chile was one of the countries that 
fared best in this period. The seemingly stable democracy seemed to withstand anything, and 
so, daring moves to broaden participation, increase competition and tackle inequality were 
ventured already in the 1960s. It would not take long until disillusionment made its entrance, 
with the loss of control of the political mobilisation and the eventual recourse to a military 
coup. It would take seventeen years until democracy was finally restored; however, this was 
to happen in a quite unusual way, namely following the path and using the means set out by 
the authoritarian regime itself. Therefore, the return to democracy was not a tumultuous event, 
but an organised handover from the military to a civilian elected government. As good and 
desirable as the absence of violence might be, the transition under the auspices of the military 
entailed considerable constraints, obstructions and complications to the consolidation of 
democracy. While free and fair elections soon became commonplace again, many 
authoritarian elements would remain well into the 21st century. The implications were not 
only evident in the biased and resilient institutions, but also pervaded civil society, thus 
reaching into the very core of democracy: the citizens. Measured with indicators that 
concentrate on formal aspects of democracy and macroeconomic variables, Chile quickly 
earned the reputation of a showcase democratisation, arousing the interest of scholars, elites 
and of politicians in subsequently democratising countries. Combed through with a more 
substantial measurement of democracy, Chile remained a case of incomplete transition and 
consolidation, and many were the studies that insisted on deconstructing the image of a near-
perfect democracy. However, more than twenty years into the transition, and after substantial 
reforms and events (e.g. the indictment and death of Pinochet) contributed to leaps forward in 
the consolidation process, it is time to reassess the status quo and repeat the question whether 
Chilean democratisation has been successfully completed. This leads to the guiding questions 
of this thesis, namely (1) whether, and if so, how Chile was able to overcome its remaining 
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institutional and political authoritarian legacies; (2) in how far the political, social and 
economic context has changed or evolved in a way that precludes a renewed breakdown of 
democracy; and finally (3) what kind of democracy Chile has reached after twenty years. The 
present thesis addresses these questions in three steps: The first, theoretical chapter discusses 
the concept of democracy itself and democratisation, following their historical development 
and presenting different conceptualisations and meanings of the terms. The second part, 
consisting of three separate chapters, gives a historical oversight of the emergence and rise of 
democracy in Chile, the development of the political and economic elites, the transformations 
of all spheres of Chilean society, and eventually the impact of the authoritarian regime on 
Chile. The last chapter is predominantly analytic, describing the transition and consolidation 
process, and eventually performing an assessment on the quality of democracy by 2009. 
 
The data and information which form the base of the discussions, descriptions and analyses 
were gathered from the predominantly secondary and primary analysis of scholar literature, 
reports and legal texts. The framework for the assessment of the quality of democracy was 
largely taken from Diamond and Morlino’s (2005) Assessing the Quality of Democracy. 
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I Theoretical Background 
 
 
The importance and relevance of democracy have not diminished in the last decades as, on the 
one hand, it nonetheless retained its broadly undisputed position as the favourite and most 
promising political system worldwide, and, on the other, many countries remain where, even 
when the will is present, democratisation has not been initiated or successfully completed. 
However, before turning to the phenomenon of democratisation, it is important to shed some 
light on the concept behind it: democracy. Although the term enjoys a very broad and 
diversified usage, it has different meanings and concepts which influence what people are 
speaking about when they actually use the word. Taken a step further, when discussing 
democratisation and the quality of democracy in a given country, assessments can differ 
greatly according to the different intensity and extension of the concept used. 
 
1. Democracy 
 
The term democracy comes from the Greek words demos and kratein. What is understood by 
it, including the meaning, the type and the level of democracy, has come to change and be 
debated throughout the centuries since the Antique.  
The origins of democracy can be found in 5th century BC Athens, where it reflected the direct 
exercise of popular control over government. However, the Assembly in which debates took 
place and decisions were made consisted of only few men, excluding a large share of the 
people (unprivileged men, women, slaves, foreigners) from citizenship. (Dahl 1989) Freedom 
and participation were not based on the important principle of equality, which would only 
become paramount many centuries later.  
The term experienced an important comeback from the Middle Ages in Europe, especially in 
the 17th and 18th centuries: The peak was reached with the American and French Revolutions, 
which elevated direct democracy to their ideal of a political regime (Rousseau 1762). 
However, with the establishment of nation-states and the growth of administrative territory of 
the regimes, direct democracy became less and less feasible and gave way to a preference for 
representative forms. (Grugel 2002: 14; see also Dahl 1989: 135-152) 
The rise of two ideologies strongly influenced democratic theory in the 18th and 19th 
centuries: Liberalism and Socialism. Liberalism introduced the primacy of the individual over 
the collective, and with it the right, but not the obligation to participate in politics. Individuals 
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in their quest for self-fulfilment and development were thus respected in their free will by a 
representative democracy, where their particular interests were aggregated and brought 
forward for them. The liberal concepts of representation, equality, and accountability thus 
developed and became an essential component of democracy. (Grugel 2002: 14)  
With the rise and intensification of capitalism, the concept of equality of all citizens became 
an important debate topic in democracy theories, as opinions differed as to the degree of 
responsibility individuals were believed to be able to take. The rising capitalist ownership 
class feared that the working class (as well as some peoples) was not “mature” or “civilised” 
enough to take political decisions and participate in the decision-making process. The 
concepts of participation and citizenship were discussed well into the 20th century in debates 
about who should be granted rights and duties in the polity. It would only be well into the 20th 
century that discrimination based on class, gender and race would be removed from 
citizenship inclusion. The liberal concept of representative democracy was able to assert 
itself, and elected parliaments believed to represent the whole community became essential in 
democracies. (ibid. 15-16) 
Socialism revived the Athenian ideal of a direct democracy with a popular government, 
without the mediation and representation by third parties. The community was given priority 
in democratic rights, by contrast to the liberal individualist stance. Marxism further developed 
this concept of democracy, denouncing the exploitation of the masses and the inequality 
which liberal capitalist democracy did not address, and advocated for economic quality in 
order to restore the balance of power and guarantee for actual political rights. As 
representative democracy was in the hands of the bourgeoisie, the only means to break the 
exploitation and alienation spiral would be revolution and class solidarity. (ibid. 13-16) 
 
The Second World War had a significant influence on the change in democratic theories and 
the acceptance and primacy of democracy as a political regime. Mobilisation during the war 
had been extensive and concerned every citizen regardless of birth, occupation or sex. After 
the War people were not easily to be underprivileged or discriminated against again, and the 
abolition of persistent exclusions (e.g. of Afro-Americans in the US, women in most 
European countries), together with the promotion of social and economic reforms became 
paramount. (Grugel 2002: 16-17)  
 
While revolutionary movements and utopias were largely de-legitimised and abandoned in 
most of Europe, they persisted in other regions, where they influenced political processes and 
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conflicts well into the 21st century. It was not until the Cold War with its anti-communist 
propaganda, and the eventual fall of Real Socialism that liberal democracy became the 
unchallenged dominant concept of democracy and equated with freedom. With the 
disintegration of one of the two ideological and political blocks, and the rise of 
Behaviouralism in the 1950s and 1960s, the empirical reality of the West became the standard 
of democracy and the only accepted form of government in a “free world”. A dichotomy was 
created between democracy and all other forms of government. The distinction between 
socialist and liberal democracy gave way to one between empirical/realistic/descriptive and 
normative/philosophical/idealistic traditions of democracy. (Grugel 2002: 17-18; 30) 
 
The empirical democratic concept (advocated by Schumpeter) concentrated on the form of 
government and the election of political leaders. The stance that every member of the 
population should partake in the decision-making process was not shared by empiricists; 
instead, they concentrated on the institutionalisation of competition for power between elites. 
(Huntington 1991: 7) The conditions for democracy were “high-quality leadership in political 
parties; autonomy of political elites from the state; an independent bureaucracy; an opposition 
and civil society that accept the rules of the game; and a political culture of tolerance and 
compromise.” (Grugel 2002: 18) The people’s role was thus reduced from direct participation 
to accepting or refusing leaders who would decide for them. In spite of its omission of 
substantive dimensions and narrow conception, the empirical theories allowed the 
development of clear, transparent criteria for measuring democracy, and thus for comparative 
studies to flourish. (Huntington 1991: 11; Grugel 2002: 18-19) 
Dahl pioneered the change towards normative theories with his distinction between the 
empirical cases and the political ideal of democracy. Empirical democracies were termed 
instead as “polyarchies”, since they were on the track to becoming, but still not fully 
democracies, lacking several conditions necessary for democracy; rather, they reflected 
consensual government by competing elites. (Dahl 1989)  
In spite of the advantages of empirical democratic theory for measuring democracies, its 
shortcomings were not ignored for long. The assumption that the described Western societies 
were pluralist and that actors played in a neutral arena (without structural privileges and 
unevenly distributed power) proved erroneous. The concentration on procedural dimensions 
completely ignored hidden structures of power, the effects of socio-economic inequalities on 
inclusion and citizenship, and the substantive dimensions of democracy which influence 
political activity, focussing only on the formal and observable ones. (Grugel 2002: 20-22; 30) 
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The result was the understanding that democracy should not be equated with any of the 
existing systems of government, as Weir and Beetham (ibid.: 21) suggested, and a more 
critical and thorough approach to democracy assessments.  
 
Drawing away from empirical traditions, new approaches developed normative 
understandings of democracy from the 1970s onwards, including participatory democracy 
(giving priority to participation over representation; emphasising active as opposed to passive 
citizenship, as well as community over individualism; and striving to overcome inequality), 
feminism (denouncing gendered structural inequalities (social, economic and political); the 
male bias of democracy theories; and advocating for the extension of democracy to the private 
sphere), associationalism (seeking to strengthen protection of working people and the poor; 
freedom through participation in the community), citizenship theories (stressing the 
importance of civil society; associations, networks, agency and resistance; political, social and 
economic inclusion) and cosmopolitanism (focussing on trends of globalisation and the 
transnationalisation of politics; and the increased significance of non-state actors), often being 
given more to the communitarian perception of democracy than to the liberal one. (Grugel 
2002: 23-29) 
 
Until around the middle of the 1990s, democracy was associated with the liberal concept of 
the term, which implied elections, the existence of two or more parties in the political system, 
and a certain set of procedures for government. However, newer definitions have come to 
criticise this understanding as too narrow, and focussing only on the conditions and 
procedures instead of the defining characteristics. Instead, they pleaded for a broadening of 
the concept, including also the substantive dimensions of rights, equality and freedom. 
(Grugel 2002: 6) 
 
A distinction can be made between formal and substantive democracy. Formal democracy is 
understood as a “set of rules, procedures and institutions” (Grugel 2002: 6). 
Substantive democracy by contrast is more dynamic; it is a  
 
“process that has to be continually reproduced, a way of regulating power relations in such a way as to maximize 
the opportunities for individuals to influence the conditions in which they live, to participate in and influence 
debates about the key decisions which affect society. (Kaldor and Vejvoda 1997: 67)” (ibid. 6) 
 
This understanding goes hand in hand with the importance given to participation, 
accountability, the rule of law, tolerance and pluralism. The arena where this process is 
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reproduced every day is the state or government institutions on the one hand, and civil society 
on the other. (ibid. 7) 
 
2. The Quality of Democracies 
 
Linz and Stepan (1996) identified five interacting arenas which are necessary for a high-
quality democracy: a lively civil society, a relatively autonomous political society, a rule of 
law, a usable state, and an economic society. However, in order for democracy to be even 
roughly possible, stateness needs to be robust, i.e. a sovereign state which holds the monopoly 
of the legitimate use of force in a recognised territory, which has the bureaucratic and 
administrative capability to collect and manage taxes and disposes of a judicial system. 
 
Diamond and Morlino (2005) discerned eight dimensions essential to democracy, and on the 
basis of which they suggested a framework for assessing the quality of democracy. The 
dimensions would be the rule of law, participation, competition, vertical accountability, and 
horizontal accountability (the “procedural” dimensions), as well as freedom and equality (the 
“substantive” dimensions). The link between the two sets is the eight dimension, 
responsiveness (the “results” dimension), reflecting whether the public policies actually 
conform to and reflect the demands and preferences of citizens. 
 
The rule of law can be said to be the basis without which none of the other dimensions can 
thrive. It implies that governmental actors have the monopoly on violence throughout the 
territory and across social strata, a prerequisite for civil order; the equality of all citizens 
before the law (especially in its enforcement and access to the courts); the clarity, publicity 
and universality of laws; the active prevention and fight against corruption in all branches 
(political, administrative, and judicial); an efficient, competent and responsible state 
bureaucracy; a professional, efficient and law abiding police force respectful of rights and 
freedoms;  civilian control over the military and the intelligence services; an expeditious, 
neutral and independent judiciary at all levels; the respect and enforcement of court rulings by 
all agencies of the state; and the supremacy of the constitution, including a constitutional 
court to interpret and defend it. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xiv-xv)  
An important prerequisite for a functioning rule of law is a political culture which reflects 
whether the liberal and democratic values are rooted in society, and the existence of traditions 
of a competent and impartial bureaucracy. A further determinant is the existence and 
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allocation of the institutional and economic means needed for the implementation, which 
often represents a hurdle not only in developing, but also in developed countries (mostly due 
to lack of political will or self-restraint). (ibid. xvi) 
Possible indicators for the rule of law would be “the degree to which public officials are 
responsible before the law, or enjoy relative impunity; the extent of official corruption, as 
measured […] by indices of perceptions of corruption and market distortions; the extent of 
civil-liberty violations; the access of citizens to the court system; [...] the average duration of 
legal proceedings” and the extent of civilian control of the military, police and intelligence 
services. (ibid. xv, xxxix)  
 
Participation is the second procedural dimension necessary for democracy. It includes formal 
rights of political participation for adult citizens, ranging from the right to vote to the rights to 
“organize, assemble, protest, lobby for their interests, and otherwise influence the decision-
making process”. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xvi) The full enjoyment of these rights requires 
political equality, allowing equal access to political resources, but also effective prevention of 
fraud and protection of voters and candidates against violence and intimidation at and in 
between elections. The education system here is an important tool, aimed at increasing the 
literacy rate and enhancing citizens’ knowledge about and interest in the political system. 
Again, a political culture that values the equality in worth and dignity of all citizens and is 
propitious to participation is an important asset, while the rule of law protects the actual 
usufruct of participation rights, especially for economically or socially disadvantaged groups. 
(ibid. xvi-xvii, xxxii) 
Participation can be traced by indicators such as voter turnout rates; membership in political 
parties, social movements and NGOs; the communication between citizens and their elected 
representatives in office; and the participation of citizens in public debates. (ibid. xvii) 
 
The third of the procedural dimensions is competition, meaning the competition between 
different political parties in regular, free and fair elections. It is an important factor which is 
expressed especially in the political parties, allowing for new parties to join the electoral arena 
and compete for the citizens’ approval, for the proposition of alternatives among which 
citizens can choose (including to hold incumbents responsible for “bad” policies by voting 
them out and alternation in power), for broader access to the media, as well as campaign 
funding for an equal and fair competition in elections. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xvii) Of 
course there are great implications by the different variants of representative systems (e.g. 
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majoritarian, consensual), allowing for varying levels of proportional representation of 
different groups in parliament and more or less frequent and facilitated alternation of power. 
(ibid. xvii) Again, the rule of law is essential to competition, as it regulates the finances and 
funding of parties (and can therefore counteract corruption and bias based on economic 
resources), oversees the access to and pluralism of mass media, monitors the elections (esp. 
electoral commissions), and enforces the political rights of parties and citizens. The most 
obvious indicator for competition is the presence of opposition in parliament. (ibid. xviii-xix) 
 
Vertical accountability is the fourth procedural dimension of democracies. It is closely linked 
to the previous two dimensions, participation and competition, as it gives citizens and civil 
society groups the possibility to review and control political leaders and institutions, heavily 
relying on genuine participation rights of citizens and political actors; and political 
competition offering alternatives among which to choose. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xiii; 
xix-xx) It allows for citizens to demand information, justification and responsibility from their 
elected political leaders, and to accordingly reward (re-elect) or punish (vote for an opposition 
party or abstain) them according to the citizens’ evaluation of their performance. While fair 
and competitive elections are the most obvious arena for vertical accountability, it is also 
performed by political as well as civil society groups (civic associations, NGOs, social 
movements, interest groups, think tanks, mass media) in between elections. This, of course, 
can only be efficient if they are not only well-developed, but also enjoy the protection of a 
strong rule of law. (ibid. xx) 
However, the preferences and expectations of citizens can not only change with time, but also 
be influenced and structured by representatives of civil and political groups. (ibid. xix) It 
should therefore not be seen as a one-sided, but rather as a dynamic and circular process. 
Furthermore, the liberal assumption that citizens are able to perceive and assess their interests 
and needs and the means to fulfil them accurately, and that they are capable of judging 
whether the government is really corresponding to their expectations in the medium term (and 
not just the short-term results) is delicate, as lack of or manipulated information and 
knowledge, as well as distortion of motives of political actors can undermine citizens’ 
judgements. 
 
The last one of the procedural dimensions is horizontal accountability. In addition to vertical 
accountability, incumbent political leaders are answerable to more or less equal political 
institutional actors, which have the required expertise and legal authority to monitor, 
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investigate and sanction their performance and decisions. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxi) 
Some of the most important features of these agencies – the opposition in parliament; the 
court system; investigative committees; audit agencies; the central bank; the electoral 
committee; counter corruption commissions; the ombudsman – are their autonomy, 
independence from political influence, but also the protection by the rule of law. While the 
scrutiny is mostly disagreeable for incumbents, it is important that these agencies are 
allocated enough resources, rights and protection to perform their tasks thoroughly and to 
prosecute offences. Besides a strong freedom of information and transparency, the importance 
of a functioning rule of law for the enforcement of prosecutions is obvious. (ibid. xxii-xxiv) 
 
The first of the two substantive dimensions is freedom. It is strongly connected to the 
acknowledgement and implementation of rights: The political rights include “the rights to 
vote, to stand for office, to campaign, and to organize political parties. […] [They] make 
possible vigorous political participation and competition, hence vertical accountability.” 
(Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxv) The civil rights include “personal liberty, security, and 
privacy; freedom of thought, expression, and information; freedom of religion; freedom of 
assembly, association, and organisation, including the right to form and join trade unions and 
political parties; freedom of movement and residence; and the right to legal defense and due 
process”. (ibid. xxv) Furthermore, socioeconomic rights such as “rights to private property 
and entrepreneurship, […] rights associated with employment, the right to fair pay and time 
off, and the right to collective bargaining” (ibid. xxv) enhance the freedom of citizens from 
hardship and want. Again, the protecting patron of the implementation of freedom is a strong, 
effective and fair rule of law, establishing the rights citizens can claim, and ensuring that 
violations (including by police, military and intelligence services) are prosecuted. Besides the 
ombudsman and human rights commissions, civil society needs to have leeway and be active 
in the monitoring of rights, and the mass media should not refrain from disclosing violations 
or shortcomings; government agencies should be hindered in any attempts to curtail freedom 
in the name of national security. (ibid. xxv-xxvi)  
 
Equality is the second of the substantive dimensions. Encompassing all previous dimensions, 
the political equality of all citizens is very important, as it goes hand in hand with the rights 
and legal protections mentioned above. Citizens need to be seen as equal based simply on 
their citizenship, and not on other factors such as gender, race or wealth (as used to be the 
case). Taken one step further, political equality is connected to other forms of equality as 
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well, in the sense that blatant inequalities in income, wealth and status very often affect 
political equality and the exercise of citizenship rights. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxvi-
xxvii) This entails that cultural (protection from paternalistic treatment and discrimination) 
and social rights (to mental and physical health, to assistance and social security, to work and 
to strike, to education, to a clean environment, to housing) need to be envisaged as well in a 
democracy. (ibid. xxviii) While social and economic equality requires the state to invest in 
egalitarian policies, regarding infrastructure and human capital (public health and education), 
the organisation, association and mobilisation of disadvantaged groups needs to be protected 
by an egalitarian and efficient rule of law. (ibid. xxviii-xxix) 
 
The last dimension, which reflects the results of democracy, is responsiveness. In spite of its 
similarity to vertical accountability, responsiveness entails a different dimension: It does not 
limit itself to the competition for voters’ reward or punishment in elections, and withstanding 
political and civil society actors’ monitoring and criticism in between election dates, but on 
the overall responsiveness of governments to the expectations, interests, needs and demands 
of citizens. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxix) The first question behind this dimension is how 
to discern what the citizens actually want. Diamond and Morlino discern a chain of three 
linkages:  
 
“First, choices are structured in a way that distils citizens’ diverse, multidimensional policy preferences into 
more coherent national policy choices offered by competing political parties. Second, citizens’ electoral 
preferences are aggregated […] into a government of policymakers. And third, elected officials and their 
appointees then translate policy stances and commitments into actual policy outcomes.” (ibid. xxix) 
 
Thus the interests and preferences of individual citizens go through three “layers” of 
processing before they are actually reflected (or not) in government policies. The dimension 
of participation is also quite relevant for responsiveness, as in representative systems the 
differing interests and demands must be articulated and aggregated by political parties in 
order to find resonance in the election process. (ibid. xxx) As has been mentioned in vertical 
accountability, there are some fallacies and weaknesses which can affect responsiveness. 
Firstly, citizens might have a vague idea of what they want, but not have enough knowledge 
or information to identify the policies needed to reach their aims. As such, measures that 
might actually benefit them in the medium or long term, but which appear unpopular in the 
short term might be unpopular und lead to punishing political behaviour. This leaves political 
actors the responsibility to decide which path to take. Secondly, it might happen that no party 
actually offers the interests and aims that a majority of the citizens wants. An electoral 
victory, then, does not reflect the responsiveness of the victorious party to the citizens’ needs, 
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but other factors. Thirdly, political leaders might compete in the elections with policies and 
intentions which they do not intend, once elected, to implement. Once elected, they might 
concentrate on maximising their own influence and take advantage of the complexity of 
problems over the course of the term. Fourthly, especially in developing countries, political 
leaders may intend to implement the policies their voters expect from them, but do not have 
the necessary resources to do this. Fifthly, in many countries, there are some (more or less) 
influential political parties which are not based on programmes or ideologies, but on ethnic or 
identity lines. The social and political interests and demands aggregated in these parties only 
have these cultural factors in common, but other social and political cleavages may prove 
problematic for the implementation of policies and programmes. Finally, corruption and 
privileged access to power by lobbies and wealthy interest groups may distort government 
decisions and actions, undermining the responsiveness to the electorate in its integrity for the 
responsiveness to a minority. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxix-xxxi)  
Indicators for responsiveness could be citizens’ assessment of their government’s 
responsiveness to their individual needs and concerns (through surveys), their satisfaction 
with democracy, and the distance between the elected political leaders and the citizens on 
certain policies. (ibid. xxxi) 
 
It is important to point out, however, that the authors did not intend to say that a truthful 
democracy has to fulfil all of the dimensions to the maximum, or even imply that this would 
be possible. In a pragmatic way, the combination of different achievements and emphases of 
the dimensions defines the kind of democracy a regime is or wants to be, and the 
improvements in some dimensions might go hand in hand with benefits, but also tradeoffs and 
tensions in others. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: x) This means that while there might be some 
democracies which fulfil less dimensions than others, e.g. defective democracies (political 
rights are limited; elected leaders are constrained by the influence of powerful groups; civil 
rights and the rule of law are not guaranteed) or delegative democracies (elected officials do 
not respect the citizens’ preferences, do not respect the rule of law or are not checked by other 
agencies of government), it is impossible to identify one framework that would be “right and 
true for all societies”. (ibid. xi-xii) Nevertheless, even with this in mind, it can be said that the 
dimensions are interrelated in such a way that, if one or more dimensions remain extremely 
weak, the others will be difficult to uphold as well. (ibid. xxxi) The better balanced the 
dimensions are, the closer a democracy is of being high-quality. 
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When analysing the level of democratic quality in a case study (as will be performed in part 
V) it is not only helpful but also necessary to include contextual factors such as the 
socioeconomic context, legacies from previous regimes, the institutional design, and 
especially in recently democratised states the mode of transition that led to the present 
condition. (Diamond & Morlino 2005: xxxvii)  
 
3. Explanations for Democratisation 
 
Although the struggle for democratisation is mostly accepted as „normal“ and desirable 
nowadays, the implementation of democracy not only in the developing countries, but also in 
Europe and the “West” is a quite recent phenomenon, especially in relation to human history.  
The prerequisite for democracy to become a viable possibility was the emergence and 
consolidation of state-building and nation-building, beginning in the 17th and 18th centuries 
respectively.1 The Treaty of Westphalia, the French Revolution and the threat of Napoleonic 
domination intensified the process of state nation-building, which was meant to bind the 
population within the territories together, and thereby strengthen the borders that were still 
somewhat unstable in the emerging states. The high point of nation-building, according to 
Linz and Stepan (1996) was reached with the peace treaties after World War I, and the 
proclamation of the principle of self-determination by U.S. President Woodrow Wilson in 
1918. The Second World War and later the Cold War eventually asserted the supremacy of 
democracy after the defeat of Fascism and Communism.  
The proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 and the adoption of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966, in force since 1976) 
represented the point of departure for the increasing importance of rights and the ensuing 
public relations crisis of regimes that did not respect them. As democracy proved to be the 
form of government that best upheld human, civil and political rights, its rising popularity 
further enlarged the discussion whether to include economic and social rights as well in the 
concept of democracy or not. 
 
Huntington famously explained the emergence of democracy across the globe with a wave 
model (Huntington 1991; Seligson (1987) used the metaphor of a pendulum); democracies did 
                                                 
1 As Linz and Stepan (1996: pp. 20 et seq.) point out, these two processes are not identical, and should be 
considered and analysed separately; even today, not all states overlap with nations, and not all nations have a 
state of their own. Furthermore, there are still disputes and conflicts (including in Europe) about nationality, 
stateness and autonomy, although only few state borders have been changed in the last decades. 
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not surprisingly loom independently and unconnectedly from nowhere, but in groups, or 
waves, which bore similar explanations for their emergence. The path of democratisation 
cannot be described as linear, as while an increasing number of states became democratic, 
other formerly democratic collapsed and experienced renewed phases of authoritarianism.  
The first wave of democratic expansion took place from the beginning of the 19th century into 
the middle of the 1920s (1828-1926), induced by the expansion of capitalism, the 
emancipation and rise of social classes which demanded popular rule and a socialisation of 
the economy, and the slow emergence of global markets. Capitalism, however, was not yet 
seen as mandatory for democracy, as Socialist concepts of democracy also emerged and 
enjoyed popularity. This wave was “broken” by the rise of Fascism in Europe, and a wave of 
totalitarianism and authoritarianism would last until the end of the Second World War 
(reverse wave from 1922-42).  
The second wave followed the end of the Second World War and the victory of the Allies 
over the Axis of powers (1943-1962). Democratisation in Central Europe and Japan was 
largely orchestrated by the victors, and in Latin America some experiments in democracy 
were started. The breakdown of the colonial powers and independence of the colonies in 
Africa also saw democracies emerging in the newly created states, although they were mostly 
characterised by instability, and were primarily formalistic. However, by the beginning of the 
1960s and 1970s many of the developing countries, including Latin America, were again 
ruled by authoritarian regimes, thus bringing the second wave to an end (reverse wave from 
1958-75).  
The beginning of the third wave finally was identified in the middle of the 1970s, with the 
democratisation of Southern Europe (Portugal, Greece and Spain), followed by the breakdown 
of the authoritarian regimes in Latin America (including Chile) in the 1980s, and culminating 
with the dismemberment of the Soviet Union and the ensuing democratisation of Eastern and 
Central Europe and of some states in Africa. In Asia, Taiwan and South Korea emerged from 
authoritarian rule, and democratic movements developed in other countries as well 
(Philippines, China). Expectations of economic performance and better living standards had 
been disappointed by the authoritarian regimes, which were not able to counteract the 
economic crises of the 1970s and 1980s. In many countries, furthermore, the liberalisation of 
the Catholic Church had a great positive influence on democratisation movements, as well as 
the pro-democracy shift in US foreign policy (as opposed to supporting any regime that would 
counteract Communism). (Huntington 1991; Grugel 2002: 34, 43; Baloyra 1987: 2) The end 
of the Cold War and the defeat of Communism led Fukuyama to perceive the ‘end of history’ 
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altogether, as the West, and with it capitalism and democracy (the ‘free’ world) had clearly 
and definitely prevailed over all other alternatives, especially Socialism and Communism (the 
main antagonists). With the end of the competition between ideologies, history as well had 
found its conclusion. (Grugel 2002: 2, 34) Globalisation thus became an important factor in 
the explanation of democratisations, as the democratising countries in each wave were seen as 
having interacted and influenced each other on three different levels: culturally (through the 
growth of a global communications network), economically (through the propagation of the 
global capitalist economic order), and politically (with the creation of global governance 
institutions), even if to a minimal extent. (ibid. 2, 7-8, 34, 121-122) 
Although the grouping of cases in phases (or waves) seems to be able to explain some 
common contextual international causes of democratisation, upon a closer look it becomes 
clear that these were not the essential or only causes (in spite of the impact of globalisation, 
national factors still play the overwhelming role in democratisation), that the “waves” are not 
as clear-cut as it might suggest, often overlapping, and that the understanding of democracy 
used as a reference was very narrow and formalistic, allowing for states with quite 
authoritative features to be considered as democratic, just because they presented relatively 
clean elections (the ‘electoralist fallacy’ (Linz & Stepan 1996: 4)). (Grugel 2002: 1, 32-37) In 
order to better understand the processes and outcomes of the “waves”, the balance of several 
factors besides the formal ones would be more yielding: “(1) favourable sociohistorical 
circumstances, (2) the support and encouragement of external actors, (3) the agreement of key 
elites on the desirability of democracy, and (4) the availability of alternative leadership 
committed to democratic politics.” (Baloyra 1987: 2) 
 
The spread of democracy entailed a discussion about types of democracy, as the spread of the 
liberal democratic model of the West was questioned and criticised for its limitations and bias 
by civil society, scholars and politicians in the developing countries as well as in the West. 
Furthermore, the renewed strong connection between capitalism and democracy was 
challenged by those who criticised the inequality of the emerging global economy, and did not 
accept that the Western model was the only possible model of democracy. (Grugel 2002: 3; 8) 
These criticisms have been repeatedly reinforced by decisions of governance institutions to 
favour and support countries according to other than democratic values, ignoring the 
superficiality or even absence of democracy. (ibid. 8) Furthermore, the consolidation of 
democracy has been hindered or hampered in some cases by the insistence on the 
development of a liberal market by international governance institutions, subverting the 
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stability of these countries. (ibid. 9, 119-120) “Capitalist development, globally and 
nationally, may create opportunities for democratisation but it also generates structural 
inequality, which operates as a barrier to the realisation of democracy.” (Grugel 2002: 10) 
 
4. Theories of Democratisation 
 
The study of democratisation has delivered several different theories over time, which broadly 
differed in the breadth, intensity and perspective of their interpretations of why and how 
democracies emerge. The realisation that there are not only different paths, but that quite 
different circumstances can lead to democratisation, was not developed until the 1980s. 
(Grugel 2002: 2)  
The initial theories which appeared in the 1970s and 1980s mostly used a quite minimalist 
version of democracy, and concentrated mainly on the process undergone from non-
democracy to democracy. The main aim was to identify the paths and mechanisms that lead to 
democratisation. Stepan (1986) was one of the pioneers in establishing different paths to 
democracy, depending on several factors such as whether the democratisation was externally 
or internally induced, who the main actors were, the importance of ideology etc. (cf. Grugel 
2002: 3-4) In 1996, Linz & Stepan analysed the implications of different regime types for 
transitions and consolidation, introducing, besides totalitarianism and authoritarianism, also 
post-totalitarianism and sultanism (Linz & Stepan 1996: 55 et seq.; Linz 2000) It was only in 
the 1990s that theories of democratisation shifted their focus from transition to consolidation, 
i.e. not halting at the conclusion that a given country was finally democratic (by whatever 
criteria used), but continuing to investigate the nature and quality of that democracy. (Grugel 
2002: 3; Diamond & Morlino 2005: ix) The theories no longer restricted themselves to 
structure and agency, but also to the role of political culture, political economy and 
institutionalism in the consolidation phase. (Grugel 2002: 3-4) The (formal) concept of 
democratisation as the “holding of clean elections and the introduction of basic norms [...] that 
make free elections possible” (ibid. 5) was complemented by an inclusion of liberal individual 
rights and also citizenship rights, not just de jure but de facto (substantive democratisation). 
(ibid. 5) The inclusion of individual and citizenship rights entailed a debate on the impact and 
necessity of socioeconomic equality for democracy and a successful consolidation (for 
thresholds of economic and sociocultural development for democracy to emerge, see Seligson 
1987: 7). While some scholars argued against a concept that risked to be excessive and 
therefore less workable, and questioned the necessity of the economic with the socio-political 
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dimension, others insisted on the impact of economic (in-)equality on democracy itself, and 
that ignoring this relationship implicated an incomplete consideration of consolidation. 
(Grugel 2002: 5) 
 
Three theories significantly influenced the debate on democratisation, namely modernisation 
theory and historical sociology, both concentrating on structuralist explanations of 
democratisation, and transition theory, integrating an agency approach to the matter. (Grugel 
2002: 46) 
 
Modernisation theory emphasised the link between democratisation and globalisation, and 
was broadly influenced by Lipset in the early 1960s. For modernisationists, democracy was 
strongly connected to modernisation and progress, which could be measured by subsequent 
benchmarks valid for all states. According to Walt Rostow, the stages leading from 
traditionalism to modernity were “the traditional society; the pre-take-off society; take-off; the 
road to maturity; and the mass consumption society.” (cf. Grugel 2002: 48) Consequently, 
Western Europe and the US were identified at the highest levels of democratisation and 
modernisation, having passed all the phases and processes which other states had yet to 
achieve. Democracy was thus equated with economic development and the establishment of 
capitalism. The development of a capitalist globalised market was seen as the only possibility 
for producing wealth, which would eventually trickle down and thereby benefit the masses as 
well. An educated middle class would then emerge and become strong, and class conflict 
would automatically become redundant. Non-democratic states would do best in following the 
example of the more advanced societies; at the end of that process all states would be modern 
and democratic, and thus quite similar. (ibid. 47)  
The shortcomings of this theory include its oversimplification of the relationship between 
capitalism and democracy, which has been shown not to be as linear as modernisationists 
suggested (Linz 2000: 57); markets can be propitious, but also harmful to democracy. The 
correlation of wealth, education and democracy led Lipset to deduce that capitalism led to 
democracy. Furthermore, the perspective on the developing countries as delayed students and 
followers of the already far advanced West is ethnocentric, ahistorical and constricting, 
leaving almost no room for diverging forms of democracy not found in contemporary Western 
societies and ignoring the influence of changing conditions. (ibid. 49-50) Another criticism 
arises from modernisationists’ overemphasis on structures, leaving human agents of action 
and even politics out. (Grugel 2002: 49) 
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Today, modernisation theory has been restated by scholars, either with a restriction to 
developing states (Leftwich, claiming that in the long run economic development does 
produce democracy), or emphasising the role of political culture and of a dynamic civil 
society in the consolidation of democracies (Diamond). (ibid. 50) 
 
Historical sociology is also a structuralist approach to democratisation (indeed often called 
“structuralism”) and had its roots in the emergence of behaviouralism in the 1960s and the re-
introduction and emphasis on the state in political science. In contrast to modernisation 
theory, structuralists concentrated on explaining why democratisation happened the way it 
did, and not in predicting outcomes. The state advances to an important actor, which, 
however, is seen in a close relationship with class; collective actors are thus considered in 
explanations of democratisation. (Grugel 2002: 51-52) 
 
“Structuralists trace the transformation of the state through class conflict over time, in order to explain 
how democracy […] has sometimes emerged. […] contains elements of a political economy of 
democratization in that it emphasizes how changes in the economy – for example the expansion of 
production for the market – lead to social or class conflict, although economic change is not, on its 
own, regarded as determining political outcomes. […] historical sociology identifies factors that are 
distinctive to particular cases.” (ibid. 52) 
 
An important contribution to historical sociology was Moore’s study of political change in a 
comparative case study of eight countries. He identified that the interactions between the 
farmerry, the landed upper class and the bourgeoisie considerably shaped the outcomes of 
democratisation, with “bourgeois revolution leading to capitalism and democracy; revolution 
from above leading to industrialisation and fascism; and revolution from below leading to 
communism.” (ibid. 52-53) The emphasis was later enlarged to broader questions of social 
power, and Rueschmeyer, Stephens and Stephens eventually identified three power structures: 
relative class power, the role of the state and the impact of transnational power structures. 
Structuralists accepted the impact of capitalism on the state, but not in the same way as 
modernisationists. Instead, they argued that what made democratisation viable were the 
subordinated classes’ demands for reforms of the capitalist state, and the state’s progressive 
reaction to them. (ibid. 53-54) 
In spite of its merits in diachronic comparisons of diverse countries and regions, historical 
sociology was criticised for its overly structuralist view of democratisation and the omission 
of individual agency, with its overemphasis on collective actors (classes and the state) and 
structures. (ibid. 55)  
For the analysis of democratic consolidation historical sociology brings in the important 
acceptance of conflict as an integrated element of democracy, and also possible structural 
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explanations (economic, social, and global) for unsuccessful or partial democratisations. (ibid. 
56) 
 
Transition studies (also known as agency approach) concentrate on the role of individual 
actors who shape democratisation and democracy through their conscious actions, a degree of 
luck and their willingness to compromise. In contrast to the structuralist theories discussed 
earlier, transition studies do not reduce democratisation to a “natural” process when certain 
structural conditions are in place (economy, development; interaction between classes and the 
state, history). (Grugel 2002: 56-57) The emphasis is instead placed on elites’ decisions to 
commit to democracy (Baloyra 1987: 38). Rustow in his critique of modernisation showed 
that structural conditions are not crucial; instead, he identified three different stages which 
democratisation entails: “a preparatory phase, a decision phase, in which the choices and 
negotiations of ‘a small circle of leaders’ play a particularly crucial role (Rustow 1970: 356), 
and a habituation phase in which citizens and leaders fully adapt to the new system. These 
stages were later transformed into liberalisation, transition and consolidation.” (Grugel 2002: 
57) Thus, the negotiations between (political) elites and the incumbent leaders are seen as 
decisive for democratisation, as Schmitter, O’Donnel and Whiteheat have shown. “They 
concluded that skilful leadership, aided by luck, was the key to outcomes which lead to the 
establishment of democratic procedures for government.” (ibid. 57-58) This approach for the 
first time did not stipulate economic development as a precondition for democracy, thus 
allowing for optimism in developing countries, as democratisation became more tangible 
from the agency perspective. (ibid. 62-63)  
Rational choice theories also influenced the transition approach, as Przeworski advocated that 
the elites’ decision on democratisation depended on the alternatives available, as they would 
opt for the most preferable one for them according to their cost-benefit calculations. (ibid. 58-
59) However, as Przeworski would later admit, the elite pacts did not guarantee for broad 
political inclusion of the masses, and stability might be installed to the cost of more 
substantive democratisation (thus based on a quite narrow and elitist concept of democracy). 
Furthermore, the concentration on the elites completely ignored or downplayed the influence 
and role of civil society in democratisation in each phase (including in unsuccessful 
democratisations). (ibid. 59-61) 
In spite of its shortcoming, transition theory has largely contributed to the renewed focus on 
political debate and negotiations, and the approach that democratisation does not “happen” 
and conclude from one moment to the next (e.g. when free and competitive elections are 
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held), but instead spreads out over three stages (liberalisation, transition and consolidation), 
has been very fruitful in combination with more substantive understandings of democracy 
(including an analysis of socio-economic and cultural change as well). (ibid. 63) 
 
5. Transition to Democracy 
 
According to Morlino, (1987: 54-55) transition from an authoritarian regime does not 
necessarily entail an ideal democracy: He identifies different possible outcomes, including a 
limited democracy (political rights are partially constrained or limited), a protected 
democracy (the military’s influence and control over the civilian elites lingers, as in the case 
of Chile after the transition) and an institutional hybrid (elites and institutions retain their 
roles, some extent of change and opening). In spite of having passed the mark from 
authoritarianism to democracy, these forms are still weak consolidations or incomplete 
democratisations, and therefore more liable to recidivism if the problems are not tackled. 
(Baloyra 1987: 19)  
 
“A democratic transition is complete when sufficient agreement has been reached about political procedures to 
produce an elected government, when a government comes to power that is the direct result of a free and popular 
vote, when this government de facto has the authority to generate new policies, and when the executive, 
legislative and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not have to share power with other bodies 
de jure.” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 3) 
 
[…] working definition of a consolidated democracy […]: 
- Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, 
economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their 
objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede 
from the state. 
- Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the 
belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life 
in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less 
isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
- Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces 
alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of 
conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. 
(ibid. 5-6) 
 
This clearly shows that the transition process itself and the outcomes of the negotiation in this 
phase can have very significant influence on the democratic regime to follow. In spite of some 
apparent similarities between cases of democratisation, the legacies of the past, the strength 
and leeway of the opposition, and the perceptions and choices of elites differ from case to 
case, making superficially similar cases lead to different outcomes. (Baloyra 1987: 9) This is 
why, despite all the research and comparative studies made in this field, it is still impossible 
 22 
to predict the development of democratisations or to identify an ideal one which would be 
applicable internationally. (Grugel 2002: 10) 
As has been shown, the sheer holding of free and fair elections, the re-emergence of parties, 
and the creation of formally democratic institutions are not enough for a substantive 
understanding of democracy (ibid. 72-73). For transitions this means that the process is not 
completed until civil society and culture (and possibly also the economy) are pervaded with 
democratisation as well. (ibid. 30-31) 
 
Baloyra (1987: 10-12) describes the process of regime transition in five stages: Deterioration 
(which might be followed by re-equilibration), breakdown, installation, implementation and 
inauguration. In the first stage, deterioration, the regime is increasingly unable to cope with 
political and economic issues (security and prosperity) and can no longer maintain its 
“legitimacy” by force or through effectiveness and efficacy. The containment of the 
opposition and civil society may fail, as elites (on both sides) revise their preferences, and 
protests (national, but also international) get out of hand. (Grugel 2002: 98) Although they 
cannot suffice on their own, economic and political (and sometimes military) pressure from 
abroad can contribute to the outcome of the deterioration; in the light of an ever more 
democratisation- and human rights-friendly global environment, this influence has tended to 
beneficiate the democratisation struggles in recent years (after subverting them in many cases 
in the past). (Linz & Stepan 1996: 74-75) Most authoritarian regimes have tried to avert a 
breakdown either by increasing repression or by means of liberalisation measures, which 
include more autonomy for civil society organisations, the introduction of habeas corpus, the 
symbolic release of political prisoners, social welfare policies and more tolerance for 
opposition. (ibid. 3)  
If a regime is not able to regain its balance (re-equilibration), a breakdown is the inevitable 
consequence, marking the end of the nature of the regime. It is also possible, albeit less 
common, that a breakdown is not preceded by deterioration, for instance when the head of 
state suddenly dies or another striking event unpredictably initiates the downfall of the 
regime. However, in the case of military authoritarian regimes, the most common form of 
breakdown is extrication. An aperturist group within the military may prevail in their decision 
that a withdrawal from government (military-as-government) would be best for the military-
as-institution. (ibid. 59-67; Morlino 1987: 73) The factors leading to this assessment are 
various, ranging from the perception of a strong opposition, the (un-) availability of better 
alternatives (cost-benefit calculus), the performance of the economy and the ensuing pattern 
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of social cleavages and mobilisation against the regime, to the presence of antagonist actors to 
the military. (Baloyra 1987: 40-41) It would be a fallacy, however, to assume that the causes 
must immediately precede the breakdown; they might be more or less latently present 
throughout some period of time, and not be precipitated until an event or action occurs which 
leads to the collapse. (ibid. 42-44) The outcome of the breakdown can take the form either of 
a reforma (not violent, negotiated and agreed by the incumbents and the opposition; high level 
of continuity) or of a ruptura (mostly violent, opposition as the main actor, strong 
discontinuity). (Morlino 1987: 62-63) 
Installation follows the breakdown, with a new government taking over, usually in order to 
prepare the institutional and legal changes necessary for democratisation. Before the process 
is complete, however, there is a very decisive stage of implementation (“more a “muddling 
through” than an epic story” (Baloyra 1987: 12)), in which the protagonists position 
themselves and try to implement and negotiate the changes to be carried out and the roles to 
be played; actors can be either obstructionists or aperturists, i.e. either resist or endorse far-
reaching change and reform.  
Ideally, aperturists will eventually assert themselves (“endgame”), and finally the last stage of 
inauguration is reached, entailing “[…] the crystallization of a pattern of relations among 
society, political community, government and state that conforms to the democratic blueprint 
and results from the installation of a government committed to democratization” (ibid. 12).  
 
In the installation and implementation stages, there are some crucial aspects that need to be 
high on the agenda (cf. Baloyra 1987: 13; Grugel 2002: 68-69; Linz & Stepan 1996: 9-14): 
the restoration of the rule of law, a constitutional revision, the re-emergence of a multi-party 
system, the electoral process, and the transfer of power. None of these measures are to be 
understood in narrow terms. The first point, concerning the rule of law, demands that the 
government itself acts only within the limits of the law, and that the judiciary is entrusted and 
given competences in the overseeing of the rule of law and the punishment or amnesty for 
infringements and human rights violations. This presupposes that the territorial integrity is not 
challenged, that the state actually holds the monopoly of the use of force, and that there is an 
impartial and efficient bureaucracy available (Linz & Stepan 1996: 11). The constitutional 
revision reflects the change of the nature of the regime, as the state, the economic model, the 
representation and the government model must be reviewed and reformed in order to fit the 
demands and interests of a democratic regime. If the constitution is not at least reviewed 
during the transition, it is almost inevitable that the emerging democracy will be constrained 
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by authoritarian features and legacies enshrined in it. The relationship between and limits of 
the legislative, the executive and judicative powers need to be balanced for the new 
governments to be legitimate and accountable. Reforms should also envisage important 
bodies of the state which are not legitimised through elections, namely the bureaucracy, the 
police, the judicial system, and the security forces. (Grugel 2002: 76) The military-civilian 
relationship is of utmost importance here. 
The (re-)emergence of a multi-party system is fundamental in order for voters to have 
different alternatives among which to choose, and for the sake of vertical and horizontal 
accountability, as discussed above. However, the re-emergence of parties which already 
existed before the authoritarian regime had come to power can be a blessing and a problem at 
the same time. It is certainly easier for parties to reorganise when they already had strong 
structures before, and ideally at least some of the previous leaders and actors might be able to 
step up again or let younger cadres profit from their experience. Furthermore, the legitimacy 
and belief in the political system might be accepted with less reluctance in view of the 
tradition. On the other hand, parties (and party cleavages) may re-emerge that do not reflect 
the contemporary interests and preferences any more, leading to an offer of alternatives that 
does not correspond to the demands of citizens. As a result, the party constellations that 
allowed for democracy to collapse in the first place might be reproduced, thus not reflecting 
an important “learning process”. (Morlino 1987: 66) Furthermore, the re-instalment of 
traditional political elites could reproduce the social cleavages that preceded authoritarianism, 
and thus resume the alienation from civil society. The result would then be “a kind of hyper-
electoralism, in which the parties engage in debate with each other, with society increasingly 
disconnected from political events.” (Grugel 2002: 74-75) 
The fourth point is important with a view to the inauguration stage, as the electoral process 
needs to be agreed upon, establishing the statute, the timetable to be observed, and the 
measures to be taken in order to secure the validity, legitimacy (representativeness) and 
efficacy of the elections. Finally, the transfer of power must be agreed upon and adhered to, 
establishing the timing and procedures.  
A further aspect during the installation and implementation phases after the breakdown of an 
authoritarian regime is the role and influence the military insists on keeping throughout the 
process. The military’s readiness to extricate mostly does not automatically entail the 
complete withdrawal from politics. The first most manifest danger of this refusal to withdraw 
is the guarantee of the physical integrity of voters in the first elections taking place after the 
breakdown. (Baloyra 1987: 46) This hurdle being taken, constitutional and institutional 
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legacies may hinder the democratisation process and the overcoming of authoritarian enclaves 
of influence and power. Where severe human rights violations during the authoritarian regime 
need to be addressed, enforced amnesties may constitute serious problems for the 
reconciliation process. (Baloyra 1987: 47) If these complications are not tackled properly 
during the installation and implementation phases, or within a reasonable timeframe, the new 
democratically legitimated governments may be confronted with dwindling support for 
democracy as such, a reaction which can be exacerbated in the context of economic crises. 
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II Historical Oversight Part 1: 1960s – 1970 
 
 
In order to understand the development towards the downfall of democracy in Chile, it is 
imperative to know the circumstances leading to the polarisation of society and the political 
system, beginning from the early 1960s.  
 
On a first sight, Chile made the impression of being a model of a functioning, democratic 
multi-party system, enjoying broad acceptance for its decision-making processes, structures 
and institutions, and looking back at a long constitutional tradition (with a Constitution dating 
from 1925). (Klein 2993: 2-3) Although the inclusion and democratisation process was 
enhanced during the 1960s, the process of integration of all social groups (including rural and 
urban groups) into the political process through vote was not accomplished until 1970.  
 
The consequence of the industrialisation efforts was not the development of an “innovative 
and aggressive middle class” (ibid. 29), but rather a strengthening of the ties between the state 
and the economy: Chile became one of the Latin American countries with the strongest state 
leading investor long before the election of Socialist Salvador Allende as president in 1970, 
second only to Cuba. The role of the state became predominant in the economy, making effort 
to protect and implement its interests a priority. Access and connections to the state became 
imperative for consideration in employment, distribution, entitlements and receivables, again 
strengthening the significance of the state’s role. (ibid. 29-30) 
 
An important barrier to general participation was the interdiction of rural trade union 
formation until 1967; those social sectors best interacting with the state held the primacy of 
interests (in this case cheap labour and commodities). In return, the state, in search of political 
support, made effort in obtaining the financiero’s, merchant’s, middle classes’ and rural 
oligarchy’s benevolence, deferring necessary reforms which could disgruntle the land owners, 
and suppressing any uprising attempts (strikes, land occupations). (ibid. 30) 
The political parties reflected the close relationship between state and the privileged classes. 
Besides the all-encompassing parties, there was not much room for other autonomous forms 
of social organisation. Through their monopolistic role as mediators between society and the 
state, it was consequentially mandatory to gain access to a party in order to assert or even 
articulate one’s interests and enjoy privileges as well. The political parties therefore 
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permeated all fields of society (from governmental agencies to trade unions, neighbour’s 
unions to schools). (Valenzuela 1978: 3; Klein 1933: 31-32) 
The state’s interests can thus be characterised as overlapping with the privileged classes’. A 
rise in economic influence of the state simultaneously meant an increase in access for these 
actors. It was in their interest to control the access to the state itself, reproducing their own 
influence and upholding the inclusion and exclusion respectively of certain social classes. The 
overlap was consolidated through the interweavement of bureaucrats and special interest 
groups in the decision-making process. (Klein 1993: 31-33) 
 
By the mid-20th century the competition for political influence and participation became more 
intense, and the interests represented started increasingly differing ideologically and 
economically. An array of political parties surged, partly through split-off from already 
established parties, mergers or as start-ups, making the achievement of an electoral majority 
almost impossible for any of them. By the mid-1960s for the first time, the vote could be 
evenly split between the three ideological camps: Left, Right and Centre. (Klein 1993: 32-33) 
As a matter of course, coalitions were necessary in order to form a government, leading to 
compromises not only between the collaborating parties, but also with the opposition parties. 
This state of constant compromise seeking and institutional conflict solving was known as 
Estado de compromiso (state of compromise) and was characteristic of the Chilean political 
system until 1970. (ibid. 33)  
 
The attenuation of this tradition of compromise and coalition seeking began being felt during 
the presidency of Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez (1958-1964), “[…] da die Parteien doktrinärer, 
kompromißloser, exklusiver und wesentlich feindlicher einander gegenüber eingestellt 
wurden.“ (Allan, Angel: Some Problems in the Interpretation of Recent Chilean History, in: 
Bulletin of Latin American Research 7 (1988) 1, 93, quoted in Klein 1993: 38) The political 
parties spectrum underwent some considerable changes: The Partido Demócrata Cristiano 
(PDC, Christian Democratic Party) founded in 1957 rose to the most influential party, the 
Partido Socialista (PS) united with the Partido Comunista (PC, Communist Party) and some 
other smaller parties to the Frente de Acción Popular (FRAP, United Popular Action Front, 
later Unión Popular (UP, Popular Unity)), and a new right-wing party, the Partido -acional 
(PN, National Party) was founded in 1966. Amidst the rather paralysing (not dynamic), elitist 
and conservative right wing parties, the new centrist movement, the PDC, soon achieved 
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electoral success, its main endeavour being a reform of the rural structures, which were seen 
as the main impediment to economic development. (Klein 1993: 37-41) 
 
The traditional link between the Conservative Party and the Catholic Church had been 
weakened in part through the secularisation of society in 1925 (though Chile remained a 
predominantly Catholic country), but especially through the new orientation of the Church 
towards social reform after the Second Vatican Council. (Collier & Sater 1996: 305-308) 
Under these conditions, the PDC found a broad support by the Church from the beginning of 
the 1960s for its intended reforms, though its success should definitely not be reduced to this 
aspect (as the party itself claimed to be strictly non-confessional). (ibid. 308) One of the big 
undertakings of the PDC was to create networks of support in areas never before organised 
nor mobilised: the countryside, the universities, the poor. Neighbourhood committees, 
mother’s groups and youth clubs emerged in the shanty towns in Santiago, creating new 
bridges to an electorate previously neglected by the parties. 
Through its combination of capitalist and socialist elements in its programme, the PDC 
claimed that a “communitarian” society could transcend the ideological divide – though their 
concrete conception of this society form was never fixed, allowing for different interpretations 
and broad identification with the programme. (Collier & Sater 1996: 306-307; del Campo 
2002: 16) The combination of democratic values and social reform was described as a 
“Revolución en Libertad” (Revolution in Liberty), attracting moderate left and right wing 
voters alike. (Collier & Sater 1996: 307) 
On September 4th 1964, the PDC candidate Eduardo Frei Montalva won the presidency 
elections (56.08%), marking the peak of the party’s rise since its foundation. Striving to 
forestall a victory of the leftist candidate Salvador Allende Gossens (FRAP) – in order to 
avoid the worst case –, the U.S. had joined the Partido Liberal (Liberal Party) and the Partido 
Conservador Unido (United Conservative Party) in their support for Frei. (del Campo 2002: 
16; Klein 1993: 42) Contrary to the expectations (and political tradition), the PDC decided to 
govern alone after its electoral victory, without a coalition. Even the Right, which had 
supported Frei and thereby enabled his victory, could not count on its interests being 
considered (especially regarding agrarian reform). This perceived arrogance and hubris 
hardened the political divide, inducing a change in attitudes of the political parties. The time 
for compromise and deals seemed to come to an end, the struggle for power becoming more 
pronounced, leading to increasing polarisation. (Collier & Sater 1996: 311, 324; Klein 1993: 
41-44) 
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Taking his election pledges seriously, Frei went about introducing some extensive reforms, 
which included the nationalisation of copper, the promoción popular (popular advancement), 
rural reform, education (new schools, alphabetisation, increase in expenditure) and welfare 
(improvements in medical care, new hospitals). (del Campo 2002: 16; Collier & Sater 1996: 
311-312)  
Public expenditure almost doubling through the costly social reforms, the Frei government 
soon looked for the most important sector of Chile’s economy for new revenues: the copper 
industry. Most of Chile’s industry and manufacture was owned by foreign, mainly US 
investors, who held not only a monopoly of revenues, but also of technological know-how. 
The model of import substitution was to be complemented by the partial nationalisation of the 
most important industries, such as copper and saltpetre, reducing Chile’s dependency on 
foreign investors and taking the production (and revenues) into its own hands. Contrarily to 
the Left, who demanded an outright nationalisation, and not wanting to take the US interests 
on, the government tried to induce a peaceful transition in form of chilenización 
(“chilenisation”). In exchange for tax concessions, the Chilean state obtained a 51 percent 
holding of the companies (the most influential ones being Kennecott and Anaconda) and 
expected investment and provision interworking - which, however, as noted by Dieter Nohlen, 
was mostly disadvantageous for the Chilean part. (del Campo 2002: 16-17; Collier & Sater 
315)  
 
In addition to the chilenización of the industry, the PDC government introduced a far-
reaching agrarian reform, at the same time boosting the emerging rural trade unions. Large 
estate and firms were to be redistributed and split into newly created asentamientos 
(settlements) run by farmer cooperatives. (del Campo 2002: 17) New federations were 
created, labour laws enforcement was seen to and the minimum wage for farmers was raised 
to the urban level for the first time in Chilean history. (Collier & Sater 1996: 313) By the end 
of Frei’s period, around 1,300 haciendas (farms, mainly inefficiently run ones) had been 
expropriated and redistributed as asentamientos, worked by socios (associates) of elected 
farmer committees. Day-labourers and casual workers, however, were denied socio status, 
seeing a new privileged class replacing the former landlords. (ibid. 314) The constitutional 
reform and agrarian reform bills necessary for these measures met great resistance by the 
Right in Congress, but were eventually signed in July 1967. They ruled that all farms over 80 
“basic hectares” were “[…] liable to expropriation, the owners being entitled to retain an 80-
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hectare “reserve” and to compensation in the form of a small cash payment and long-term 
government bonds.” (ibid. 313-314)  
 
The promoción popular was launched to build up and foster local networks, mobilising and 
organising previously unattended segments of society. Juntas de vecinos (neighbours’ 
associations), centros de madres (mother groups), parents’ groups, youth clubs and sports 
associations were only some of the many forms the promoción took. (Collier & Sater 1996: 
311) Traditionally claiming to represent the “unprivileged”, the Left saw its passive clientele 
increasingly being usurped by the PDC. As a countermeasure, the Left made its inroad into 
the shanty towns and settlements, and especially began encouraging the seizure of urban and 
rural land, as a speedier alternative to land reforms. Enticed by the more radical wing of the 
Left, land tomas (seizures) had become a frequent and problematic occurrence by the end of 
Frei’s period, further enraging the Right, which was increasingly cut off its privileges. (ibid. 
312-314; Klein 1993: 43) The envisaged rural mobilisation got out of the PDC’s control and 
became an action dominated by the Left. 
 
Benefiting from the propitious development in the international market, especially thanks to 
the adaptation of the copper price to the soaring London Metal Exchange levels (nearly 
double the price American companies accepted so far), Chile saw an initial economic success, 
a considerable improvement of life quality of the majority of the population and a rise in 
agricultural output, leading to higher tax revenues. (Collier & Sater 1996: 315-320; Klein 
1993: 42-43) However, the nationalisation of the capital industry and the reforms could not 
solve the problem of ever rising foreign debt, inflation and decline of GDP in the medium 
term. New taxes were introduced in order to tackle the growing demand originating from the 
reforms: as private investors drew back, the state took over their part, further extending and 
intensifying its interventionist role in the economy. The wage rises and the empowered trade 
unions however did not halt in the bounds the government had foreseen, constantly increasing 
their demands (striking when deemed necessary), and thereby making a balanced policy more 
difficult. (Collier & Sater 1996: 317-319)  
 
In the face of disillusionment from the initial hopes, the reforms eventually nearly grinded to 
a halt. Leftists as well as rightists (for different reasons: the former because the reforms were 
not far-reaching enough, the latter because they completely opposed any reform at all which 
would endanger their clientelistic structures) successfully delayed the enacting of the agrarian 
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reform until 1967, further contributing to the radicalisation of the masses. (Klein 1993: 43) In 
addition to a disgruntled conservative electorate, which was directly afflicted by the 
expropriation and the rising influence of labour unions, the return to conventional economic 
measures also disgruntled the leftist, for whom the reforms were not sufficiently far-reaching. 
Taking the reforms to a higher level, the surge of tomas (seizures) encouraged by the Left by 
the late 1960s constituted a considerable challenge for the Frei government. The Centrist 
movement saw its overall support dwindle. As by 1970 about one-quarter of the Chilean 
industrial capital was still in foreign hands, the Left also intensified their demand for a more 
radical and thorough nationalisation, as well as the abolition of the privileges foreign firms 
still enjoyed. (Collier & Sater 1996: 318; del Campo 2002: 18) 
 
Meanwhile, even within the PDC different factions appeared, insisting on different 
approaches and measures to be imposed by Frei, thereby straining the relations within the 
party itself. The appearance of a unified and coherent PDC which had control if not over the 
economy and trade unions, at least of its own members, was disturbed. From 1967 through 
1968 student rebellions at the universities became recurrent, reflecting the rising dispute 
between the political parties, but also the impact of the Cuban Revolution and the Bolivian 
guerrilla episode of 1967 (in the course of which Ernesto “Che” Guevara was killed). (Collier 
& Sater 1996: 322-323) 
 
As the electorate re-polarised in its Left and Right divide, the parties reorganised themselves 
in preparation for the upcoming presidential elections in 1970. The Right repositioned itself in 
the Partido -acional (PN, formed by the Partido Liberal, Partido Conservador Unido and 
Acción -acional) and the fascist Patria y Libertad (Fatherland and Liberty).  
The Left saw the split-off of a radicalised revolutionary movement in 1965, the Movimiento 
de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR, Revolutionary Left Movement), which declared that the 
democratic means had failed and that armed struggle was the only way to rise to power 
(adopting anti-capitalist Guevarist views and by the end of 1960s accounting for several urban 
terrorism incidents such as bank robberies, aircraft hijackings and bomb attacks). (del Campo 
2002: 16; Collier & Sater 1996: 320-321, 324) The Partido Radical (Radical Party) joined the 
Partido Socialista, Partido Comunista, Movimiento de Acción Popular Unitario (MAPU, 
Popular Unitary Action Movement, a split-off from the PDC after a violent incident between 
Carabineros and some squatters), Partido de Izquierda Radical and the Acción Popular 
Independiente (Independent Popular Action) in the Unidad Popular (UP) coalition, sending 
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(for the third time) Salvador Allende Gossens into the run for president. It is important also to 
stress the development of a new faction within the Partido Socialista, which laid out the 
creation of a “revolutionary state” as its aim, and favoured a Marxist-Leninist intransigent 
approach. Allende as many other Socialists was not part of this faction, and instead held on to 
an electoral strategy to reach his aims. (Collier & Sater 1996: 320-321) 
While the Right wing parties saw the country falling apart among all the union tumults, 
economic crises and radicalised leftist movements, the Left was not content with the reforms 
in place, demanding a faster and more intensive transformation, parts of the Left approving 
the use of arms for this purpose. (ibid. 324) 
 
The presidential election of September 4th 1970 saw the three political camps sending separate 
candidates into the run. The PDC candidate Radomiro Tomic Romero, a former senator and 
Chilean ambassador in Washington from 1965 to 1968, pleaded for an alliance with the Left. 
The newly formed UP, however, was not interested in supporting another party’s candidate 
and designated, after short hesitation, Salvador Allende Gossens as its candidate. Allende had 
already run for presidency in1952 (attaining 5.44%), 1958 (28.91%) and in 1964 (38.92%). 
The majority of the UP agreed, however, that Allende was the best suited personality to be 
sent, and decided to support him yet a fourth time. (Collier & Sater 1996: 327; Codoceo 2007: 
22) 
The Partido Comunista nominated the poet and former senator Pablo Neruda; the MAPU 
chose the agronomist Jacques Chonchol Chait as their candidate. Chonchol however withdrew 
his candidacy in favour of Allende.  
Running as an independent, former president Jorge Alessandri Rodríguez was the hope of the 
Right for an electoral victory, reflecting the demands for law and order and an end to what 
they saw as demagoguery. The novel importance of television presence turned out to be a 
considerable disadvantage to the septuagenarian Alessandri. (Collier & Sater 1996: 327) 
 
The polls preceding the election indicated a clear victory for the independent Alessandri. The 
minor “campaigns of terror” led by the Right depicting a Communist dictatorship in the case 
that Allende should win, was thought to be enough to keep the Right ahead. (Collier & Sater 
1996: 328) The narrow margin of only 40,000 votes leading to Allende’s victory surprised 
and shocked the Right and the US alike: In the context of the ongoing Cold War, and the 
acrimonious efforts to keep Communism out of Latin America, the election of a Socialist 
president was not acceptable for the Republican President Richard Nixon.  
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Allende got 36.3%, ahead of Alessandri (34.9%) and Tomic (27.8%). As the relative majority 
was not overwhelming, it was necessary to get an endorsement by Congress for the victory to 
be made official. This had never posed a problem before, as Congress had traditionally 
endorsed every leading candidate. This time, however, the PDC insisted on Allende signing 
an Estatuto de Garantías Constitucionales (Statute of Constitutional Guarantees) before 
confirming him as the President. This measure reflects the profound distrust even the 
Centrists had of a Socialist president. (del Campo 2002: 18-19) Besides the mistrust the UP 
encountered in the opposition parties, it is important to stress again that it had not won the 
elections with a considerable majority:  
 
“Die Wahl des Marxisten Allende zum chilenischen Präsidenten war Resultat des -ichtzustandekommens einer 
mehrheitssichernden Koalition um das politische Zentrum und keinesfalls Ergebnis eines Linksdralles in der 
chilenischen Gesellschaft.” (Klein 1993: 45) 
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III Historical Oversight Part 2: 1970-1973 Unidad Popular 
 
 
1. The 1970 presidential election 
 
The 1970 presidential election had been regarded as fairly predictable, as surveys preceding 
the election had indicated a clear advantage for the conservative candidate Jorge Alessandri 
(see table below).  
 
Table 1. Voter survey on the candidate preference, January and May 1970, and election outcome 
Candidate 
January 1970  
survey 
May 1970 
survey 
September 1970 
election 
Jorge Alessandri 44.4% 36.1% 34.9% 
Salvador Allende 18.5% 25.6% 36.3% 
Radomiro Tomic 23.1% 30.8% 27.8% 
Undetermined/abstentions 14.0% 7.5% 16.5% 
Sources: Nohlen 1973: 123, 132 quoted in Bogdanovic 2008: 66, 70, 74; Collier/Sater 1996: 309 
 
Therefore, the reactions to the result were quite diverse, ranging from enthusiasm to horror. 
(Codoceo 2007: 21; Collier & Sater 1996: 330) However marginal Allende’s winning 
margin was, it does not come as a surprise when compared with other preceding elections: 
The fact that three instead of two political blocks were competing with separate candidates 
allowed for the Unidad Popular (UP) candidate to win, as the non-leftist voters were split up 
between the Partido -acional (PN) and the Partido Demócrata Cristiano (PDC). 
(Valenzuela 1978: 42)  
Although the PDC adopted a programme which reflected many of the same concerns the UP 
represented (e.g. the nationalisation of copper, the introduction of a unicameral parliament; 
the difference lay in the intensity of the changes (i.e. improvements vs. introduction of 
Socialism) (Bogdanovic 2008: 64)), Allende was able to maintain his support from the 
previous 1964 presidential election (38.9% in 1964), not indicating a voter’s drain from the 
PDC (the increase in popular participation and electoral registration in the 1960s did not, 
however, induce a proportional upsurge of the Left electorate, contrary to what could have 
been expected). (Valenzuela 1978: 39) The PDC’s candidate, Radomiro Tomic, had tried to 
arrange an alliance with the Left, thereby further alienating the Right (which as the Left 
resented the Frei government for its partido único (single party) stand and its reforms). The 
UP, however, was not interested in supporting a PDC candidate. Alessandri on the other hand 
had not been able to bring his programme of stable modernisation and increase in efficiency 
 35 
(leaving the structures fairly untouched) to the centrist voters, although he could count on 
considerable financial support from the CIA. 
 
The U.S. government under the Republican President Richard Nixon did not at all tolerate a 
Socialist government in Chile. The progression of the East-West-divide in the context of the 
Cold War gave the perceived gain or loss of an ally an outstanding importance. Latin America 
was not to be lost to the Soviet enemy, therefore, in spite of the promising surveys, nothing 
was to be left to chance in the 1970 presidential election. Furthermore, the announced 
measures programmed by the UP (especially the nationalisation of copper) were detrimental 
for the U.S. businesses, which were ready to financially avert such an event through support 
of Alessandri. 
The traditional Chilean conservative clientele gladly accepted the supports offered by the CIA 
and the U.S. businesses in order to avoid a not very probable, but still possible victory of the 
Left. Already in the previous election in 1964, the PDC had profited from the financial and 
anti-Communist propaganda aid by the CIA and U.S. businesses which had helped avert the 
election of Allende back then (the CIA “invested” nearly four million US dollars for this 
purpose).2 
 
“In March 1970, the 40 Committee decided that the United States should not support any single candidate in the 
election but should instead wage "spoiling" operations against the Popular Unity coalition which supported the 
'Marxist candidate, Salvador Allende. In all, the CIA spent from $800,000 to $1,000,000 on covert action to 
affect the outcome of the 1970 Presidential election. […]The large-scale propaganda campaign which was 
undertaken by the U.S. was similar to that of 1964: an Allende victory was equated with violence and 
repression.”  (Church Report 1975) 
 
Propaganda material (books, posters, advertisements) was distributed, radio stations and the 
press (especially the conservative daily paper El Mercurio) were provided with funding and 
anti-Communist articles (often fictitious, partly emanating from CIA agents working as 
journalists), which equated the UP’s programme with brutality, repression, corruption and 
poverty, and adversarial groups were supported financially. (Bogdanovic 2008: 72, 76) 
As the election outcome was not satisfactory, the CIA concentrated its efforts on the Congress 
deputies. The UP had won the 1970 election by a thin margin; however, it did not have a 
majority in Congress.  
 
Table 2. Parliamentary elections 1969 
Party Percentage 
Partido Socialista (PS) 12.3% 
                                                 
2 The actions and plans of the CIA in Chile from 1963 to 1973 were uncovered in a report prepared by a Senate 
Select Committee in 1975 headed by Frank Church. (Church Report 1975) 
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Partido Comunista (PC) 15.9% 
Partido Radical (PR)  12.9% 
Partido Social Demócrata (PSD) 0.9% 
Unión Socialista Popular (USOPO) 2.2% 
Total Unidad Popular (UP)* 44.2% 
Democracia Cristiana (PDC) 29.7% 
Partido Nacional (PN) 20.1% 
Partido Democrático Nacional (PADENA) 1.9% 
Abstentions 26.4% 
*The UP had not been created by the time of the congressional election. 
Source: Collier/Sater 1996: 351 
 
The Constitution ruled that, if a presidential candidate did not reach an absolute majority in 
the election, he needed to be approved by Congress in order to be installed. The parties now 
forming the UP (the FRAP, the Partido Radical and the Unión Socialista Popular) held only 
44.2% of the seats, and therefore did not have the majority needed to ensure the vote for 
Allende. It was clear that the Right would not vote for a Socialist president; therefore, the 
decision lay on the PDC deputies, who held the balance of power in Congress with their 
29.7%. The CIA’s plan was to financially persuade the Centrist and Right deputies to vote for 
Alessandri instead, who would then instantly step down, inducing elections in which former 
President Frei could stand again: 
 
“This gambit, which was considered a constitutional solution to the Allende problem, consisted of inducing 
enough Congressional votes to elect Alessandri over Allende with the understanding that Alessandri would 
immediately resign, thus paving the way for a special election in which Frei would legally become a candidate. 
At the September 14 meeting of the 40 Committee, the Frei gam-bit was discussed, and the Committee 
authorized a contingency fund of $250,000 for covert support of projects which Frei or his associates deemed 
important. The funds were to be handled by Ambassador Korry and used if it appeared that they would be 
needed by the moderate faction of the Christian Deniocratic [sic] Party to swing Congressional votes to 
Alessandri.”  (Church Report 1975) 
 
Eduardo Frei, however, did not consent to this deal, underscoring the respect of the regular 
and legitimate constitutional process, thereby ending the gambit. (Church Report 1975; 
Valenzuela 1978: 48)  
As the first civilian attempt to prevent Allende from being elected failed, U.S. President 
Nixon requested on September 15th that preparations for a military coup were started, this 
time without the knowledge of the Department of State and Department of Defense: 
 
“Half a decade later, in 1970, the CIA engaged in another special effort, this time at the express request of 
President Nixon and under the injunction not to inform the Departments of State or Defense or the Ambassador 
of the project. Nor was the 40 Committee (2) ever informed. The CIA attempted, directly, to foment a military 
coup in Chile. It passed three weapons to a group of Chilean officers who plotted a coup. Beginning with the 
kidnaping [sic] of Chilean Army Commander-in-Chief Rene Schneider.” (Church Report 1975) 
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Enhancing the anti-Communist propaganda and support of like-minded groups, economic 
measures were introduced in order to increase the pressure on the Chilean military and Right 
(in form of civilian protest) to enable a military coup. Due to the scope of action of the U.S. 
businesses in the Chilean industry and the U.S. influence in international financial institutions 
(e.g. the International Monetary Fund or the Inter-American Development Bank), the 
economy became severely strained. The artificially induced difficulties added to the already 
developing uncertainty which the upcoming election of a Marxist president brought about. 
The stock market plummeted; many people distrusted the future economic development and 
withdrew their assets from the banks, investing in gold and stocks of consumer goods. 
(Collier & Sater 1996: 328; Rinke 2007: 144) It became increasingly difficult for Chile to take 
out an international loan, as the U.S. discouraged their allies from supporting a Communist 
state. (Bogdanovic 2008: 77) 
The military was put under pressure by means of the military aid: 
 
“The Ambassador was also authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if Allende were 
seated, the military could expect no further military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, Korry was 
authorized to inform the Chilean military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending 
the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24.”  (Church Report 1975) 
 
As the economic strain was not enough to impede Congress from voting for Allende on 
October 24th 1970, nor did the military seem to take action proactively, the CIA plotted the 
kidnapping of the Army Commander-in-Chief René Schneider (known for his unconditional 
respect for the Constitution, refusing to partake in a coup). (Codoceo 2007: 30; Valenzuela 
1978: 48 et seqq.) The operation was prepared by General Viaux, the weapons being supplied 
by the CIA. However, the kidnapping failed, and ended up in the death of General Schneider 
on October 25th, caused by a lethal wound resulting from his resistance to the kidnappers three 
days earlier. General Carlos Prats was assigned as his successor as Commander-in-Chief. 
The reactions to the event were contrary to the expected outcome: Instead of overruling the 
popular vote, the majority of Congress deputies (153 to 35; the PN continuing its opposition) 
rallied behind Allende, enabling his inauguration on November 3rd as the first Socialist 
president in Chile. 
 
The election of the Socialist Allende can be seen as the peak of a complete reorganisation of 
Chilean society. It would be misleading to infer from his relative majority that society as a 
whole had undergone a dramatic shift to the Left (after all, the winning margin had only been 
39,175 votes – in a country counting nearly 8.9 million inhabitants by 1970) (Valenzuela 
1978: 41; Codoceo 2007: 25); instead, as Valenzuela puts it, “Allende’s election was the 
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result of the inability of Chile’s polarised political system to structure a winning majority 
coalition before the election and was further evidence of erosion of traditional mechanisms of 
political accommodation.” (1978: 39) Nevertheless, the plans of the UP for the upcoming 
years were very significant, aiming at nothing less than a project of complete social 
transformation – sought after within the constitutional and legal framework. This would prove 
very difficult, if not impossible, in the context of a minority presidency. (Valenzuela 1978: 
39-41; Codoceo 2007: 22) 
 
Salvador Allende Gossens, born in 1908 to a distinguished freemason, politically active 
family in Valparaíso, studied medicine and joined the Left movement against the Ibáñez 
regime while still in his twenties.3 He was one of the co-founders of the Socialist Party in 
1933, and had long been in the Senate (president of the Senate from 1966) before running for 
presidency four times. (Collier & Sater 1996: 330) 
In spite of the support in Congress for the confirmation as president, the PDC demanded that 
Allende sign a Estatuto de Garantías Democraticas (Statute of Constitutional Guarantees), a 
“somehow otiose clarification of freedoms already in the constitution.” (ibid. 328) That the 
PDC should insist on this reaffirmation “showed the deterioration of confidence between 
political leaders who had been close for decades” (Valenzuela 1978: 49), but was also a sign 
of the weak unity of the PDC: Tomic was part of the more liberal faction of the party and 
supported Allende. Many in the party did not, however, share his trust in the Socialist 
Allende. The demand of the Estatuto was aimed at appeasing the worries of this faction. 
(ibid.) 
Not only Congress, but other key institutions as well, especially the judiciary (e.g. the 
Contraloría, Comptroller) were predominantly conservative, a fact which would later 
exacerbate the UP government’s problems in enforcing its programme. (ibid. 44) 
 
2. The programme and reforms of the Unidad Popular government 
 
The UP government set as its goal not less than a Vía Chilena al Socialismo (Chilean Path to 
Socialism), implying a transformation of Chilean society towards the abolition of latifundia 
and the overcoming of the imperialist, oligarchic and monopolistic capitalist structures. 
(Codoceo 2007: 33; Tinke 2007: 144 et seqq.) A feature which distinguished Chile from other 
                                                 
3 Carlos Ibáñez del Campo was a dictatorial president from 1927-31 after the military uprising and coup against 
Arturo Alessandri (father of Jorge Alessandri, president from 1958-64 and PN candidate in 1970), and later 
again elected for a second presidency from 1952-58. ( Codoceo 2007: 22) 
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Latin American Socialist countries was that this transformation did not imply the destruction 
of the old order and the completely new organisation of a revolutionary system on the debris 
of the old one, but a peaceful transition, respecting the Constitution and its democratic, 
pluralist and libertarian values. (Valenzuela 1978: 43 et seqq.) 
 
In regard to the political ties and foreign relations, the UP did not intend to prioritise like-
minded countries; relations should be equal and cooperative in general, emphasising Latin-
American solidarity (especially within the Andean Pact). (Bogdanovic 2008: 80 et seqq.) The 
resumption of diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet and Communist countries were 
not meant to defy the U.S., but rather as an inclusion of all partners. Within Latin America, 
however, the resistance to U.S. influence was an important factor in the creation of a feeling 
of solidarity among the most affected countries (in which U.S. businesses held the largest 
share of assets). (ibid.) Although the U.S. was hostile of the Socialist Allende, the relations 
were not cut off. The reduction of the substantial military aid, the decrease of U.S. exports 
and the hindrance of international credits within the international financial institutions did, 
however, represent considerable reprisals for Chile (introduced as a reaction to the rise to 
power of a Socialist, only secondly because of the nationalisation of U.S. businesses). 
 
The UP programme consisted of four principal strategies forming the Via Chilena al 
Socialismo, with the “ultimate goal […] to transform class and property relations and to 
institute a new economic development scheme along Socialist lines” (Valenzuela 1978: 50): 
expansion of government programmes and services, income redistribution, state control of 
key industries, and extension of land reform. 
 
One of the main concerns of the UP was to overcome the stark social divide, introducing 
programmes for social development (e.g. the Desarrollo Social programme (Social 
Development Programme)) on the one hand, and fomenting participation on the other hand. 
The industrial and agrarian reforms were geared to redistribute assets and revenues (in the 
1960s, 3% of the industrial companies controlled approx. 60% of the assets, and 2% of 
landowners possessed 55% of the land) (Codoceo 2007: 33), an intense wage increase and 
employment offensive would incorporate more people in the working process. Programmes 
like the distribution of milk to children, of breakfasts, of food in general, free school books 
and uniforms were introduced to improve the lives of the socially weak. (Codoceo 2007: 34; 
Valenzuela 1978: 50; Bogdanovic 2008: 96) These measures had immediate positive effects: 
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“As a consequence of higher wages and new initiatives in health and nutrition, many poorer 
Chileans, perhaps for the first time in their lives, ate well and clothed themselves somewhat 
better than before.” (Collier & Sater 1996: 330) The aim was to create a spiral of growth: The 
wage increases financed by the state would spur demand and consequently production 
(inducing higher productivity and capacity of the manufacturing industries), which would in 
turn create more jobs and reduce unemployment, giving more people wages which they could 
again spend on Chilean consumer goods. (Valenzuela 1978: 50) 
 
The development of participation, which had already seen many improvements and thresholds 
since its beginning in the Electoral Law of 1874 (initially “Voto censitario” (defined by 
property), 1925 male suffrage for literates, 1934/52 female suffrage (municipal/presidential), 
1970 universal suffrage for citizens over 18) reached its peak in the inclusion of illiterates in 
1972. (Codoceo 2007: 24; Rinke 2007: 145) The number of voters increased by 130% 
between 1958 and 1970. Politics were no longer “eine Art Freizeitbeschäftigung oder 
sportliche Aktivität, um den sozialen Status zu zelebrieren” (quoted in Codoceo 2007: 24), as 
Patricio Meller puts it, but permeated all social strata. The political process increasingly 
became accessible to all sorts of demands and ideals, creating and fomenting new sorts of 
organisations and structures. (Collier & Sater 1996: 331) The number of unions grew from 
1,997 in 1952 to 4,551 in 1970, the farmer organisations from 33 in 1965 to 510 in 1970. The 
urbanisation of Chilean society (from 43% in 1907 to 75.1% in 1970) implied a better access 
to (and heightened demand for) consumer goods. (Codoceo 2007: 24-25) 
The overall improvement of the neglected weaker social strata would hopefully induce a rise 
in popularity of the UP government, which would then broaden the support for Allende (from 
34.9% in the 1970 election). (Valenzuela 1978: 51) 
 
Setting forth and intensifying the initiated reforms of the Frei government, the UP strived for 
the nationalisation and socialisation of the key industries and services (copper, ore and 
saltpeter; electricity, transport, communications – mainly in U.S. possession). Many sectors 
had already been nationalised (steel, oil fields, refineries, railroads, airlines) or enjoyed state 
participation through the Corporación de Fomento a la Producción (CORFO, Production 
Development Corporation) under the previous government. However, the still perceived 
dependency on imports and foreign corporations – perceived as the main obstacle to 
development and growth – would be completely overcome when the Chilean state took 
control of all its industries and large corporations (Collier & Sater 1996: 334 et seqq,), thereby 
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facilitating the creation of a non-discriminatory egalitarian society. Furthermore, the new 
revenues would finance the planned extensive social programmes. It was Allende’s conviction 
that this was to be achieved by the democratic means compliant with the legal and 
constitutional settings. 
The importance of copper for the Chilean economy cannot be understated. Possessing the 
biggest copper deposits worldwide (approx. 40%), Chile was and continues to be the main 
copper exporter worldwide. The industry was, however, in the possession of a few U.S. 
corporations (e.g. Anaconda and Kennecott), the revenues (making up 70% of the total 
foreign exchange) not staying in Chile. (Codoceo 2007: 33; Collier & Sater 1996: 334) The 
necessary constitutional reform was passed unanimously in Congress on July 11th 1971, 
establishing that the state was, hitherto, owner of all mineral and natural resources in Chile, 
but that the former proprietors would be remunerated for the nationalisation. In these terms, 
nationalisation did not necessarily imply a conflict with U.S. relations. However, 
compensation was thus calculated:  
 
“El monto de la indemnización, o indemnizaciones, según los casos, podrá determinarse sobre la base del costo 
original de dichos bienes, deducidas las amortizaciones, depreciaciones, castigos y desvalorización por 
obsolescencia. También podrá deducirse del monto de la indemnización el todo o parte de las rentabilidades 
excesivas que hubieren obtenido las empresas nacionalizadas.“4 (Ley N° 17.450 Reforma la Constitución 
Política del Estado) 
 
This regulation resulted in most of the former proprietors actually owing the Chilean state 
money for the nationalisation (Anaconda US$78 million, Kennecott US$310 million). (Collier 
& Sater 1996: 334 et seqq.) The reactions of the U.S. were no less sweeping: External 
accounts were frozen or confiscated, the financial boycott expanded and the delivery of much 
needed spare parts (especially for the copper industry) refused. Furthermore, the companies 
brought the case to foreign courts (in Europe and the U.S.), some actually producing the 
retention of copper shipments in international ports. (Codoceo 2007: 33; Rinke 2007: 148; 
Collier & Sater 1996: 335 et seqq.) 
The copper industry was assembled in the new Corporación del Cobre (CODELCO, Copper 
Corporation) which administered the sector henceforth. Soon after copper, the ore and 
saltpetre mining followed. 
After the nationalisation, a centrally planned economy was to be built up consisting of three 
sectors: a “Social Area” (fully state-owned), a “Mixed Area” (compounding state and private 
ownership, the state being the majority stockholder), and a “Private Area” (without state 
                                                 
4 The amount of the compensation, or compensations, depending on the case, will be determined according to the 
original cost of the concerned goods, deducing the amortisations, the depreciations, penalisations and 
devaluation due to obsolescence. Furthermore, the amount of the compensation of the excessive returns that the 
nationalised companies have obtained can also be deduced. (own translation) 
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ownership, small businesses). (Collier & Sater 1996: 341) The mixed sector, however, did not 
materialise, leaving the two other sectors as exclusive options. As to the division into Private 
and Social Area, opinions differed within the UP coalition: the Communists and the Radicals 
favoured only the takeover of truly monopolising companies, allowing for small businesses to 
remain in private hands. The Socialists and the MAPU on the other hand insisted on all means 
of production being nationalised, without any exemptions. (Collier & Sater 1996: 341) 
The newly nationalised sectors were protected from foreign competition by high import tariffs 
– ranging from 105 to 750%. (Codoceo 2007: 33-34) 
The project submitted in October 1971 proposing the nationalisation of all companies 
exceeding around US$1 million in net worth (253 altogether) against compensation in 
“interest-bearing bonds equal to the 1969 book value of their assets, small-time investors 
receiving an adjustment for inflation, larger shareholders getting a less favorable deal” 
(Collier & Sater 1996: 341) met strong resistance from the opposition in Congress. In order to 
get the reform through, Allende used a long forgotten decree (DFL 520) from the short-lived 
Socialist Republic of 1932 (under Colonel Marmaduke Grove, from June 4th to September 
14th 1932) which allowed for nationalisation of “essential” industrial companies in the case 
they infringed the law – a formulation which was interpreted very generously by the UP (any 
minor infraction would do). (ibid. 1996: 341 et seqq.; Rinke 2007: 146) Another legacy from 
the past, dating from the Popular Front period, enabled the state to “requisition factories 
should they fail to operate efficiently, though without transferring formal ownership to the 
state”. (Collier & Sater 1996: 342) Here again any strike activity (often encouraged by the 
leftist unions) or disruption of production was enough for the UP to send in its interventores 
(inspectors/comptrollers) to take charge of the factories. Within a short period of time, the 
state had also gained control over the food, entertainment, textile and IT industry. “By 1973, 
through a combination of requisitions, seizures, and purchases of stock, the state controlled 80 
percent of the country’s industrial output, upward of 400 enterprises, and around 60 percent of 
GNP.” (Alberto Baltra 1973: 53-54 quoted in Collier & Sater 1996: 342) 
 
Another reform initiated by the Frei government was the agrarian reform, which was to be 
intensified and accelerated. The remaining haciendas and latifundia were seized by the state, 
re-divided and allocated to new agrarian units: asentamientos (introduced by the Frei 
government), Centros de Reforma Agraria (CERA, Agrarian Reform Centres) or Centros de 
Producción (CEPRO, Production Centres). Farm workers were allowed direct participation in 
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the new Consejos Campesinos (Farmer Councils) and were henceforth state employees. 
(Rinke 2007: 148 et seqq.; Collier & Sater 1996: 338 et seqq.) 
By 1972 60% of the cultivable land had been seized by the state and distributed to 
cooperatives and farmers, and only 3% of the farms were left which exceeded eighty hectares 
(compared to 55% in 1965). (Codoceo 2007: 34; Collier & Sater 1996: 337 et seqq.) 
 
One of the most important problems to tackle was inflation, an ever-present implication in the 
Chilean economy for decades. Social expenditures exploded due to the new social 
programmes (health, housing, education, social security) and the assumption of the part of 
main investor in the key industries. As a reaction, the state nationalised the banking sector to 
gain control over credit, then pouring money into the economy in the hope that the structural 
transformations would eventually slow down inflation. (Rinke 2007: 146; Valenzuela 1978: 
52) The prices of consumer products were held down through increasing price regulation (the 
price for electricity fell by 85%, for telephone by 33%, for postal services by 22% and for gas 
by 21%), in the belief that this would only be necessary until production met the increasing 
demand. Additionally, wages were raised by 55% in 1971. (Codoceo 2007: 34; Collier & 
Sater 1996: 43) 
 
In order to bring its programme across, but also to ensure support from the increasingly 
participant masses, the UP set forth the nationalisation of the media (newpapers, magazines, 
radio), but also the creation of new newspapers and magazines and a state publishing house. 
The contents were mainly propagandistic, acting as a counterbalance to the (partly CIA-
subsidised) Right media which did not hesitate in criticising and defaming the government’s 
acts. Striving for a monopoly of the media, the UP exerted pressure on the oppositional papers 
through advertisement placement: The nationalisation of the industry and businesses meant 
that the advertising was also ruled by the state, which was a vital part of the newspapers’ 
funding. (Bogdanovic 2008: 85) 
 
The messages were also transmitted through a cultural offensive, the Concientización 
(Awareness Raising) consisting of cultural and artistic promotion (fighting the cultural 
imperialism from the U.S., with critics (Ariel Dorfman) and singers (Angel Parra) raising 
awareness and support for the Vía Chilena) (Rinke 2007: 150 et seqq.), and the planning of a 
new educational system, the Escuela -acional Unida (ENU, National Unified Scool, 1973). 
The first concern was to democratise and provide better access to the schooling system for all 
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children, especially the poor. The main idea however was to instigate the creation of the 
“hombre nuevo”,  
 
“the new man …, free to develop himself fully in a non-capitalist society, and who will express himself as a 
personality … conscious of and in solidarity with the revolutionary process, who is … technically and 
scientifically able to develop the economy in a society in transition to socialism.” (Farrell 1986: 96 quoted in 
Collier & Sater 1996: 352) 
 
The sense of Socialist collectivity was to become primordial in the education of the young 
Chileans, as opposed to the individualism fomented by Capitalism. (Bogdanovic 2007: 87) 
 
All in all, the first year of the UP government was a very good one economically, with 
purchasing power as high as never before (thanks to wage increases and price regulation),  
GNP going up 3.8% in 1971, industrial production soaring by 12.1% and unemployment 
declining, reaching 3.9% in 1971. (Collier & Sater 1996: 343) The intended consequence of a 
higher demand for basic goods was achieved. The opposition was still in disarray after the 
shock of the election and did not yet combine their efforts against the UP measures. However, 
demand could only be met through the exploitation of available but limited inventories and 
supplies of raw materials, as well as consumption of the foreign currency reserves for the 
growing imports. As the reserves became exhausted, the balance quickly became negative. 
Chilean (especially agricultural) production could not keep up with the internal demand, 
making the import of basic goods a priority (to the detriment of other urgently needed 
technical equipment). (Valenzuela 1978: 52) 
 
3. The problems and backlashes of the UP government 
 
Although Allende remained faithful to his intention of not infringing the Constitution and the 
legal regulations, the resistance to the UP reforms and the problems arising with them 
eventually led to a violent abruption of the Vía chilena al Socialismo through a military coup. 
The heralds of the coup, however, were quite apparent from the beginning of the UP 
government, and emanated from many different social and political groups. The most 
important elements which paved the way to the breakdown of democracy were the strong 
radicalisation and polarisation of the political parties and of society, and the erosion of a 
viable Centre which could reach a compromise; the increased participation and mobilisation 
of the masses, which eventually got out of control of the parties; and finally the economic and 
institutional crises which brought the country to a standstill. (Codoceo 2007: 21; Valenzuela 
1978: 59) 
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The Partido -acional had not supported the election of Allende in Congress in 1970, and its 
stance towards the UP did not in any way improve through the planned reforms. Quite on the 
contrary, the reforms mostly affected its traditional clientele, the oligarchy and rural 
landlords. The support by the CIA and U.S. businesses was not enough to impede Allende’s 
rise to power; for many, this was a sign that the democratic process had failed in representing 
their interests. The radicalised faction created on April 1st 1971, the Patria y Libertad, headed 
by Pablo Rodriguez, did not stop at using illegal and violent means in order to sabotage and 
hinder the new government’s plans. It was repeatedly involved in armed street battles with the 
brigades of the radicalised Left (see below). (Codoceo 2007: 30) 
 
The Partido Demócrata Cristiano was challenged by the task of keeping its unity as a Centrist 
party, in midst of an increasingly polarised political system. The Christian Democrats were 
not a uniform mass, but also had factions with different tendencies and affiliations. The 
presidential election had taught many of the party members that an approximation to the Left 
was not prone to succeed. In between the Left and Right blocks, the Centrists needed to 
redefine their stance, and present a viable alternative to the other parties, a difficult task in a 
traditionally polarised political system. One of its most important goals was to gain the 
sympathy and support of the associations, corporations and unions dissatisfied with the UP 
reforms. In this point, the PDC was quite successful, and the effects on the reforms were 
considerable, as the strikes and boycotts further undermined the government’s legitimacy. 
(Codoceo 2007: 30) The agrarian reform, the nationalisation and the confiscation of property 
affected its clientele to a degree in which any compromise would signify treason to its 
principles.  
However, the gains in sympathy did not reflect in the municipal election results in 1971. This 
was an important turning point in the PDC’s stance: The PDC then decided that light 
opposition was not enough, and that a broader mobilisation and less accommodation would be 
needed to gain more support. (Valenzuela 1978: 72) 
 
“For the PDC, the middle months of 1971 were something like a moment of truth. Any attempt at cooperation 
with the UP threatened it with a loss of identity and to confer on it the status of a political chameleon […].  The 
logic of traditional party competition more or less compelled it to assume an opposition stance.” (Collier & 
Sater 1996: 347) 
 
The polarisation of the PDC was enhanced in June 1971 when the former Minister of the 
Interior under Frei, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic, was assassinated by terrorists of an extremist 
leftist group, the Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo (VOP, People’s Organised Vanguard). 
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The same terrorists had been released from prison through an amnesty granted at the 
inauguration of Allende. Although Allende quickly disarmed the VOP, it was not able to 
crush the remaining paramilitary groups (such as the MIR), thereby infuriating the PDC, who 
decided to mobilise a militant group of its own. (Rinke 2007: 152) The peak of the 
mobilisation was the PDC’s part in the creation of the Frente -acional de Defensa Gremial 
(National Front of Union Defence) in 1973, representing over one thousand associations, 
which organised strikes and manifestations. (Codoceo 2007: 31) 
 
The PDC and the PN eventually collaborated in so-called Comités Democraticos (CODEs) in 
order to coordinate their parliamentary opposition to the UP government and to build a 
coalition in upcoming elections (eventually leading to the victory of their joint candidates in 
the parliamentary elections). The U.S. were no longer the target of criticism; instead, 
international Communism and the UP specifically rose to the common enemy which would 
unite the opposition. Initiated as a democratic movement, it soon took to the streets in its 
opposition to the governmental measures. In all its destabilisation efforts, the opposition was 
generously supported by the U.S. through the CIA (amounting to US$8 million until 1973) 
and the economic sanctions. (Codoceo 2007: 30-35; Rinke 2007: 154) 
 
The Unidad Popular was an even more diversified coalition, with important ideological 
differences also pertaining to the means to be used in order to change the political, social and 
economic structures. The Communist party, the Radicals and a moderate group within the 
Socialist party, which Allende can be attributed to, strived at a peaceful, gradual 
transformation of society without any transgression of the democratic and parliamentary 
process. Any change or measure should be legitimised by legal (especially constitutional) 
means, even if this meant a delay of the process.  
However, the more radical faction, especially the part of the Socialist Party headed by 
secretary-general Carlos Altamirano (surging after the XXII. Kongress in 1967 and which 
strongly sympathised with the Marxist-Leninist militant Movimiento de Izquierda 
Revolucionaria, MIR, Movement of the Revolucionary Left) and the MAPU, already wary of 
the democratic and constitutional rules of the political system from the beginning, grew ever 
more intransigent as the problems became more and more apparent. (Codoceo 2007: 28 et 
seqq.; Collier & Sater 1996: 332) Their conviction was that the way to Socialism was 
necessarily an armed revolution, as the Cuban Revolution in 1959 had showed. In this 
conclusion they differed completely from the moderate faction. This ideological difference 
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led to independent illegal actions of these groups, which were attributed to the UP, but did not 
at all reflect the entire coalition’s conviction, nevertheless considerably undermining its 
legitimacy. (Codoceo 2007: 23 et seqq.) Even as it became obviously clear that the 
continuation of its measures would lead to an inevitable downfall, Allende was not able to 
resist the pressure from the militant factions. The attempts by Allende to integrate and thereby 
soothe these radical groups through concessions and amnesties (e.g. on December 31st 1971 of 
all the convicted MIR-members) proved counterproductive, and only contributed to a further 
alienation of the opposition. From the beginning, President Allende had not been in control of 
his own political coalition. (Codoceo 2007: 28; Collier & Sater 1996: 332) 
 
The radicalisation of political discourse emanating from the 1960s now permeated all social 
groups, making a compromise which could have overcome the crisis increasingly out of 
reach. An important factor in the radicalisation of society were the media, which either 
disseminated propaganda for or against the UP government. The opposition media enjoyed a 
large share of the funds from the CIA and U.S. businesses with the aim of discrediting the 
government and Communism in general. The exaggeration and also invention of negative 
news and facts became a specialty of the increasingly extremist media. (Rinke 2007: 147; 
Valenzuela 1978: 70 et seqq.) 
What the radicalised factions of each coalition had in common was the belief that the only 
way to reach their goals (as different as they could be) was through a violent uprising (of the 
masses and/or of the military), and that the legal and constitutional channels were not 
effective. These groups had only constituted a fraction of the parties in 1970, but gradually 
swelled, finally taking over control of the Left, and the Centrist and Right blocks. (Valenzuela 
1978: 45 et seqq.)  
 
Mobilisation had been an important factor during the Frei government and the presidential 
elections in 1970. The manifestations and assemblies, which had originally been a 
phenomenon of the Left parties, were increasingly arranged by the opposition, which was now 
strongly represented in the unions. As a mainly oppositional instrument, strikes got out of 
control of the UP, being used by the opposition to further exert pressure on the government 
through economic strain. An important strike which literally paralysed the economy was the 
strike of the truckers in October 1972. More than 12,000 truckage companies participated in 
the strike, demanding a better protection of the private sector from arbitrary nationalisations. 
As commodities could not be delivered, the strike led to a serious shortcut of basic goods, 
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strongly affecting all social groups and bringing about even more discontent. (Codoceo 2007: 
31) The reaction of the government of jailing the strike leaders only led to further turmoil and 
mobilisation. The number of strikes rose dramatically within few years: 
 
Table 3. Number of strikes in the private sector, 1965-1972 
 1965 1969 1971 1972 
Strikes 564 977 2.377 2.475 
Source:  Codoceo 2007: 31 
 
Although the mobilisation had been triggered by the political parties, it became increasingly 
independent, with the social and economic groups taking control of the actions. Several 
gremios (unions; shopkeepers, farmers, merchants, doctors, lawyers among others) joined the 
new Comando -acional de Defensa (National Defence Command) which would articulate 
their interests and coordinate their actions – for the first time, as Collier and Sater point out, a 
“grass-roots mass mobilization which owed little or nothing to the political parties, although 
both the PDC and the National party predictably endorsed the nationwide action”. (1996: 349; 
cf. Valenzuela 1978: 78)  
Reacting to the mobilisation of the opposition, middle- und upper-classes, the radicalised 
groups of the UP coalition reacted by expropriating further factories and property 
(incorporated into the cordones industriales, industrial belts), and organising so-called 
comandos comunales (community commands) in local community groups. (Collier & Sater 
1996: 349 et seqq.) These new structures were often paramilitary and only exacerbated the 
feeling of threat already dominating the middle- and upper-classes. However, according to 
Valenzuela, the middle- and upper-class counter-mobilisation had the largest share of impact: 
 
“[…] throughout the Allende period radicalized sectors of the working class remained a minority, and the most 
significant destabilizing and uncontrolled mobilization would continue to be the counter-mobilization of the 
middle class. The breakdown of Chilean democracy was more the result of counter-mobilization against 
perceived threats than excessive mobilization of sectors demanding their due.”  (Valenzuela 1978: 79) 
 
One of the most important problems of increased and independent mobilisation was the 
simultaneous loss of importance of the democratic and legal channels, and the loss of control 
of parties’ followers. (ibid. 1978: 80) 
  
A controversial measure of the UP government which compelled the masses to take to the 
street was the Escuela -ormal Unificada (Standard Unified School), designed to form a new 
sort of citizens taught in the “Socialist Humanism” tradition. The plan disgruntled the private 
and confessional education sectors (criticising the neglect of Christian values), but also the 
military: Apart from opposing to the state controlling and influencing the education system, 
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the military strongly objected to a Communist indoctrination of the children, which they 
deemed as the worst of all scenarios (see below). (Rinke 2007: 152; Collier & Sater 1996: 352 
et seqq.) Allende decided to delay the implementation, and the provision was negotiated in the 
following months. 
 
The financial and economic boycott staged by the U.S. represented a severe setback to the 
economy. The U.S. had been the most important trade partner of Chile hitherto, accounting 
for 37.3% of Chilean imports in 1970. (Valenzuela 1978: 56) The import substitution policy 
of the government combined with the boycott of nearly all goods by the U.S. reduced the 
proportion to 10% in 1972. (ibid.) However, the Chilean industry was not able to replace the 
supplies, and even less meet the exploding demand for commodities and produce in Chile. 
The soaring social expenditure and the necessary increased imports of basic goods (not to 
mention technological equipment) depleted the Chilean foreign currency reserves within few 
months (by 1972 56% of the export earnings were spent on food purchases; the trade deficit 
rising from US$18 million to US$255 million in 1972). (Collier & Sater 1996: 340 et seqq.) 
New international loans were desperately needed to make up for the insufficient national 
revenues, but were blocked by the U.S. at the main financial institutions (IMF, IDB, World 
Bank). The resort to other Socialist and Latin American countries for economic assistance 
was not able to avert a further economic deterioration. (ibid. 345; Rinke 2007: 148) 
 
The nationalisation of industry and the agrarian reform did not have the expected outcome of 
a substantial increase in productivity and profits. One hindering factor was the custom of 
appointing insufficiently qualified, but politically loyal personnel for the management of the 
new companies and cooperatives (the interventores). The priority of the UP government was 
to employ as many people as possible (leading to the inflationary filling of jobs) and Left 
party members in special, even if their qualifications and profiles did not at all meet the needs 
of the companies they were appointed to. (Codoceo 2007: 23; Collier & Sater 1996: 343) This 
is shown quite clearly in the mining industry: While employment in the mines increased by 
45%, per capita production decreased by 19%. (Collier & Sater 1996: 335 et seqq.) These 
measures, combined with the emigration of technical experts who were not interested in being 
paid in the comparatively worthless escudo, created a lack of technical know-how and did not 
raise production, but rather contrarily reduced it (the productivity of the mining industry fell 
by 30%). (Codoceo 2007: 335; Rinke 2007: 147) Furthermore, the appointment of managers 
and interventores often met resistance by staff sympathising with the opposition, who refused 
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to obey a leftist supervisor. The rise of the oppositional unions led to struggles within the 
mines and corporations, strikes and a general collapse of labour discipline. (ibid.; Valenzuela 
1978: 66) 
 
“In the days of American ownership, the Left had consistently supported the miners’ demands for higher wages. 
After nationalization, the government expected them to moderate or perhaps even forgo such demands. The 
workers refused, and the Christian Democrats, who now dominated the mining unions, encouraged their 
discontent in order to embarrass the government.” (Collier & Sater 1996: 336) 
 
The government reacted by jailing the union’s leaders or sending the Carabineros to cease the 
manifestations. Repeatedly the Carabineros, but also the militant Left made use of armed 
force against the protesters, claiming some deaths. Allende quickly moved to apologise for the 
casualties, but his lack of effective control over the militant groups of the UP only contributed 
to the widespread indignation at the events. (Collier & Sater 1996: 336) 
 
Furthermore, technical equipment (machinery) and especially spare parts were predominantly 
U.S.-made. With the boycotts launched by the U.S. and the prioritisation of basic goods in 
import, it became almost impossible to get the necessary parts. With the default of 
infrastructure and equipment, it is not surprising that the production and according revenues 
(especially in the copper industry) could not rise as had been planned.  
The already or soon to be expropriated factory owners stopped investing in their plants, a 
default the UP administration was not able to compensate. Additionally, the copper price fell 
by 35 cents per pound between 1970 and 1973, further reducing the profits of the mining 
industry. (Collier & Sater 1996: 337) 
Soon workers (often spurred by the MIR) began taking over factories, which would then form 
so-called cordones industriales, where not the state, but workers controlled production. (ibid. 
337-343; Rinke 2007; 147) These areas were not only out of control of the government 
(which reacted with tolerance), but were also seen as a threat by private factory owners. This 
created a strong support for the Centrist Frente -acional de Defensa Gremial. 
 
In the rural areas, the myriad of different forms of cooperatives and associations carried out 
by differing UP members was very confusing and lead to almost completely uncoordinated 
measures. (Collier & Sater 1996: 337) The UP administration literally lost control of the 
process of reorganisation it had launched. The different factions had differing conceptions 
which they put into practice.   
On the other hand, the regulation of prices led to a decrease of revenue for the agricultural 
products, further exacerbating the problem of insufficient investment. Companies and 
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cooperatives struggled to keep production going (productivity actually decreasing by 23%), 
while demand kept on soaring as the purchasing power kept increasing. (Codoceo 2007: 35) 
 
The stances to the solution of these problems differed within the UP coalition. While the 
Communists, Radicals and more moderate Socialists (including Allende) favoured a more 
careful continuation, the radicalised faction insisted on an acceleration of the pace. The 
moderate faction was not able to stand up to the radicalised pressure, and so the reforms were 
further intensified and expanded.  
A very crucial aspect to the agrarian reform were the illegal tomas, land seizures by farmers 
mostly encouraged by the radicalised Left.  
 
Table 4. Number of rural tomas and strikes, 1967-1971  
 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971 
Tomas 13² / 9³ 26 148 456 1,278 
Strikes 693 648 1,127 1,580 1,758 
² Codoceo 2007: 31    ³ Valenzuela 1978: 53 
Sources: Codoceo 2007: 31; de Vylder 1976: 205 quoted in Valenzuela 1978: 53 
 
The MIR penetrated the rural sector and organised the farmers in the so-called Movimiento 
Campesino Revolucionario (Revolutionary Farmer Movement) and several comandos 
campesinos (farmer commands). (Rinke 2007: 149) The Movimiento went about illegally 
seizing properties, without respecting the 80 hectares regulation of the government. Again, 
Allende was in a predicament and had to decide whether to punish or tolerate the farmers 
performing the tomas. The president’s resort was less than ideal: 
 
“To escape from this dilemma, Allende resorted to subterfuge: a little-known provision of the reform law 
allowed the government to seize an estate and appoint an interventor (temporary administrator) should a strike or 
stoppage interrupt work. Use of this measure enabled the government to placate the “ultras,” while remaining 
within the letter of the law, but it did little to sweeten the opposition’s temper.”  (Collier & Sater 1996: 337-338) 
 
Resistance came from the farmers who had profited from the Frei reforms and who now saw 
their properties in danger. Supported by the Christian Democrat unions, they resisted any 
attempt of control by the government and of seizure by militant groups. As the colleagues 
from the industrial sector, the oppositional agrarian unions staged manifestations demanding a 
more advantageous reorganisation (including private plots of land) of the land. Mirroring the 
development in the copper industry, decreased productivity, farmer unrest, the drastic 
reduction of important investments by farmers fearing an impending toma, but also poor 
weather dramatically cut on the agricultural production. (Collier & Sater 1996: 340) In 
addition, many farmers employed in the state plots were more concerned in growing their 
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private produce, which they could then sell for a multiple of the state price at the black 
market, than in contributing to the economy. 
 
The shortages of basic goods and decreasing production combined with an undiminished 
purchasing power generated a burgeoning black market, as well as hoardings. (Codoceo 2007: 
35, 346) Inflation got completely out of hand, reaching 1634.4% in December 1972 and 
1087% in 1973. The government was not able to counterbalance the inflation (pouring more 
money into the economy), the decrease in investment and the defective production, as its 
deficit also soared from 6.6% in 1970 to 30% in 1973. (Codoceo 2007: 35) 
 
However, the crises did not affect the electoral support of the UP coalition. Quite on the 
contrary, it was able to increase its winning margin in the April 1971 municipal elections 
(gaining 49.7% of the vote). However, this must be seen as a further sign for the polarisation 
of society:  
 
“One of the most important characteristics of the 1971 vote is that it reflected further political polarization. 
Because the electorate perceived the contest to be between a Popular Unity coalition and a more status quo-
oriented opposition, it threw more of its support to the two parties on the extremes, the Socialists and the 
Nationals. All of the centrist parties, including the Christian Democrats and two Radical fragments, lost support 
in absolute terms with respect to the previous election.” (Valenzuela 1978: 54) 
 
The increase in electoral support did not reflect a clear majority of the population. There were 
still many Chileans who did not back the UP and its far-reaching reforms, and who 
furthermore supported the increasingly radicalised opposition to the government. And the 
results in the municipal elections did not change the power distribution in Congress (two-
fifths of the Chamber, one-third of the Senate). As a matter of fact, the UP candidates were 
actually mostly defeated by united opposition candidates in most congressional by-elections, 
as well as union and university positions. (Collier & Sater 1996: 331 et seqq.; Valenzuela 
1978: 58) 
 
In order to weaken the legislative resistance in Congress, in November 1971, the UP planned 
a constitutional amendment which would introduce a unicameral legislature. (Collier & Sater 
1996: 347) This change would have further strengthened the presidential power, a tendency 
which had been started already in the decades preceding the UP’s electoral victory. The 
president could dissolve parliament once within a presidential term. The reform, expectedly, 
did not pass Congress, and was dropped as the UP hoped to make up for the majority at the 
following congressional elections in 1973. (ibid. 333) 
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In February 1972 a constitutional amendment passed Congress that forbid any expropriations 
which were not legitimised by Congress. Making use of his presidential veto, Allende blocked 
the proposal. However, the opposition voted to override the presidential veto, claiming that a 
simple majority was sufficient for that matter. This triggered a major political crisis, as 
Allende insisted that a two-thirds majority was necessary to override the president. As the 
constitutional regulation was not clear in this point, the opposition demanded a plebiscite, 
which Allende refused. The matter was to be resolved later on. In June 1972 another 
constitutional amendment was introduced by the PDC, this time forbidding the seizure of 
farms smaller than forty hectares. The argument over the amendment was increasingly 
accompanied by violence on the streets, caused by the demonstrations and counter-
demonstrations of the extremist groups. (Collier & Sater 1996: 349) In order to contain 
violence, a new Ley de control de armas (Arms Control Law) went into effect in October 
1972. Unfortunately, it had little effect on the increasingly violent confrontations. (Rinke 
2007: 153 et seqq.) 
 
As a reaction to the UP reforms, and denouncing the food shortages and soaring inflation, on 
December 1st 1971 middle- and upper-class housewives organised a “March of the Empty 
Saucepans” during the visit of Fidel Castro to Chile. When leftist groups assaulted and 
attacked the demonstrators, the opposition planned to impeach the Minister of the Interior, 
José Tohá. In order to avoid this, Allende relocated him at the ministry of Defence.  
The impeachment of UP ministers became a recurring instrument of the opposition to 
pressurise the government. (Rinke 2007: 153) Tax increases were constantly vetoed in 
Congress, impeding the government of collecting urgently needed money. (Valenzuela 1978: 
71) In November 1972 Allende appointed the Army Commander-in-Chief, General Carlos 
Prats as new Minister of the Interior as a measure to appease the opposition.  
 
Another sector where the UP met great resistance was Justice (the Contraloría and the 
courts). The institutions and courts were mainly staffed with conservative personnel, which 
not only refused to arbitrate the congressional conflicts (especially regarding the voting 
regulations for vetoes), but also openly criticised the government. The conflict went as far as a 
declaration by the Justice on May 7th 1973 that the government had breached the law, and on 
May 26th that the rule of law was in a crisis in Chile. (Codoceo 2007: 35) 
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The upcoming congressional elections in March 1973 were seen as decisive for the future of 
the political crisis: If the opposition united in the Confederación de la Democracia 
(Democracy Confederation) won three-thirds of the votes, it could not only override the 
presidential vetoes, but also impeach Allende himself. With the sabotage, legislative 
blockade, the mass mobilisation and negative propaganda, the opposition hoped that the 
hardship and instability would guarantee a landslide victory. (Valenzuela 1978: 77; Collier & 
Sater 1996: 351) 
 
4. The downfall of the UP government 
 
To the distress of the opposition, the gains it made in the congressional elections of March 
1973 (reaching 55.7%, as opposed to 51.7% in 1969) missed the necessary two-thirds 
majority it had hoped for. (Valenzuela 1978: 77) The expected punishment of the government 
did not materialise. The president could not be impeached by Congress. As the constitutional 
and democratic processes had been depleted, the election marked a turning point in the 
strategies of the opposition, which now predominantly believed that a military coup would be 
the only solution out of the crisis. (ibid.)  
Attempts by the UP moderate wing to reach an understanding with the Christian Democrats 
were made (in March, June 1972 and July 1973), but were mostly undermined by actions and 
pressure by the intransigent factions of both blocks. Polarisation and enmity were already too 
strong to stem the tide: the Chilean society was split up in two intransigent blocks. 
(Valenzuela 1978: 77 et seqq.; Collier & Sater 1996: 348 et seqq.) 
 
The military was actually materially better off during the UP years than under the preceding 
Frei and Alessandri governments. However, the increasing armed confrontations on the street 
between Left and Right extremist groups were a sign that the government had lost the 
monopoly of the use of force in spite of the Ley de control de armas (Arms Control Law). The 
verbal attacks by paramilitary Marxist groups (calling for a replacement of the military by 
workers’ militias) soon were complemented by disdain by the opposition, which sought to 
provoke a reaction of the Armed Forces. The Right was not reluctant to openly urge the 
military to intervene and take control of the state. (Collier & Sater 1996: 353; Rinke 2007: 
155)  
A precursor of the developments to come was the rebellion of the Second Armoured 
Regiment on June 29th 1973, known as the Tancazo, which clearly showed the discontent of 
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large sections of the military. (Rinke 2007: 155) The result was lenient, as General Prats 
managed to stop the coup. However, in the meantime, the Left unionists had encouraged the 
seizure of more than 350 factories and incorporation in the cordones industriales, which they 
refused to restitute – a further sign that Allende was not in control of power. Allende tried to 
counteract the impeding downfall by appointing more ministries to military personnel 
(General Prats became Minister of Defence, Admiral Raúl Montero Minister of Finance, 
General César Ruiz Minister of Public Works). This step, however, came too late, as the 
opposition, and the military as well had lost all belief in a constitutional solution. (Collier & 
Sater 1996: 354 et seqq.; Rinke 2007: 156) 
The parallel structures of the military, which had been mostly isolated from civil society in 
the preceding decades (“military in barracks”), were strongly influenced by the U.S. promoted 
Doctrine of National Security, which elevated the fight against Communism to a national 
security issue. The officers agreed that it was the duty of the military to protect the Chilean 
Constitution and state from extremism and decay. However, the means to enforce this, and 
especially the borders within which the military could act, were interpreted in various ways. 
(Rinke 2007: 156) 
The military was also provoked by the MIR and militant UP factions which assassinated 
Commander Arturo Araya on July 26th, and a month later a young Army lieutenant. The 
paramilitary organisations were keen on an armed confrontation, of which they hoped to 
emerge victorious (as in the Cuban Revolution). (Collier & Sater 1996: 355 et seqq.; Rinke 
2007: 155) 
On August 22nd, Congress adopted a resolution,  
 
„die die Exekutive des wiederholten Verfassungsbruchs, der Auhöhlung [sic] der Bürgerrechte und der 
Zulassung außerhalb der Verfassung stehender Parallelorgane bezichtigte und den Präsidenten sowie vor allem 
die den Streitkräften angehörigen Minister unter Verweis auf ihre Gehorsamspflicht gegenüber den anderen 
Verfassungsorganen aufforderte, diese Lage sofort zu ändern.“  (Rinke 2007: 156) 
 
Many authors have interpreted this resolution as an appeal to the military to intervene. (cf. 
Rinke 2007: 156; Collier & Sater 1996: 356) The final proposition by Allende in early 
September was to call a plebiscite, a possibility still being discussed when the government 
was overthrown in the military coup.  
The group of officers (including General Prats) who respected the Constitution to the point 
that they would rather try to strengthen than to overthrow a democratically legitimised 
president, was increasingly edged out by the more radical faction. (Rinke 2007: 156) 
Eventually, the other Generals passed a vote of no confidence in General Prats, who 
subsequently resigned from his post. The way was cleared for the military to take action. 
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IV Historical Oversight Part 3: The Pinochet Regime 
 
 
As the UP government was unable to concentrate on its programme, the political parties 
reached a point on which no compromise in any form seemed to be possible, and the judiciary 
institutions either withdrew from the process or intervened in a clearly partisan way, the only 
apparently neutral power left which still enjoyed some legitimacy from most sides was the 
military. (Valenzuela 1978: 82) The expectations both sides (the supporters and opponents of 
the UP) had towards the military were quite opposite: The opposition expected them to 
overthrow Allende, subsequently restoring the executive power to them. The UP on the other 
hand hoped that the military would affirm its loyalty to the Constitution and support the 
government through active participation (i.e. in the ministries) and curbing the protests. 
 
The military however could not be seen as homogenous. Quite on the contrary, the 
incorporation of officers and commanders into several ministries only exacerbated the 
cleavage between the two factions which had developed throughout the UP period. While 
some abhorred the UP so much they supported any means to overthrow it, others were loyal to 
the Constitution to a point where they would not violate it even to get rid of a government 
which they did not fully support, and which was obviously not able to control the situation. 
(Valenzuela 1978: 82-83) Ironically, because it was increasingly included in the struggle to 
solve the political crisis precisely because it was considered to be neutral, the military was 
actually further politicised. The traditional separation of society and the military did not 
withstand the political undertow of the 1960s and early 1970s.  
With the increase of violence and attacks on the military from both Left and Right militants, 
the “Constitutionalist” officers in the military were eventually replaced by more amenable 
ones. (ibid. 99-104) This process culminated in the removal of General Prats (Commander-in-
Chief of the Army, Minister of Defence) and Admiral Raúl Montero (Commander-in-Chief of 
the navy) from their posts (after the other generals told them they did not enjoy their trust any 
more), two of the last few commanding officers opposing a coup. (ibid. 99) General Augusto 
Pinochet succeeded General Prats as Commander-in-Chief, assuming the highest office in the 
military. 
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1. The military coup 
 
The military coup itself was not planned with much anticipation, contrarily to what might 
have been expected; the concrete actions were only planned a few days before the date, at a 
meeting on September 8th in Valparaiso. A document was prepared and signed by Admiral 
José Toribio Merino (Navy), General Gustavo Leigh (Air Force), General Augusto Pinochet 
(Army) and General César Mendoza from the Carabineros on the 10th, stipulating the date 
and procedure of the coup. (Rinke 2007: 157) The consent by General Pinochet had not been 
taken for granted before. Until the last minute shift he was considered a Constitutionalist 
officer. (ibid. 156 et seqq.; Valenzuela 1978: 105 et seqq.) Later on he would, however, 
portray himself as the mastermind behind the planning of the coup. 
This does not mean that the wish and the disposition were not present before. The process, as 
has been shown, was a long and complicated one, which eventually culminated in the military 
coup. 
The manoeuvres did not raise any suspicion as they were performed one week before the 
commemorations of the historical Junta de Gobierno on September 18th (1810, one of the first 
important milestones in the independence process of Chile). The attack began in Valparaiso 
early in the morning at around 4:30 a.m., spreading out throughout the country, the different 
regiments taking over city by city, until they finally reached Santiago.  
The military had expected to meet a major armed resistance by leftist militias (a belief much 
spurred by the Right and the media, and vindicated by the MIR). Instead, the few attempts at 
resisting organised by the MIR and the militant Socialists were quickly curbed, even in the 
supposedly heavily armed capital. The militant Left realised for the first time that the 
overestimation of its own power and the underestimation of the Army’s initiative would have 
fatal consequences. (Rinke 2007: 157; Codoceo 2007 44-46) 
The main connecting roads to the capital were cut off, the leftist broadcasting stations were 
occupied. At 8:40 a.m. the military broadcast (on Radio Agricultura) its first appeal for the 
president to surrender. President Allende refused to capitulate and instead held out in the 
presidential palace La Moneda even as it was bombed around noon. At 9:10 a.m. he broadcast 
(on Radio Magallanes y Corporación) his last speech to the Chilean people, in which he 
swore not to give up defending the Constitution. Eventually, as the palace was bombed from 
the air and troops invaded the palace, he committed suicide. (Rinke 2007: 157; Codoceo 36-
37) 
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It is interesting to analyse the course of the coup in the light of the negligible resistance. There 
was no parallel leftist army, nor a strong defence at Allende’s disposition. Under these 
circumstances, it seems quite obvious that there was no military necessity to attack the 
Moneda with such means. The bombardment must be seen as a strong symbol, not so much 
enacted for its need, but for the message it spread: It showed that the military would not recoil 
from the use of martial means if necessary to pursue its plan. This becomes quite obvious in 
the Decretos (Decrees) issued on the same day, where the military made explicit reference to 
the bombing of the Moneda as a punishment if the people did not subordinate. (Codoceo 
2007: 39 et seqq.) Furthermore, the attack on the Moneda must be seen in the context of 
competing factions within the Fuerzas Armadas (FF.AA., Armed Forces). As mentioned 
above, Pinochet had not been a member of the plot until shortly before the coup was 
performed (although his acquiescence was vital for the coup to be successful). As the 
Commander of the Army, however, he was highest in the military hierarchy. An open 
concurrence had developed between him and the air force’s General Leigh regarding who 
should take control after the president had been overthrown. The air bombing was a means of 
General Leigh to prove his allegiance to the plot, the invasion of the palace can be interpreted 
as General Pinochet’s attempt to stand the pace. (ibid. 40 et seqq.) It was especially important 
for the latter to show that he had changed his mind completely to the point of brutally 
persecuting the UP he had previously tolerated. As Codoceo shows, Pinochet underwent a 
radical change with the September 11th coup, from a moderate Constitutionalist to a brutal 
dictator. (2007: 40 et seqq.) 
 
As to the involvement of the U.S. in the military coup of September 11th, no evidence was 
found that the CIA had any direct influence on the event itself. The coup was, however, 
endorsed by the Nixon administration, and the financial aid, military cooperation and the 
destabilisation policies against the UP government definitely played an important role in the 
developments leading to the coup. (Rinke 2007: 157) The financial aid, which had been 
considerably cut back during the UP period, was resumed after the coup. Early attempts by 
the United Nations to inquire into the human rights violations and at adopting a resolution 
against the Junta were blocked by the U.S. (ibid. 161) 
 
The reactions to the coup were quite different. While the UP supporters immediately realised 
that it meant nothing good for them, the opposition and large sections of society actually 
welcomed the military’s intervention. The calls for the military to intervene had been based 
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on the belief that it was the only institution which could restore political stability and 
democracy, enjoying a widespread trust. (Rottensteiner 1996: 14; Rinke 2007: 158; Klein 
1993: 73) The diverging labels for the event show this split quite well: while the supporters of 
the coup saw it as a “pronunciamiento militar” (a sort of authoritative announcement, ending 
the previous chaos), the opponents defined it as nothing less than a “golpe de Estado” (a coup 
d’état, clearly breaking with the democratic tradition). (Rottensteiner 1996: 15) 
 
The Junta that now took charge consisted of the four generals which had planned the coup. 
Initially at least, the plan was to restore the power to the political parties, after the perceived 
threat had been defeated. The FF.AA. would then return to the “barracks” and withdraw from 
the political process. However, internalising the role preached by the Doctrine of National 
Security and of neoliberalism, the military set another, more far-reaching objective: to 
completely restructure Chile politically, economically and socially. The purpose of the coup 
then was not only to react to the crisis in which the political and social system were, but also 
to create or restructure a new system altogether, sought to prevent similar developments as 
had preceded the coup. (Rottensteiner 1996: 16; Klein 1993: 58) 
 
As a further justification of their intervention, the Junta denounced an alleged so-called “Plan 
Z” of the UP. According to the military, the UP had been secretly preparing a paramilitary 
action with support from Cuba, planning to assassinate leading oppositional political figures 
and military officers on September 19th. The proofs for this were printed in the “El Libro 
Blanco del cambio de gobierno en Chile” (The White Book of Change of Chilean 
Government) in October 1973, in which the UP is further incriminated with human rights 
violations. There is clear agreement, however, that both “Plan Z” and the “White Book” were 
invented by the military in order to justify and legitimise the brutal coup. (del Campo 2002: 
28 et seqq.; Codoceo 2007: 48 et seqq.) 
 
The first important document to be released on the 11th was the “Acta de Constitución de la 
Junta de Gobierno” (Founding Charter of the Government Board, DL 1), which declares the 
military to be the constitutional defender of the state. According to the Acta, as Chile was 
being systematically destroyed by a “dogmatic and exclusive” ideology, the military saw it as 
their duty to intervene: 
 “Considerando:  
[...] 1.o- Que la Fuerza Pública, formada constitucionalmente por el Ejército, la Armada, la Fuerza Aérea y el 
Cuerpo de Carabineros, representa la organización que el Estado se ha dado para el resguardo y defensa de su 
integridad física y moral y de su identidad histórico-cultural; 
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[...]3.o- Que Chile se encuentra en un proceso de destrucción sistemática e integral de estos elementos 
constitutivos de su ser, por efecto de la intromisión de una ideología dogmática y excluyente, inspirada en los 
principios foráneos del marxismo-leninismo; 
 
Han acordado, en cumplimiento del impostergable deber que tal misión impone a los organismos defensores del 
Estado, dictar el siguiente, 
Decreto-ley:  
1.o- Con esta fecha se constituyen en Junta de Gobierno y asumen el Mando Supremo de la -ación, con el 
patriótico compromiso de restaurar la chilenidad, la justicia y la institucionalidad quebrantadas [...].” (Acta de 
Constitución de la Junta de Gobierno, 1973)5 
 
The initial idea was that the leadership would rotate among them, General Pinochet taking the 
first term due to the traditional primacy of the Army. One of the first measures of the Junta 
was to dissolve Congress and the prohibition and persecution of the leftist political parties and 
movements: 
 
 “[…] los [p]artidos […] y todas aquellas entidades, agrupaciones, facciones o movimientos que sustenten la 
doctrina marxista o que por sus fines o por la conducta de sus adherentes sean sustancialmente coincidentes con 
los principios y objetivos de dicha doctrina [...].” (Decreto Ley 77, 1973)6  
 
The PN dissolved voluntarily, as it saw its main objectives (leadership by the military, 
modernisation of Chilean economy according to neoliberal principles) achieved through the 
coup. (Rinke 2007: 160; Klein 1978: 84) The freedom of the media was abolished, most 
newspapers being shut down and all media being subjected to censorship, with the 
conservative El Mercurio rising to the main mouthpiece of the regime. (Rinke 2007: 160; 
Klein 1993: 93) 
 
2. The Doctrine of 7ational Security 
 
The Doctrine of National Security was greatly influenced and propagated by the U.S. and the 
Brazilian dictatorship during the Cold War and found its supporters in other Latin American 
military regimes – in Argentina, Uruguay and Brazil. It stipulated that the utmost threat to the 
                                                 
5 Considering: 
1st- That the Public Force, constitutionally formed by the Armed Forces, the Navy, the Air Force and the Police 
Corps, represents the organisation that the State has given itself in order to protect and defend its physical and 
moral integrity and its historic-cultural identity; […] 
3rd- That Chile is currently in a process of systematic and comprehensive destruction of these constituting 
elements, due to the interference of a dogmatic and excluding ideology inspired by the foreign principles of 
Marxism-Leninism; 
Have agreed, in compliance with the urgent duty that such a mission imposes on the State defence organisms, to 
dictate the following, 
Decree: 
1st- With this date the Government Board is constituted and takes the supreme command of the nation, with the 
patriotic commitment to restore chilenity [chilenidad], justice and the disrupted institutions […]. (own 
translation) 
6 […] the parties […] and all entities, groupings, factions or movements that sustain the Marxist doctrine or 
which by their aims or the conduct of their members are substantially coincident with the principles and 
objectives of the aforementioned doctrine […]. (own translation) 
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nation was Marxism, which infiltrated society and used its democratic political procedures 
and institutions to gradually install a Communist dictatorship. After the Cuban Revolution in 
1959, the threat of a further spread of Marxism in Latin America seemed imminent. In order 
to effectively ban the threat, the means had to be adapted to the circumstances: In a partisan 
war, the distinction between enemies and civilians became blurred. Every citizen was 
potentially a subversive element. Traditional democracy and political processes were not 
efficient in fending the advance of the Marxists and were rather propitious for them, so in the 
name of National Security, democracy had to be curtailed. (Rottensteiner 1996: 17 et seqq.) 
The nation was now in a “War for the salvation of the nation” against Communist intruders. 
(Rinke 2007: 158)  
 
„El marxismo es una doctrina simplemente equivocada, como ha habido tantas en la historia. -o. El marxismo 
es una doctrina intrínsecamente perversa, lo que significa que todo lo que de ella brota, por sano que se 
presente en apariencias, está carcomido por el veleno que corroe su raíz. Esto es lo que quiere decir que su 
error sea intrínseco y, por eso mismo, global, en términos que no cabe con él ningún diálogo o transacción 
posibles. 
-o obstante la realidad contemporánea indica que el marxismo no es únicamente una doctrina intrínsecamente 
perversa. Es además una agresión permanente, hoy al servicio del imperialismo soviético. [...] guerra no 
convencional […]. […] infiltra los núcleos vitales de las sociedades libres [...]. [...] promueve el desorden en 
todas sus formas. [...] El objetivo [...] es el debilitamiento de las sociedades que la secta roja no controla, a fin 
de poder dejar caer sus garras sobre ellas en el momento oportuno, para convertirlas en nuevos satélites del 
imperialismo soviético, donde un implacable régimen totalitario no tolera ni el mas leve atisbo de las 
manifestaciones que en cambio él mismo estimulo en las sociedades libres.” [emphasis by Klein] (Pinochet, 
Augusto: Mensaje del Presidente, in: El Mercurio, September 12th 1976; quoted in: Klein 1993: 68 et seqq.)7 
 
Under such circumstances, the military was not only allowed but requisitioned to overcome 
the society-military separation and to intervene in the political process, with whatever means 
it deemed necessary. (Klein 1993: 63; Codoceo 2007: 48) And in order to be successful, it 
was mandatory to take control over all activities and institutions of society – with the 
exception of the economy (regarding regulation), as will be shown below. This was done with 
the first Decreto Ley (DL 1) in which the constitutive, legislative and executive powers were 
assembled in the Junta, without any sort of checks and balances incorporated. (Klein 1993: 
93)  
                                                 
7 Marxism is simply a misguided doctrine, such as there have been so many in history. No. Marxism is an 
intrinsically perverse doctrine, which means that everything that emanates from it, however sound it might seem, 
is rotten by the poison that runs through its roots. That is why its mistake is intrinsic, and as such, global, in  the 
terms that dialogue or deals are impossible with it. 
Nevertheless, contemporary reality shows that Marxism is not just an intrinsically perverted doctrine. It is also a 
permanent aggression, nowadays at the service of Soviet imperialism. […] unconventional war […]. […] it 
infiltrates the vital cores of free societies […]. […] it promotes chaos in all its forms. […] The objective […] is 
the weakening of the societies which are not under the control of the red sect, with the aim of dropping its claws 
over them at an opportune time in order to convert them into new satellites of Soviet imperialism, where a 
relentless totalitarian regime does not even tolerate the smallest inkling of the manifestations it had previously 
stimulated in the free societies. (own translation) 
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The notwithstanding conservative judiciary posed no significant hurdle to the regime. It was 
later to be strongly criticised for its immediate subordination to the Junta, not staging any sort 
of resistance or reproach for the human rights and constitutional violations. (Rinke 2007: 161; 
Klein 1993: 93) 
The military as the traditional and constitutionally defined guardian of the national unity and 
integrity was supposedly legitimised to intervene under such circumstances as it did, as the 
values it was supposed to protect were at great risk. Their task would only be completed when 
the “enemies” and the roots of their ascension (the political weakness in society at large) had 
been completely eradicated. (Klein 1993: 69) As social conflicts were reduced in this ally-
enemy dichotomy, any defiant opinion or criticism was regarded as insurgent. Additionally, 
the concept of chilenidad, which according to the regime’s construction reflected the Chilean 
moral and historic-cultural identity and was therefore intrinsically contrary to atheist 
Marxism, was put in the foreground as the most important value to be protected. This being 
said, the danger not only concerned the Western traditional capitalist values, but the very 
essence of “chilenity” itself. The defence against Marxism was thus elevated to a historic 
sacred mission. (Codoceo 2007: 50 et seqq.) 
 
In order to fight the elements and structures they regarded as responsible for the chaos and 
threat of democracy, the Junta first decreed all three types of states: of emergency, of war and 
of siege. A curfew was introduced which remained in force for many years. This made it 
possible to persecute the Left with rampant measures and an oppression which has been a 
strong reason for the cleavage in the assessment of the regime in society even today. 
Outstanding personalities sympathising with the UP were persecuted, tortured and murdered 
exemplarily (i. a. the famous singer Víctor Jara, university professors, politicians), eventually 
all political parties were affected by the prohibition by 1977, and the most influential labour 
union Central Única de Trabajadores (CUT, Worker’s United Centre) was dissolved. (del 
Campo 2002: 27; Codoceo 2007: 56; Klein 1993: 95) 
 
3. The consolidation of the military regime 
 
It must be stressed that in spite of its “rebellion”, the FF.AA. endeavoured to abide by the 
strong legalistic tradition in Chile (even the UP government with its radical measures had 
remained within the frame of legislation, though the militant leftist factions did not). This 
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meant that the rule of the Junta be institutionalised and legalised in a new Constitution. 
(Rottensteiner 1996: 17) 
 The military had justified the coup with the defence of the Constitution; as it was now 
advocating a new social order, it needed a correspondent framework to abide by. The 
preparations for it began shortly after the coup, but the new draft was not ready to be voted 
until 1980. In the meantime, provisional constitutional amendments (Actas Constitucionales) 
were introduced in order to legalise the actions of the regime after the coup. However, as 
Rinke (2007) points out, even this framework was breached by the Junta, as it did not recoil 
from breaching its own provisions in order to pursue its major projects. (2007: 161; 
Klein1993: 103) 
The recourse to traditionally democratic concepts as the presidency (which Pinochet took over 
in 1974) and plebiscites (performed in 1978 and 1980 – although the circumstances did not 
allow for fair proceedings) can be seen as attempts at legitimising the regime in a country 
with a long democratic tradition. (Klein 1993: 91) The overcoming of the deep economic 
crisis would do the rest for the legitimisation and popularity of the Junta. (Codoceo 2007: 56) 
The plebiscite (“Consulta -acional”) of January 1978 was held as a reaction to international 
criticism and reprobation of the human rights violations of the regime (and the assassinations 
abroad, discussed below). Chileans were asked to declare their support for the regime. In spite 
of the objections of the Catholic Church and of other members of the Junta, Pinochet forged 
ahead with the undertaking and officially attained nearly three-quarters of the vote – under all 
but democratic conditions. Pinochet used the result as an opportunity to widen his 
predominance over the other members of the Junta. (Klein 1993: 106) 
 
The main targets of the military regime’s oppression and persecution were the members and 
sympathisers of the Left. Vendettas, house searches, book burnings, arrests, torture (35,868), 
disappearances (979), extrajudicial executions and assassinations (1,319), forced exile and 
banishment from public offices became recurrent. (Codoceo 2007: 55; Rottensteiner 1996: 
18-19; del Campo 2002: 27) On September 11th the national stadium in Santiago was 
transformed into a concentration camp where political prisoners were tortured and 
“disappeared”. Others were sent to another camp on Isla Dawson in the Strait of Magellan in 
the far-south, where they endured harsh conditions, forced labour and almost complete 
seclusion from their families. (del Campo 2002: 27 et seqq.) 84.42% of the killings and 
disappearances were registered in the first years of the regime, between 1973 and 1978. 
(Codoceo 2007: 55)  
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It was clear to the Junta that it would not serve its interests for the military to be identified 
with the massive human rights violations, internally and externally. (Klein 1993: 100 et seqq.) 
A new institution was created in June 1974, the Dirección -acional de Inteligencia (DINA, 
National Intelligence Directorate), led by General Manuel Contreras, which was directly 
subordinated to General Pinochet.  
 
“[…] organismo militar de carácter técnico profesional, dependiente directamente de la Junta de Gobierno y 
cuya misión será la de reunir toda la información a nivel nacional [...] con el propósito de producir la 
inteligencia que se requiera para la formulación de políticas, planificación y para la adopción de medidas que 
procuren el resguardo de la seguridad nacional y el desarrollo del país.”  (Decreto Ley 521, 1974)8  
 
The Junta thereby outsourced its repressive actions and assassinations, which nonetheless 
remained under General Pinochet’s control. The concentration of all repressive actions in one 
institution enhanced a better specialisation and coordination, and allowed for the military to 
withdraw from that political chapter (namely the persecution of dissidents). As the leftist 
partisans had either been caught in the first days, fled Chile or gone underground, the 
measures were adapted to combing through society in search of insurrectional elements. The 
activities of the DINA did not confine to Chile; as many tens of thousands of Chileans had 
fled the country or been forcefully exiled, the DINA cooperated with the Operación Condor 
(a coordination project of the Latin American military regimes in Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Bolivia, Chile and the CIA, consisting of “[…] Informationsaustausch, die 
Einrichtung eines „Oppositionellenarchivs“ und die Bildung von Spezialeinheiten, zu deren 
Aufgabe auch die Ermordung politischer Gegner gehörte“). (del Campo 2002: 29 et seqq.; 
Rinke 2007: 160) Three particular incidents, the assassination of General Carlos Prats in 
Buenos Aires in 1974, of the Christian Democrat Bernardo Leighton in Rome in 1975 (who 
survived badly wounded) and of the UP Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlando Letelier in 
Washington D.C. in September 1976 caused a great stir, especially in the U.S. (which 
supported and agreed on DINA’s activities as long as they did not occur in the U.S.). (Rinke 
2007: 160; del Campo 2002: 29) 
As the Catholic Church, the U.S. under the new Democrat President Jimmy Carter (especially 
after Letelier’s assassination in Washington D.C.) and the United Nations increased their 
pressure on the regime to curb the systematic human rights violations (the U.S. particularly 
imposing an arms embargo), the DINA was dissolved in August 1977 and replaced by the 
                                                 
8 […] a military organ with technical-professional character, directly dependent of the Government Board and 
whose mission will be the gathering of all information at the national level […] with the aim to produce the 
required intelligence for the formulation of policies, plans and for the adoption of measures that foment the 
protection of the national security and the development of the country. (own translation) 
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practically identical Central -acional de Información (CNI, National Information Centre). 
Though the violations did continue, the number of desaparecidos dwindled considerably. 
(Rottensteiner 1996: 19) In spite of the tensions, the regime made an enormous effort to 
maintain good external relations with the U.S., especially in consideration of the importance 
of exports for the economic plan. (Rinke 2007: 161 et seqq.) 
 
4. The programme of the military regime 
 
The main idea behind the restructuring of society was to depoliticise society. Ideologies were 
made responsible for the crises of the past. In order for the same circumstances not to develop 
again, the regime set forth a project of banning all political parties and political activities of 
any sort. In this reasoning the military reflected the perception of the Right, especially of the 
PN. Resenting its displacement as the dominant political faction, the PN blamed the political 
modernisation with broader participation and liberalisation of democracy for the decay of the 
nation. (Klein 1993: 59 et seqq.) The two legacies which should be targeted above all were 
the Estatismo (initiated under the Frei administration and intensified under Allende) and the 
(multi)party democracy. Instead of the highly ideological, inclusive, mobilising and 
demagogic party democracy of the preceding decades, the Right favoured the idealised 
authoritative hierarchical Portilian model from the 19th century, where order and progress 
ostensibly enabled the country to prosper. (ibid. 61 et seqq.) According to this view, the origin 
of social and political conflicts was not to be found in the structures themselves (i.e. inherent 
to any society) but rather as a result of Marxist subversion attempts at destabilising the nation. 
The aim of the Right (the PN and the Patria y Libertad) and the gremios (which had 
significantly contributed to the destabilisation in the UP period) was to reinstall an 
authoritative, corporatist social order, where the gremios would be the link between the state 
authority and the social base. (ibid. 67-74) 
The regime went one step further in its concept for a new society, aiming not only at 
excluding the middle and lower classes from the democratic process, but any particular 
interests in general – including those of the formerly privileged Right. Mediators (e.g. unions) 
between the state and society, which had been an important constituent in the democratic 
decision process and had enjoyed far-reaching privileges, were dismantled and prohibited. 
(ibid. 74 et seqq., 80, 94)  
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Neoliberalism 
 
The crisis in Chile was not restricted to the political system, but affected the economy as well. 
It was obvious that the situation could not go on as it was. The Junta was determined to tackle 
the problems and was convinced that for this it was necessary to break with the programme 
and measures of the UP period. Initially, however, the military regime did not have a proper 
plan how this was to be achieved. Therefore, it confined itself to re-privatising some of the 
businesses nationalised under Allende, and proceeding with the state incentives. (Klein 1993: 
73)  
 
In 1956 an agreement between the University of Chicago and the Universidad Católica de 
Chile had been concluded (prepared by the Chicago professors T.W. Schultz, Earl J. 
Hamilton, Arnols Harberger and Simon Rottenberg in June 1955 in Chile), which started a 
student and professor exchange between the two universities, lasting until 1964. (Codoceo 
2007: 57) Many later influential Chilean economists profited from the exchange and were 
influenced by the Monetarist Neoliberal scholars in Chicago (later known as the Chicago 
Boys). In the 1960s, as the first of them had returned and graduated, they gained influence in 
the universities and private economy, and put their learning into practice: For the 1970 
presidential election they prepared an economic concept for the Conservative Alessandri, 
adapted to Chilean reality, in which they designed the necessary measures and restructuring to 
overcome the crisis. (Klein 1993: 75 et seqq.; Codoceo 2007: 58) As Alessandri did not win 
the election, the Chicago Boys continued to elaborate their economic plans and concepts 
during the UP administration. This was an important advantage for them, as when the military 
took charge, it was in need of a conceived programme, which they could immediately lay 
before. In addition, the highly technocratic character of the programme was most suitable for 
the social change envisaged by the military (depoliticisation and modernisation) and 
compatible with the Doctrine of National Security. Initially an auxiliary to the regime it soon 
became the main ideology behind most policies and plans, pervading all areas of society. 
(Klein 1993: 77) The technocratic and scientific nature of the neoliberal reasoning increased 
its acceptance by the military, which recognised it as the only non-partisan and scientifically 
true approach available. The claim of objective truth clearly implies an authoritarian concept 
of power, as one of the state’s tasks is to ensure that this truth is not questioned or 
undermined. (ibid. 82-83) 
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Eventually, in 1975 Milton Friedman (an important economist at the University of Chicago, 
later to receive the Nobel Prize in Economics; advocate of Monetarism and opponent of 
Keynesianism) met personally with Pinochet in his visit to Chile, and was able to convince 
him of the primacy of the neoliberal concept. This was the turning point to the entry of the 
Chicago Boys and of technocracy to power. As will be shown in the next section, this also 
meant the ascendency of General Pinochet as the strongman of the regime. Unrivalled, the 
technocrats were able to push through their ideas and programme despite the strong 
opposition to the measures and the initial setbacks. (Klein 1993: 90-31, 102) 
 
Some of the problems and causes for the crisis were identified in the inefficiency in the use of 
resources, the public expenditure deficit, the overprotection from foreign concurrence and 
ownership, the overregulation of private initiative, production and the capital market, the 
soaring inflation rate (rising around 1% daily), the unproductiveness of the economy, the 
stagnating exportation and the imbalance of payments. (Klein 1993: 121-123) Although many 
of the problems had been created and exacerbated deliberately by the U.S. and the Right 
(boycotts, sabotage, destabilisation), the crisis was also rooted in the many mistakes of the 
Allende policies and in the very structures, rules and procedures of the economy themselves. 
Tackling these causes was prioritised, as the regime quickly understood that its legitimacy 
was strongly linked to an economic recovery. (Codoceo 2007: 56) 
 
The main idea was to abolish the broadly criticised Estatismo (“statism”), i.e. the active 
interventionist role of the state and the according claiming, expectant attitude of the people; 
the state was not to intervene in the economy any more, or only where it seemed absolutely 
crucial. In the last decades the state had increasingly taken over tasks and initiatives from 
society and had thereby contributed to the suppression of individual and private initiative and 
freedom, seen as crucial for economic growth, and lead to increasing dependency from the 
state. (Klein 1993: 60, 79)  
 
„[…] Sin embargo, cuando el Estado se va metiendo cada vez más en la economía, casí todas se convierten en 
decisiones de tipo político, que se votan directamente. El mercado y la iniciativa individuales, pasan a ser 
tapadas por el monstruo estatal y, de hecho, la iniciativa y los derechos de las personas se convierten en letra 
muerta.”  (Bardón 1978: La Nueva institucionalidad Económica, in: Informe Gemines 15, 83, quoted in: Klein 
1993: 60)9 
 
                                                 
9 Nevertheless, if the State increasingly interferes in the economy, nearly all decisions become political in 
nature, and are voted directly. The market and individual initiative are suppressed by the state monster and, in 
fact, the initiative and rights of people become empty rhetoric. (own translation) 
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Withdrawing from this swollen role, the state would finally allow the economy to regulate 
itself according to the rules of the free market, which would eventually lead to natural growth, 
efficiency and prosperity: It was believed that each person, given the freedom of choice in a 
free market, would eventually make the most optimal choices for oneself. (ibid. 80) With the 
addition of free optimised choices, the market would automatically regulate itself accordingly, 
creating not only ideal circumstances and outputs, but also political freedom: Through their 
choices and preferences, individuals restricted the state’s power to interfere arbitrarily. Main 
aspects of the new policies were individualism, consumerism, modernisation, privatisation 
and the overhaul of values and rules no longer deemed important. (Klein 1993: 84) 
An intended effect of the withdrawal of the state was a significant reduction in public 
expenditure and a renaturation of the bloated state institutions, thus increasing efficiency and 
allowing for a reorientation of capacities. (ibid. 113) 
 
The only way to do this was to privatise and liberalise economy and society as a whole, and 
the regime’s intervention was aimed at enabling this shift and “liberation” to take place – 
intervening in order to stop intervention, regulating in order to ban regulation. The state’s role 
was to be reduced to “die Schaffung und die anschließende Bewahrung eines „geschützten 
Bereiches“ für die Individuen, der aus der Summe von stabilen Regeln, die die notwendige 
Abwesenheit von Unsicherheit hinsichtlich der Fähigkeit persönliche Erwartungen im Zuge 
des Austausches zu erfüllen, besteht.” (Klein 1993: 79) Any further intervention or distortion 
by the state, including measures aimed at redistribution and compensation for the social 
inequities, was not allowed. On the contrary, the ensuing different positions and order were 
regarded as natural and fair, as they emanated from the free doing of the market. (ibid. 80 et 
seqq.) 
 
Another characteristic ensuing from neoliberalism is that interests are necessarily individual. 
This means that they are only free and natural if they are not influenced or manipulated 
through the forging of factional interests. (Klein 1993: 81) This being said, parties, unions and 
other forms of agglomeration of interests were prohibited and illegitimate in a system which 
protected the freedom of the market above all. This ban included the gremios, which were 
also seen as a source of distortion of interests and of the individual freedom. Taken a step 
further, it is easy to realise that these principles are also attributable to the decision making 
process in general, discrediting majority decisions and collective mobilisation. (ibid. 82) In a 
perfect symbiosis, the authoritarian state had the necessary power to repress the articulation 
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(in free media) of aggregated social interests represented in different organisations (free 
unions, opposition parties, parliament), a prerequisite to the full functioning of the free 
market. (ibid. 82, 122) Democracy, then, cannot be representative by nature, but is fulfilled in 
the market itself. The idea was, simply said, to destroy the old structures and order, and by 
depoliticising society to permit the market rules to materialise in a new system. (Klein 1993: 
83-85) 
 
The economy was to undergo a “Shock-Plan” (from spring 1975 onwards), including radical 
cuts in public expenditure, state investment, the deregulation of the banking system, the 
decrease of import tariffs (from 1974, gradually to a flat 10% rate in 1977), the privatisation 
of nearly all state businesses and the opening to foreign investment and ownership (repealing 
the discrimination of foreign investors in March 1977). (Klein 1993: 124, 125) In order to do 
this, Chile resigned from the Andean pact in late 1976, which Allende had eagerly helped to 
draw up. (Rinke 2007: 162, Klein 1993: 125)  
The gremios, which had hoped to (re-)gain a privileged position in the new economic 
structures were put behind as their ideas contradicted a fully self-regulating and free market as 
propagated by neoliberalism. (Rinke 2007: 162)  
One of the most important measures to be implemented was the Plan Laboral and further 
reforms introduced in 1979 by the Minister of Employment and Social Affairs, José Piñera 
(brother of the incumbent president, Sebastián Piñera), radically changing many areas of the 
social system: 
 
“Todas ellas robustecen la libertad de decisión de las personas. El Plan Laboral con la libertad sindical; la 
futura reforma previsional con un sistema de pensiones basada en la capitalización individual; la Directiva 
Educacional y la reforma de la salud a través de la descentralización operativa y la mayor flexibilidad de 
opciones individuales; la modernización judicial al hacer más efectivo y expedito el acdeso [sic] de toda 
persona a la justicia; el reordenamiento agrícola al fortalecer la propiedad privada en el campo; y por último, 
la reforma administrativa al agilizar el sector estatal y permitir reducir su tamaño que abruma con su pesada 
carga a todos los chilenos.” (Piñera 1979: Dar un golpe de timón, crear esquemas nuevos ..., Interview in: Qué 
pasa 454 (27. Dec. 1979 – 2. Jan. 1980), 8, quoted in Klein 1993: 111-112)10 
 
Through liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, an increase in the role of experts and 
technocrats and by taking back the role of the state, parties and unions, Chile was to undergo a 
rapid modernisation based on rationality and freedom, as opposed to dogmatism and ideology. 
                                                 
10 All of them strengthen the freedom of choice of people. The Work Plan with the union freedom; the future 
provisional reform with a pension system based on individual capitalisation; the Educational Directive with the 
health care reform through the operational decentralisation and the higher flexibility of individual options; the 
judiciary modernisation by making the access of all people to justice more effective and expeditious; the agrarian 
reorganisation by strengthening private property in rural areas; and finally the administration reform by speeding 
up the state sector and allowing to reduce its size, which with its enormous weight crushes every Chilean. (own 
translation)  
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(Klein 1993: 112, Codoceo 2007: 59) The role of the traditionally strong labour unions was 
severely cut back, allowing on the one hand an easier creation and thereby fragmentation of 
unions (lowering the minimum membership figure and allowing for parallel unions), on the 
other hand restricting their influence on the assertion process: interests were no longer seen as 
collective but individual, so the collective articulation was reduced to salaries and working 
conditions on firm level. (Klein 1993: 119) The freedom of organisation was withdrawn for 
the public servants. The market principles had found their way to the work legislation and 
relations: The very relationship between the state, the companies and the unions was radically 
changed: the conflicts and discussions between employers and employees were henceforth 
seen as private issues, in which the state should not meddle. (Codoceo 2007: 66, 68) During 
the Allende period, employment had been enforced and protected often at the cost of 
productivity and profitability. Under the Plan Laboral, jobs were no longer protected 
(especially in the case of a strike), leading to increasing unemployment, especially in the 
industry. The fear of job loss therefore became pivotal, driving back the need to express 
discontent in and stand for unions. (Klein 1993: 119-120, Codoceo 2007: 66) The main union, 
the CUT was prohibited and its leaders persecuted. Any unions deemed as “political”, 
ideological and deviant to the neoliberal ideals of the regime (i.e. Communist, revolutionary, 
confrontational) were prohibited. (Codoceo 2007: 66) Mobilisation of workers became almost 
impossible with the introduction of curfews, the proclamation of state of emergency and of 
war. (ibid. 67) With the passage of the new Constitution in 1980, these principles were further 
elevated and established in the 19th article (paragraphs 15 to 19). (Constitución Política de la 
República de Chile 1980) 
 
The fiscal deficit was to be drastically reduced. Some of the most important policies were the 
ban on state price controls and regulations, the liberalisation of the capital market, the 
devaluation of the escudo, the introduction of a fixed exchange rate towards the dollar in 
January 1978, the considerable cut in state expenditure (except on the military, from 40% in 
1973 to 87% of total expenditures in 1986) and the ban on protective tariffs. The state reduced 
its role as main entrepreneur and investor (reducing its investments by 15-20%) to a 
minimum, promoting private ownership and investment. (Klein 1993: 121-124, 135) The 
income tax was raised while wages declined. Production was deregulated, allowing for a 
diversification and reorientation of commodities (especially targeted at export). 
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The initial result (1974-1976) was a continued increase in prices (inflation) with a decrease of 
real wages, a surge of unemployment, the lapse of the GNP (-12.9%), of the industrial 
production and of the purchasing power. (Rinke 2007: 162-163, Codoceo 2007: 63) Other 
factors further exacerbated the situation, as the oil price increased and the copper export 
proceeds stagnated. (Rinke 2007: 162, Klein 1993: 124-125) The Junta nevertheless 
continued implementing its plan, in spite of the bad performance and the rising criticisms.  
However, from around 1977 until 1981 the economy actually stabilised as a result of the 
drastic measures. (Rinke 2007: 162 et seqq.) Within few years the solvency of Chile had been 
restored and foreign investors were pouring money into the national economy. The budget 
deficits were tackled by 1979 and the balance of trade profited from the privatisations and 
reduction in subventions. With the renewed trust from the international financial institutions 
(with whom the Chicago Boys were well interconnected), Chile was able to renegotiate its 
foreign debts and credits. (Klein 1993: 86-87) The inflation rate finally dropped after many 
decades of abortive attempts, exports and industrial production soared. The agrarian industry 
was realigned for the export sector, produce was diversified. Within four years the economy 
had managed a 32% growth. (Rinke 2007: 163) As one of the first countries to actually 
introduce neoliberalism thus radically, Chile was celebrated as the showpiece of the possible 
economic miracle. (ibid.; Klein 1993: 128) Though there were also other countries which 
followed the neoliberal doctrine in their policies (in the U.K. under Margaret Thatcher and the 
U.S. under Ronald Reagan), none of them were under such an authoritarian rule which 
combined neoliberalism with the Doctrine of National Security thus meticulously. 
There were nevertheless some indicators that show the difficulties of keeping up the recovery: 
Though GNP was rising again, it did not reach the increase rates it had formerly achieved; the 
production of produce did not increase enough to meet the demands of society; in the service 
sector, growth was slow; the investment rate did not recover from its backlash; and 
unemployment soared, effectively cutting back purchasing power. (Klein 1993: 128) Imports 
were still necessary and benefited from the overrated Peso (due to the fixed dollar exchange 
rate), while exports only grew slowly. The promoted mass consumerism only exacerbated the 
situation, vaulting the foreign balance of payments deficit and debt. (ibid. 128-129) 
Apprehending a substantial increase of their credit costs, the new company conglomerates 
effectively (backed by the dogmatic Minister of Finance de Castro) averted the necessary 
devaluation of the peso until 1982 (thus distorting the allegedly free regulation of the market). 
(Klein 1993: 130, Rinke 2007: 168) When the urgent devaluation was finally performed (and 
de Castro was replaced), it was already too late: From a soaring economic miracle, Chile 
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tumbled into the worst crisis since the 1950s (surpassing even the crisis of the 1970s) from 
1981. As the GNP fell dramatically (-14.1%) and the unemployment rate soared to 30%, the 
Junta decided to intervene, pushing the already climbing foreign debt to US$ 19 billion in 
1983. (Klein 1993: 130, Codoceo 2007: 63-64) Along with credits and grants, the central bank 
was urged to take over the five biggest private banks in order to avoid a financial failure; it 
was pivotal to preserve the international trust in order to avoid an increase of credit costs from 
the international financial institutions. (Klein 1993: 131, Rinke 2007: 168) 
 
It would be erroneous therefore to assume that the Chilean state had effectively withdrawn 
from the economy. In spite of the neoliberal discourse, the state kept its intervention and 
regulation in certain areas regarded as essential to the national economy, such as copper. The 
idea behind state interventionism however changed from the pursuit of social equity under 
Allende to the pursuit of new market relations and growth. (Rinke 2007: 163) As the ensuing 
economic crisis became unavoidable, the state intervened with grants, re-nationalisations of 
recently privatised companies and employment programmes in order to prevent the worst. By 
November 1983, the state had regained control over around 60% of the national capital. 
(Klein 1993: 131) Banished measures such as tariffs (raised from 10% until 1982 to 20% in 
1983 and 35% in 1984), protectionism, luxury taxes and controlled interest rates were re-
introduced. (ibid.; Codoceo 2007: 62) Through these measures, the state reversed its anti-
interventionist policies, and the Chicago Boys saw their credibility and popularity tumble. 
This was not, however, to last: From 1985, the economy began to recover and as the 
indicators improved, the Chicago Boys returned to power along with their neoliberal 
programme. Many of the emergency nationalised companies, industries and banks were re-
privatised, leading to further foreign ownership, as the national investors were recovering 
from the economic distress and did not have the necessary means to purchase the assets. As a 
result, ownership became even more concentrated than before 1982. (Klein 1993: 131-132) 
Further sectors previously in state hand were privatised, such as electricity, gas, water and 
telecommunications. The tariffs were considerably reduced again. (Codoceo 2007: 61-62) In 
the remaining years of the regime, Chile experienced a good recovery, with an average 7% 
growth. (Klein 1993: 132, Codoceo 2007: 63-64) One of the positive aspects of the 
restructuring of the economy was the decreased share of copper in the total Chilean exports; 
as production was diversified and re-orientated, Chile was able to reduce its vulnerability to 
world copper price fluctuations. (Klein 1993: 136) As agrarian products increased their share 
in exports, the industrial sector saw a setback in its economic importance. (Klein 1993: 136) 
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With the backing of World Bank credits, Chile was finally able to restructure its foreign debts. 
(Rinke 2007: 168) 
 
An important effect was the rise of a new technocratic elite, composed of the new “Chilean 
manager” type businessmen. Taught in the tradition of neoliberalism, they were characterised 
by their “[…] -eigung zum spekulativen Aktiengeschäft, die internationale Ausrichtung, 
sowie die Offenheit für innovative Geschäftsmethoden.” (Rinke 2007: 163) The new 
generation distinguished itself through a new culture of pragmatism, secularism and 
individualism. (Klein 1993: 147-148) 
 
The purchasing power eventually rose, allowing for a surge of mass consumption and of 
Chilean life standards. Imported goods rushed into the market, the number of cars on the 
streets rose, the new underground in Santiago was inaugurated in 1975, the computer sector 
boomed and new shopping centres appeared almost everywhere. (Rinke 2007: 164)  
However, as the number of unemployed continued to be exorbitant, there was a large 
percentage of Chileans who did not partake in the profits of the economic growth. As the state 
withdrew to a large extent from the economy, it deregulated the employment relationship 
through the Plan Laboral in 1979, leading to a cut-back of workers’ rights and of wages 
(which continually declined until 1987). Most Chileans now found themselves in precarious 
employment contracts, unemployed or having to work in the informal sector in order to get 
along. (ibid.) The number of poor Chileans surged within few years, from around 17% in 
1970 to 41% in 1987 (data from CEPAL, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 64). In a light attempt to 
counteract, the regime started initiatives to build social homing in the worst poblaciones 
(shanty towns) and to employ more people in special programmes. However, the strains of the 
concomitant labour laws and social security reforms (health and pensions) could not be 
compensated thus. 
 
Social and cultural reforms 
 
The social insurance scheme was reformed. This was, alongside the Plan Laboral, one of the 
most important policies of the Minister of Employment and Social Affairs José Piñera. The 
state withdrew from its role as manager of the insurances, privatising the health and pension 
systems. They were no longer to be based on the solidarity principle (inter-generational) but 
on individual provisions and capitalisation. (Codoceo 2007: 65, 69) New private companies 
 74 
emerged offering to administer the individuals’ pension contributions. (ibid. 70) The result 
was a two-tier system, with the ones previously or newly privileged profiting from it. (Rinke 
2007: 169) In the 5-year transition period, Chileans were allowed to choose between the old 
and the new pension system. Spurred by financial incentives, and under the spell of the 
repression of dissent, most Chileans changed to the new system. (Codoceo 2007: 70-71) As 
the social and economic differences were not tackled but rather worsened, a majority of the 
population were put at a disadvantage with the new system. The two-tier system reflected the 
dual social structure which developed from the policies and reforms of the Junta: while an 
entrepreneurial group (and some parts of the middle class) was able to (re-)gain its wealth and 
influence through privatisation, the development of the service and financial sectors, the 
middle class, the workers and the marginalised sectors saw the possibilities for social 
mobility, interest articulation and improved integration worsen considerably. (Klein 1993: 
139) The privatisation of the health system also led to a direct relationship between 
contributions and services and to the creation of new health institutions and administrations. 
However, the new Fondo -acional de Salud (FONASA, National Health Fund) was similar to 
the former Servicio -acional de Salud (SNS, National Health Service) in that the solidarity 
principle remained between healthy and ill contributors, and that the state continued to 
subsidise the system. A variety of different providers with varying percentages of public and 
private contributions emerged. (Codoceo 2007: 71-72) 
 
The agrarian and industrial reforms carried out under the UP government were reversed to a 
large extent (around 30% of land were returned to their original owners, 30% distributed to 
other farmers and 20% to other citizens; the number of state owned companies fell from 596 
in 1973 to 48 in 1983), allowing for large national and foreign companies and corporations to 
buy estate and production. (Codoceo 2007: 60-61) New branches of tourism, wood and 
energy industry developed, and large agro-industrial businesses emerged again. (Rinke 2007: 
164, Klein 1993: 121-122) The industry was modernised and reoriented production towards 
exportation. Effectiveness and productivity rose, accompanied by a worsening of working 
conditions and a decrease of wages. Many of the U.S. companies which had been 
expropriated during the Allende period were remunerated (Klein 1993: 123), though the 
copper production was one of the few sectors exempt from privatisation; it was considered too 
important and crucial to the economy (constituting over 50% of Chilean exports). (Klein 
1993: 127) Therefore, the Junta retained the state ownership of the copper industry. Many of 
the former owners saw their assets back, and in a struggle to undermine any attempt by the 
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Socialists to regain support among the farmers, those who had not been involved in the farmer 
uprisings and land seizures were granted property. (Klein 1993: 127-128) 
 
For the ethnic minorities, especially the Mapuche, the repeal of their legal special status 
worsened their situation again (after it had improved in the UP period), draining even more 
individuals to the urban slums. As the very existence of indigenous minorities was denied (as 
it would not fit the friend-enemy dichotomy), many of the scarce communities disbanded 
themselves. (Rinke 2007: 165) 
 
As for culture, many of the artists which had been successful under Allende were killed, 
exiled or incarcerated in the first months of the regime. Any cultural production which could 
be associated to Marxism was prohibited, a strict censorship was introduced in order to 
prevent any critical content. The elimination of UP legacies included book burnings, the 
physical destruction of artefacts and even terrorist measures. (Rinke 2007: 165) As the 
institutions for the promotion of culture were closed down, the cultural life seemed to have 
come to a standstill. Just as the political and economic systems were to be completely 
changed and the legacies of the past overcome once and for all, Pinochet envisaged a cultural 
revolution which would be based on patriotism, piety and respect. Social conflicts were not to 
be thematised but in a harmonic way. The perceived bad influence of drug traffic, 
pornography, rock music and of U.S. mass culture phenomena was to be curtailed. In spite of 
the withdrawal of the state in regulation and investment, new organisations were created to 
foment cultural events considered to be “authentically Chilean”, especially commercial folk 
music and sports. However, the cultural programme of the regime was not popular, and was 
eventually abandoned. With the spread of television and radio, culture became increasingly 
commercialised, and should therefore be seen as any other product or commodity. As such, 
the state would not subsidise it anymore; the necessary investments and funding were to be 
private as in most other economic areas. In the course of self-regulation (within the 
permission of the censorship) U.S. productions became very popular and superseded Chilean 
ones. (Rinke 2007: 165-166) 
 
The UP education project E-U had been a strong argument for the military to stage a coup, as 
they envisaged it as an attempt at indoctrinating the children with the Communist ideology. 
After the coup, the military sought control over the educational institutions, banning and 
persecuting leftist teachers, professors and students. The rectors of all universities were 
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replaced by Rectores Delegados, mostly members of the military or loyal supporters of the 
regime. (Codoceo 2007: 52, 72) Eventually liberalisation, decentralisation and privatisation 
also reached the educational sector: the state gave up its role as sole provider of education (as 
had been set down in the Constitution of 1925). (Codoceo 2007: 73) Schools were delegated 
to the municipalities, though the regime continued to subsidise them. As private investors 
were allowed to open new facilities, and the public subsidies depended of the number of 
attending pupils, education became capitalised and seen as a form of private investment. The 
universities were also affected by decentralisation and regionalisation; while the state 
continued subsidising them, fees and private investment encouraged the creation of numerous 
private facilities. Under the condition of not advocating for Communism, the state withdrew 
from its role as regulator and guide of the curricula. (ibid. 75-76) 
 
The public transportation system was also liberalised and deregulated, leading to a surge in 
transportation companies for busses, taxis, airlines and shipping. (Codoceo 2007: 62) 
 
Finally, it can be said that the Neoliberal Revolution was only possible and successful in 
Chile due to the military coup. In the wake of the authoritarian rule, it was possible to 
depoliticise society to a large degree and to “free” the market from factional interests and 
privileges to a great extent. (Klein 1993: 85) However, the desired effect of a completely self-
regulating market, in which interests would automatically be considered through the market 
mechanisms of demand and response, did not materialise; instead, the structures of collective 
interest articulation and postulation were destroyed without a replacement, thus silencing 
many social voices. As each individual was left on their own in the market, inequalities had 
not been overcome; while from 1970 to 1973 the 20% poorest Chileans owned 3.1% of total 
capital and the 20% richest 55.4%, between 1974 and 1989 the 20% poorest owned only 
2.7%, whereas the 20% richest owned 62%, transforming Chile into one of the most unequal 
countries worldwide (Meller, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 64-64). This meant that though in the 
neoliberal view each person had equal chances, at the starting point inequalities were as 
present (or even sharper) as before, and inhibited an equal assertion of interests. The strong 
social net built under Allende (with access to education, good health, job security) was largely 
retracted, as the liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation of society proceeded, comprising 
a worsening of living conditions for many Chileans. In fact, the ones which doubtlessly 
profited from the policies of the Pinochet regime were those sectors which were in some way 
connected to large business enterprises. (Valenzuela 1978: 110) 
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Although the technocrats had strived at depoliticising the economy and society, and thereby 
overcome dogmatism and ideology, the neoliberal concepts themselves were dogmatically 
and radically followed, thus inducing an ideology, albeit a completely different one from 
before. Furthermore, partial interests had a privileged access also in the new system, as the 
social and economic inequalities which subsisted (and intensified) distorted the access to 
articulation and implementation; the groups which had been privileged before the UP period 
profited under the new system as they had the capital needed to buy the privatised businesses 
and properties, thus regaining much of their lost power and influence. Furthermore, foreign 
investors and companies were privileged in the acquisition of property and industry, as the 
economic crisis had left many of the former Chilean proprietors without the necessary capital 
to buy back their assets in the short term. The result was a similar or even higher 
concentration of ownership (the ten largest groups effectively controlled 112 of the 250 most 
important private companies). (Klein 1993: 127) And just as under every previous 
government, the economic and social policies were influenced by particular interests of those 
in power, thereby undermining the supposedly free doing of the market. (ibid. 122) The 
military regime was dependent on the approval of its supporters, i.e. the Right, the 
landowners, industrialists and merchants; therefore it had to satisfy and consider their interests 
and demands in order to retain their support. (ibid. 124) 
 
5. The rise of Pinochet and the 1980 Constitution 
 
While the UP had not found the necessary majority to change the Constitution or to 
implement a new one, the Junta did not have much trouble in preparing and establishing a 
new Constitution in 1980. The plans and drafts began as soon as 1977, and the final version 
was ready to be voted in 1980. The cornerstone for the preparations was the “speech of 
Chacarillas” on June 9th 1977, stipulating the regime’s task, „eine neue Demokratie zu bilden, 
die autoritär, geschützt, integrierend und technisiert ist (...).” (Pinochet, quoted in Codoceo 
2007: 77)   
Just as there had been a division within the military before the coup (between 
constitutionalists and conspirators or reactionists), after the Junta rose to power, a polarisation 
ensued between the duros (who endorsed an indefinite rule of the regime) and the blandos 
(who advocated for a limitation of the duration and for a plan for the return to democratic 
rule). (Klein 1993: 113-114) The recurring economic crises exacerbated the regime’s external 
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and internal legitimacy, further urging an alternative to appease the critics. (ibid. 104) A 
compromise was reached with the new Constitution stipulating that Pinochet would remain in 
power for further eight years, until 1988. By then, the Junta would decide on a candidate for 
the ensuing term of eight years, who would then again be voted by the people in a plebiscite. 
(Rottensteiner 1996: 17) The main goal behind the new Constitution was to institutionalise the 
authoritarian regime, re-legalise the regime by adapting the Constitution, allow for enough 
time to reshape society and its structures, and to prepare the pathway to a representative 
government in the form of a “protected” democracy. (Rinke 2007: 166, Klein 1993: 115) By 
no means should it be possible to return to the state before the coup; instead, in a “protected 
democracy”, (Hayek 1985, quoted in Codoceo 2007: 77) the majority was not seen as apt to 
decide on all topics, and the decision making process was thus not completely democratic, 
with restrictions on the power and influence of parliament and civil society. On many issues, 
experts would decide, thereby preventing an unproductive ideological debate. (Codoceo 2007: 
77) The adoption of the title of Presidente de la República by Pinochet in December 1974 
reflected the attempt to take up (at least in appearance) the republican tradition of Chilean 
governments strongly associated with legitimacy. (Klein 1993: 97) Through certain elements 
in the Constitution, the regime tried to safeguard the influence and power of the military even 
beyond the end of the regime. (Rinke 2007: 166-167) The legitimisation was to be ensured in 
a controlled plebiscite on the Constitution in September 1980. For the seemingly unlikely case 
of a defeat of the regime, General Pinochet would nonetheless remain in office until the 
presidential election could take place, and would retain the charge of Commander-in-Chief of 
the Armed Forces for at least the ensuing eight years. (Rottensteiner 1996: 17) 
Some of the most important changes brought about by the new Constitution were the 
personalisation of the regime, the strengthening of the president and of the executive, the 
weakening of parliament, the introduction of eight year presidential terms, the induction of 
appointed senators and the creation of the Consejo de Seguridad -acional (National Security 
Council), in which the military ensured its influence in matters of national security (Art. 106 
and 107), and in the appointment of senators and members of the new Constitutional Court 
(Art. 92-94). The role of the military as the guardian of the Constitution was thus further 
elucidated. (Rinke 2007: 166, Klein 1993: 114, 116-117) The president obtained far-reaching 
powers (writ of attachment, the power to restrain the freedoms of information, of the press 
and of assembly, to stipulate entry bans, expulsions inter alia) and was not constrained by any 
form of considerable checks. Legislation, which had been dependent on unanimity in the 
Junta, was further subjected to Pinochet’s veto. Parliament was weakened, as some agendas 
 79 
were transferred to the president or restricted, including the fiscal competences, the right to 
introduce a bill and the final consent on the suspension of constitutional rights.  (Klein 1993: 
114-116) Furthermore, within the restricted right to introduce bills, if the outcome was 
nullified by the Constitutional Court, the involved deputies would immediately lose their 
mandate. Democratic decision making and interest articulation was adapted to the new ideals, 
the result being a constraint of the fields of action; decisions were technically reduced to 
certain domains and matters (affecting the political, socio-economic as well as the military 
structures), as according to neoliberalism, self-regulation and market freedom should not be 
disturbed. The Constitutional Court was filled with either regime-sympathising or regime-
appointed personnel; considerable opposition and resistance were not to be expected from it. 
(Klein 1993: 115-117) 
A new franchise was introduced which clearly favoured the Right: the binomial majoritarian 
suffrage. According to the new regulation, each political list could only nominate two 
candidates per district. In return, two candidates were always elected, thus favouring the 
second-place finisher considerably. (Codoceo 2007: 80) Furthermore, the achievement of a 
sufficient majority for a constitutional change was made more difficult, thereby avoiding a 
prompt revocation after a possible end of the regime. (Rinke 2007: 166, Codoceo 2007: 81) 
The plebiscite was performed on September 11th 1980 under the state of emergency. As there 
were no external, independent control mechanisms, and transparency was not given, the 
opposition and many international actors did not accept the result as legitimate. (Codoceo 
2007: 78) With the desired outcome, Pinochet now had another argument or proof to claim his 
legitimacy and supremacy as the President, as the 1978 vote had been confirmed by the 
constitutional plebiscite. (Klein 1993: 114-115) 
 
Although the Junta consisted of the four generals which had planned and performed the coup 
(General Pinochet, General Leigh, Admiral Merino and General Mendoza) and the initial plan 
had been to alternate in the leadership of the regime, Pinochet remained in power throughout 
the duration of the regime, usurping the power and influence of the other members of the 
Junta. Although General Pinochet had not been one of the masterminds behind the very idea 
of a military coup, the supremacy of the Army over the other services was enough for him to 
prevail over the other generals. The rising of the General is reflected in the sequence of titles 
gathered throughout the years – from Comandante en Jefe del Ejército (August 1973), 
Presidente de la Junta (September 1973), Jefe Supremo de la -ación (June 1974), Presidente 
de la República (December 1974), Capitan General to Generalissimo. (Klein 1993: 90) In the 
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January 1978 plebiscite, Pinochet had seen the result (75% in support) as a confirmation of 
his personal legitimacy, although the referendum had taken place under less than democratic 
circumstances, and had therefore been severely criticised by the United Nations, the Catholic 
Church and Chilean expatriates. 
 
The concentration of decision making, influence and power within one person is a rare 
phenomenon when compared to the other contemporary military dictatorships in Latin 
America; the very Chilean regime was increasingly personalised and personified by General 
Pinochet, who gradually withdrew the initial influence of the military as a political institution 
to his own benefit. (Klein 1993: 90) The influence of the military was cut back with the 
creation of the DINA in June 1974, which was created in order to outsource the “unpopular” 
and illegitimate repressive measures, as well as the problems involved (possible human rights 
violations charges, receding support for the policies, etc.). At the same time, a large part of the 
(para-)military activities were thus withdrawn from the control of the regular military, as the 
DINA was under General Pinochet’s personal control. (ibid. 95, 98)  
The promotion and discharge regulations were changed in a way in which General Pinochet 
had the last word (Articles 104 and 105). As the General himself stated, „-o se mueve 
ninguna hoja en este país si yo no la estoy moviendo!”. 11 (Pinochet: Qué pasa en la moneda, 
in: Qué pasa 548 (8. – 14. Okt. 1981), 9, quoted in Klein 1993: 103) To a large extent, 
institutional hierarchy was replaced by loyalty to Pinochet, the militaries in all positions 
becoming dependent on the General’s favours and sympathy. (Klein 1993: 96) Those fallen 
into disgrace due to critical attitudes or for any other reasons were swiftly discharged by 
Pinochet and replaced by more loyal ones. This practice reached its peak with the discharge of 
the airforce member of the Junta General Leigh in July 1978, who had fallen into Pinochet’s 
disgrace for increasingly speaking out in favour of a return to genuinely democratic 
conditions. (ibid. 106-107)  This incident is maybe one of the best illustrations of Pinochet’s 
supremacy over the other members of the Junta. As an effective means of containing critique, 
discussion and uprising, General Pinochet frequently shuffled offices and positions, thus 
creating a feeling of insecurity among his subordinates, and thereby ensuring loyalty, 
submission and compliance. (ibid. 110, 113) 
The position of President of the Junta itself was bound to the highest ranking military official 
(the Commander-in-Chief), which in turn was only to change in the case of death, retreat or 
total invalidity of the actual incumbent. A change of this regulation was subject to the 
                                                 
11 Not one leave moves in this country if I am not moving it. (own translation) 
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President’s approval – and therefore highly unlikely. The other members of the Junta did not 
have any means to change this. As a result, the executive power was definitively consolidated 
in General Pinochet’s hands. (ibid. 96) 
A further blow to the influence and power of the military was the shift within the 
administrative bodies: At the beginning of the regime, military personnel prevailed in the 
administration and bureaus. The first division of responsibilities assigned the matters of 
internal and external security to the Army, the economic agenda to the navy, the social agenda 
to the air force, and finally the agrarian agenda to the police. (Klein 1993: 96) However, as 
General Pinochet granted the technocratic Chicago Boys more and more leeway (beginning in 
mid-1975), the relation between military and civilian personnel shifted in favour of the latter; 
the ministries were increasingly working directly for General Pinochet, while the services 
were impotent to counteract the ongoing development and loss of authority. (ibid. 97, 109) 
The military/civilians ratio in the administration changed from 87/13% in January 1974 to 
29.4/70.6% in January 1987 (with a short counter-development between 1980 and 1982 
during the economic crisis, as the civilians’ ratio retreated slightly). (ibid. 108) However, the 
military’s presence in the posts of regional intendants, provincial governors, rectores 
delegados at the universities and in leading positions within the residual state owned 
businesses remained throughout the regime. (ibid. 108-109)  
As the Chicago Boys owed their rising influence mainly to General Pinochet, and the 
neoliberal ideology went against principles of private interests, their subordination under the 
military as an institution became negligible. (ibid. 95, 98-99)  
The second pool from which Pinochet took his experts was the sympathising Right wing, 
whose experts, organisations and institutions (inter alia the Sociedad de Fomento Fabril 
(Society for Industrial Promotion), the Opus Dei, the Patria y Libertad, the gremios and the 
Centro de Estudios Políticos (Centre for Political Studies)) had not been affected by the coup. 
The inclusion of the Right in the administration and government (as advisors, civil servants 
and ministers) not only secured its support for the regime (and for Pinochet particularly), but 
also represented a form of legitimisation, as the Right represented around one third of the 
electorate. (ibid. 102) The initially guaranteed say of the other Junta members in the 
appointment of administration and judiciary posts was effectively repealed as Pinochet made 
the decisions without previous agreement. (ibid. 97) The General justified the withdrawal of 
the military’s influence from politics with the necessity to return to democratic conditions – 
through the re-subordination of the military under the political offices (from which he as the 
new President was, of course, exempt) – and with the neoliberal principles of non-interference 
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and independence (the technocrats were generally regarded as independent from political 
ideologies). (ibid. 101) The development was further designed to soothe the international 
community’s pressure for a withdrawal of the military from politics (especially after President 
Jimmy Carter took office in 1977 in the U.S.). Klein puts the development in a nutshell when 
he states that the military mutated “vom politischen Akteur zum politischen Instrument” to the 
benefit of Pinochet’s and his technocratic experts’ autonomy. (1993: 101) As the ratio of 
civilians in the administration and government increased, so did the independence of General 
Pinochet from the Junta and the military in general. The military nevertheless remained the 
crucial pier of the regime, enabling Pinochet’s continuance in his office. In spite of the 
reduction of the initially gained political influence, the military profited from the rising 
military spending, the availability of administrative posts and the chances of social and 
military advancement provided by the regime; its support did not, therefore, recede, and the 
long survival of the regime was thus enabled. (Klein 1993: 109-110) 
Interestingly, the separation of the civil and the military sector which had been briefly 
overridden was restored due to the gradual reduction and replacement of military personnel in 
the administration and the dwindling political influence on the one hand, and the withdrawal 
of the state in many sectors due to the neoliberal reforms on the other hand. (ibid. 118, 145) 
Indeed the separation was even intensified, as the military was now a separate privileged 
class, with exclusive residential districts, an own military jurisdiction, health and pension 
facilities.  
 
As a means of preventing a further investigation and being made accountable before a 
(international) court, the Junta implemented an amnesty through the DL 2191 in April 1978 
(Ley de Amnistía), which concerned most of the crimes committed between September 1973 
and March 1978, (with the important exception of the assassination of the former Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Letelier in Washington D.C.). (Rottensteiner 1996: 19) 
 
6. The resistance and the rise of discontent 
 
In spite of the violent and harsh repression carried out by the DINA, the CNI and the military, 
the regime was not able to suppress the re-organisation of resistance and opposition. (Rinke 
2007: 167) Eventually all parties had been forbidden, the traditionally strong unions were 
effectively dismantled and mitigated and critics were either forced to exile, imprisoned, 
executed, or “disappeared”. The small-scale resistance to the coup launched by the militant 
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Left had been suppressed easily, forcing the surviving members to leave the country or go 
underground. (Codoceo 2007: 47) In the attempt to depoliticise society, the regime strove to 
discourage and suppress the aggregation of interests and demands. The electorate was held 
passive throughout most of the regime, with the exception of the 1978, 1980 and 1989 
plebiscites. Electoral registers were discarded; critical stances were not given voice, and the 
voting itself was everything but transparent and free. 
  
While international NGOs and the numerous Chilean expatriates constantly denounced the 
absence of freedom and kept record of the blatant human rights violations, these dispatches 
did not reach the Chilean public, effectively cloistered away by the rigid censorship. (Rinke 
2007: 167) Through deliberate misinformation, the strict censorship and the persecution of 
dissidents, the Chilean public had little to no access to a strong discussion on the events and 
measures of the regime. According to Klein (1993: 123) this can be seen as the source of 
misinterpretations and misjudgements throughout the population. 
The recurrent declaration of state of emergency was an instrument the regime used in order to 
curtail and prevent imminent protest and association. Furthermore, an Anti-Terror Law passed 
in 1984 broadened the term “terrorism” to such a degree, that any actions „designed to create 
commotion or fear in a sector of the population, or any actions or omissions that had a 
subversive or revolutionary intent“(Borzutzky 1987: 83, quoted in Bogdanovic 2008: 127) 
fell under its range. 
 
The April 1978 amnesty implemented by Pinochet raised the tempers of the victims’ relatives, 
who saw their right to justice revoked and their suffering spurned by the impunity of those 
responsible. (Rinke 2007: 167) 
It was in this same year of 1978 that the commemorations of Allende’s election day 
(September 4th) were resumed clandestinely at first, growing to mass demonstrations in the 
following years. The official commemorations of the day of the military coup (September 
11th) again were increasingly accompanied by counter-demonstrations, especially at burial 
sites of prominent victims of the regime. (ibid. 167-168) The regime crushed the 
demonstrations with utmost violence, but could not prevent the September revolts to recur. 
(Rinke 2007: 168) A peak was reached in 1983 at the decennium celebrations of the regime, 
with an unprecedented level of violence. (ibid. 168)  
In spite of the regime’s violent reaction, the organisation of protests and demonstrations 
became an important element in the opposition’s return, profiting from the increasing 
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discontent of large sectors of society. The copper unions which had called for a general strike 
after the assassination of one of their leaders, Tucapel Jiménez, in May 1983 were astonished 
to register a mass participation of thousands of Chileans – unprecedented before, and in spite 
of the huge associated risks. (ibid. 169) Especially as the economic crises and the reforms 
drew more and more people into distress, the legitimacy of the regime was questioned 
increasingly. Many had been willing to turn a blind eye to the repression and violence only for 
as long as the economic recovery benefited them significantly. With the unequal distribution 
of gains from the neoliberal reforms, discontent and frustration grew rapidly, leading to 
growing protests and riots. Even the small and medium business owners, who had contributed 
considerably to the destabilisation of the UP economic programme, were now disillusioned by 
the opening policies of the Neoliberals, as they were no longer protected against foreign and 
larger competition and acquisition. (Rinke 2007: 168-169) With the breakdown of the 
economy in 1983 due to the soaring foreign debt and the ensuing business failures, ever more 
people did not recoil from articulating their discontent. Furthermore, the income gap grew 
constantly, carrying ever more people into poverty; according to a survey by CEPAL, in 1970 
approximately 17% of the population were poor; according to a survey by the military regime 
itself, the proportion rose to over 45% in 1987, with 17% living in extreme poverty. (Codoceo 
2007: 64) These facts were a strong argument for the end of the regime and a return to 
democracy not only for its opponents, but also within the regime itself.  
The reaction of the regime was to scapegoat and sacrifice the Chicago Boys (who were now 
criticised for being “too Americanised”), temporarily banning them from the government and 
administration. Minister of Finance de Castro was replaced by the equally neoliberal Hernán 
Büchi, who added some protection for national production to the economic policies. (Rinke 
2007: 169) 
Contrary to the regime’s expectations, the protests did not fade away as the economy slowly 
recovered again from 1985. The emboldened citizens who had affronted the intimidation, 
violence and oppression before were not to be easily silenced any more. (ibid. 169)  
 
Backed by the Catholic Church, the unions and the clandestine party remainders, social 
movements emerged, often led and initiated by women, which included the poor, the 
Mapuche and the youth: the latter was especially affected by the high unemployment rate and 
the marginalisation, reflected in the increased alcohol and drug abuse, the rise in the number 
of violent offences, and the exacerbating social segregation. As the economic recovery and 
development became evident and present in everyday life (with the new underground system 
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in Santiago, new urban areas with skyscrapers and shopping centres), those not partaking in 
the profits were constantly reminded of their segregation and underprivileged position. (Rinke 
2007: 170-171) 
 
Three factors can be seen as important catalysts for the recreation of oppositional parties and 
of civil society, and the gradual liberalisation of the regime: the recurring crises of the 
neoliberal economic model, the undiminished influence and patronage of the Catholic Church, 
and the taking office of the Democrat Jimmy Carter in the U.S. 
The Catholic Church soon took over the role of supporter and advocate of the regime’s 
victims. As soon as 1975, the Vicaría de la Solidaridad (Solidarity Vicariate) was created as a 
platform for relatives to report on missing persons (desaparecidos). The Church actively tried 
to help the victims, thereby disgruntling the Junta. (Rinke 2007: 167) The regime was not, 
however, able and willing to cut back on the traditional influence of the Catholic Church, and 
was thereby moderate in its response. Especially soon after the coup, the Church was one of 
the few social institutional structures to be spared by the repression and annihilation policies 
of the regime. Furthermore, its influence sphere reached most of the country’s territory and 
social groups. As such, and especially after the Second Vatican Council many of its bishops 
felt appointed to defend and support the human rights victims. (Klein 1993: 104) 
 
Political parties were admitted for the first time since the bans (the Left in 1973 and all others 
in 1977) in 1983; this year is often considered the turning point in the increasing liberalisation 
of the regime and the rise of the opposition. (Rottensteiner 1996: 20) In spite of the 
persecution and oppression, some meager party structures remained, either in clandestineness 
or in exile. (Rinke 2007: 170) 
It is clear that the initial polarisation and intransigent ideologies were not differences to 
overcome easily. However, most of the parties were affected by the repression, and after 
overcoming the initial finger-pointing (reciprocally blaming the opposition and government 
respectively for the military coup and crises) they agreed on their opposition to the regime, as 
the PDC definitely discarded its legacy as proponent of the coup. As Patricio Aylwin, the 
leader of the PDC, put it, “Wenn wir etwas aus unseren eigenen Fehlern gelernt haben, dann 
ist es, dass die Demokratie ein Wert an sich ist, der jeden Tag verteidigt und vertieft werden 
muss.” (Aylwin 1998, 231, quoted in Bogdanovic 2008: 122-123) The PDC gradually united 
with the moderate reformist faction of the Socialists, the Radicals, the regime-critical Right 
and several smaller groups to form the Alianza Democrática (AD) under Ricardo Lagos. In 
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August 1983, the AD constituted through the subscription of the Manifiesto Democrático 
(Democratic Manifest), stating their view of the sources of the crisis, demanding the 
convocation of a constitutional assembly and the return to democracy: 
 
 “6. Lo repetimos una vez más, esta crisis es el producto de un sistema que limita la libertad, la justicia y la 
participación, bases esenciales de la convivencia democrática entre los chilenos. 
7. [...] La democracia no es el caos. Quien afirme lo contrario defiende privilegios inaceptables, teme a la 
libertad, desconoce los valores profundos del pueblo chileno y reniega de su historia. [...]Si hubiera existido un 
Parlamento libremente elegido, libertad de prensa y de acceso a los demás medios de comunicación, los abusos 
cometidos y las malas políticas seguidas no habrían sido posibles y los errores podrían haberse corregido a 
tiempo. 
[...]11. Para lograr ese gran objetivo, se debe poner término inmediato a los regímenes de emergencia, que han 
enterado más de nueve años sin interrupción y acaban de renovarse; restablecer la libertad y seguridad 
individuales y su efectivo resguardo por un Poder Judicial que asuma la tutela del respeto a las personas como 
corresponde en un Estado de Derecho; poner fin a las expulsiones y dar urgente solución al dramático 
problema de los exiliados; ejercer en plenitud las libertades de expresión y de opinión y los derechos de reunión 
y asociación, eliminándose las medidas que los restringen; recuperar la autonomía de las 
Universidades y regular la vida de los partidos políticos. [...]la convocatoria a una Asamblea 
Constituyente integrada por las distintas corrientes de opinión y, la adopción de un sistema 
lectoral que garantice la libre, informada y auténtica expresión de la voluntad ciudadana.” 
(Manifiesto Democratico 1983)12   
 
With this important document, the AD not only declared the collaboration of various parties 
in the joint struggle, but also the willingness to enter a dialogue with the regime on the 
transition to democracy: “16. Llamamos a encarar el futuro sin odios ni revanchismos, con 
espíritu generoso y voluntad de hacer justicia.”13 
The small surviving militant faction of the MIR (the Frente Patriótico Manuel Rodríguez, 
FPMR, Patriotic Front Manuel Rodriguez) in return started a new Movimiento Democrático 
Popular (MDP, Democratic People’s Movement) with the militant faction of the Socialists 
under the leadership of Clodomiro Almeyda in 1983. (Rinke 2007: 170) In contrast to the AD 
parties, the MDP did not support a dialogue, but preferred mobilisation and constraint instead 
– at least initially. (Bogdanovic 2008: 124) The FPMR launched a last attempt to induce an 
end to the regime through violence on September 8th 1986, with a failed assassination attempt 
                                                 
12 6. We repeat it once again, this crisis is the product of a system that limits freedom, justice and participation, 
which are essential bases for the democratic coexistence of the Chileans. 
7. […] Democracy is not chaos. Whoever affirms the contrary is defending the unacceptable privileges, fears 
freedom and does not know the profound values of the Chilean people and denies its history. […] If a freely 
elected parliament, freedom of the press and access to the other media had existed, the committed abuses and 
subsequent bad politics would not have been possible and the mistakes could have been corrected on time. 
11. In order to achieve that big objective, the states of emergency which have lasted more than nine consecutive 
years must be stopped immediately; the individual freedom and security must be re-established and protected by 
a judicial power that guards the respect of people as it should be under the rule of law; the expulsions must be 
stopped and urgently find a solution for the dramatic problem of the exiles; exercise fully the freedom of 
expression and opinion, and the rights to assembly and association, eliminating the measures that restrict them; 
restore the autonomy of the universities and regulate the life of the political parties. […] the call of a Constituent 
Assembly integrated by different currents of opinion, and the adoption of an electoral system that guarantees the 
free, informed and authentic expression of the citizens’ will. (own translation) 
13 We send out a call to face the future without hatred nor revenge, with a generous spirit and the will to do 
justice. (own translation) 
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(“Operación Siglo XX”, Operation 20th Century) on General Pinochet. However, the operation 
lacked in organisation, and its performance was poor. The General survived the attack slightly 
harmed, along with other twelve people, while five other people were killed. (Rottensteiner 
1996: 20) General Pinochet actually saw the abortive attack as a further sign of his legitimacy, 
claiming that providence had saved him from any harm, as he was meant to remain Chile’s 
protecting leader. On the other hand, the incident made a compelling case for the argument 
that without the military’s rule, Chile would return to the chaotic, violent state, as during the 
UP period.  As beside the many critics and bereaved there was still considerable support for 
the regime (mainly from large business owners and some parts of the Right, whose dread still 
remained the UP period), this argument was unalteredly effective. (Rinke 2007: 171) After 
this incident, the militant Left largely withdrew from the political agenda of fighting the 
regime with armed violence. The other parties agreed to join archbishop cardinal Juan 
Francisco Fresno’s initiative to unite the opposition through the signing of the Acuerdo 
-acional para la Transición a la Plena Democracia (National Agreement for the Transition 
to Full Democracy) in August 1985, in preparation for the upcoming plebiscite in 1988. 
(Rinke 2007: 170) The effects of this coalition were decisive for the further developments, but 
especially for the time after the military regime; for the first time since the 1960s, the marked 
polarisation of the political parties and confrontational tone made way for a “gemäßigter 
Pluralismus” (Klein 1993: 118-119), characterised by a less split up and less ideologically 
intransigent (rather centralised) landscape of political parties. Furthermore, in order to 
convince the people to find their courage again and stand up for their rights and freedom, it 
was essential that the opposition united in one front, withstanding the attempts of the regime 
to divide the minds. 
Soon the protests were no longer organised by unionists alone, but were planned and 
performed by the oppositional social groups and political parties as a preparation of the 
upcoming plebiscite; on the one hand it was important to pressurise the regime and thereby 
draw the national and international attention to the Chilean people’s discontent and resistance; 
the social mobilisation in addition to the economic backlashes were recognised as important 
catalysers for change. On the other hand the protests encouraged the citizens to take action 
and to raise their initially particular claims to the democratisation in the upcoming plebiscite. 
 
From 1982 onwards, the regime gradually realised that it could not muzzle the discontent and 
protests easily (i.e. through increased repression) and granted some small concessions, such as 
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a slight relaxation of censorship, of the restrictions of the right of assembly, and the drawing 
of a list of exiles for whom the return was permitted. (Rinke 2007: 171) 
 
With the taking office of President Jimmy Carter in January 1977, the regime had seen the 
initial supportive or at least tolerant attitude of the U.S. come to an end. (Klein 1993: 104) 
The new president elevated the human rights concern to a priority, and not only did not look 
away, but exerted pressure on Chile to improve its human rights record. 
 
In spite of the suppression attempts and violence used against the protesters, the regime 
eventually opened up for dialogue with the opposition. (Bogdanovic 2008: 127) The Acuerdo 
-acional and the decision of all parties to the Acuerdo to finally accept the 1980 Constitution 
as the framework in which the transition was bound to take place, led to talks between the 
archbishop cardinal Fresno and the Minister of the Interior Jarpa. (Bogdanovic 2008: 127-
128) Eventually the regime conceded some constitutional changes, namely the direct election 
of the members of parliament and of the president, the readmission of parties and the 
introduction of means to perform constitutional changes. Further demands of the Acuerdo, 
inter alia the end of the state of emergency and the reinsertion of all political and social rights, 
were not granted by the regime. (Bogdanovic 2008: 129) 
 
New hurdles were installed by the regime: Parties were only admitted if they were effectively 
reorganised in party structures and needed to be officially admitted to the election by the 
regime. This required a minimum 35 000 declared members. The Alianza consisted of various 
parties with one common aim for sure, but quite different programmes, and the decision 
whether to unite in one party or as separate ones was much discussed. In the end the members 
of the Alianza decided to split into the PDC and the Partido por la Democracia (PPD). 
Notwithstanding the struggle was led together in a joint “Campaña del -O”. (Bogdanovic 
2008: 132) 
Finally October 5th 1988 arrived and the preparations were all set for the plebiscite. The result 
of 54.7% against the prolongation of Pinochet’s tenure was striking, alongside the highest 
turnout in Chilean history. (Bogdanovic 2008: 131) As a result, a presidential election was set 
for 1990. The most important challenge of the Alianza was to get its voters and supporters to 
sign up in the electoral registers, and to guarantee that this was not accompanied by 
persecution or violence of any sort. (ibid. 131-132) This was not an easy task in such a short 
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timeframe. The next step then was to convince the traditionally reluctant people to actually go 
to the polls in order to avert a defeat. (Bogdanovic 2008: 132)  
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V The Democratisation Process 1989-2009  
 
 
Chile is one of the few cases in which the authoritarian regime itself introduced and 
institutionalised the path to democratisation, paving the way for a transfer of power from the 
military to a civilian government. (Bogdanovic 2008: 120) The Constitution of 1980 was 
crafted to consolidate Pinochet’s rule and influence, even in the unlikely case of a 
liberalisation. Pinochet had not predicted that the opposition would be able to reintegrate itself 
and mobilise enough support for the plebiscite scheduled for 1989. When it became quite 
evident that the likelihood of a “no” was rising, the General went about to introduce some 
more elements in the Constitution which would secure his influence and impunity beyond the 
transition and settle the “rules of the game”. (Codoceo 2008: 77-78) In so doing, Pinochet 
added a significant number of obstacles in the subsequent democratic governments’ way, 
which would take more than two decades to overcome. In return for the opposition’s 
acceptance, however, 54 amendments were further made to the Constitution as a preparation 
for democracy, which initiated the repeal of the authoritarian features. (Valenzuela 1999: 231) 
 
1. The political parties and governments after the transition 
 
Initially, immediately after the transition, three political groupings constituted the political 
parties system in Chile. The most influential one during the transition (formed in 1989) was 
the Centre-Left Concertación, comprising the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist 
Party (PS), the new Party for Democracy (PPD) and the Social Democratic Radical Party 
(PRSD). The Centre-Right formed the “Democracia y Progreso” alliance (“Democracy and 
Progress”) in 1989, which integrated the Independent Democratic Union (UDI) and the 
National Renewal Party (RN). (Valenzuela 1999: 232) In 2009, it incorporated some 
independents and defectors from the Concertación to become the Coalition for Change. 
Finally, the third block was the Communist Party. (Freedom House 2010) 
 
In the five presidential elections that have taken place since the return to democracy, the first 
four were won by candidates of the centre-left coalition. The election of 2009 represented a 
landmark, as for the first time a Centre-Right candidate won the vote. Furthermore, the 
succession of a right-wing president with a link to the Pinochet regime (his brother, José 
Piñera, was Miniter for Employment and Social Affairs under Pinochet and was largely 
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responsible for the privatisation and capitalisation of the pensions system) after a left-wing 
president whose father (General of the Airforce Alberto Bachelet) had been tortured by the 
regime police and therefore had to flee to Germany during the dictatorship is probably one of 
the best showcases for the far-reaching division of Chilean society. 
 
The first elected president after the transition was Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) (55.2%) of the 
Concertación, a Christian Democrat, who defeated Pinochet’s candidate, former Miniter of 
Finance Hernán Büchi (29.4%). The first democratic term had been established to last only 
four years, after which a new president would be elected.  
The 1993 presidential election brought another Concertación Christian Democrat candidate, 
Eduardo Frei Ruiz to victory (son of the former president), defeating first the Partido 
Socialista’s candidate Ricardo Lagos in a preliminary contest, and eventually Arturo 
Alessandri (a grandson of the former president) of the Centre-Right Coalition for Change  in 
the second round (58.1% to 30.2%). (Valenzuela 1999: 234) Meanwhile, the Chamber of 
Deputies saw the Coalition for Change lead with 70 (out of 120) seats ahead of the 
Concertación. The Senate, however, continued in the firm grip of the eight designated 
senators. (Valenzuela 1999: 234) Slowly, within the Concertación the Left began to gain the 
upper hand, thus claiming the next presidential candidate for themselves. (Valenzuela 1999: 
234) 
The third presidency after the transition from 1999 to 2005 was taken by Ricardo Lagos, and 
thus for the first time by a Socialist, strongly associated with the former Unidad Popular. In 
the second round he defeated the Centre-Right Alliance candidate Joaquín Lavín of the UDI, 
who had previously been an adviser of General Pinochet and a journalist for the Mercurio 
newspaper. (Rinke 2007: 184-185) 
The last of the Concertación presidents after the transition before the continuum was broken 
was Socialist Michelle Bachelet, Minister of Health and Defence under the Lagos 
government, who gained 53.5% of the vote against Sebastián Piñera (RN) in the second round 
in January 2006. (Rinke 2007: 186-187) Bachelet constituted a novelty in many senses: she 
was the first woman in Chilean history to take over the highest state office, an agnostic, the 
first president to have a four-year term after the constitutional amendments, and also the first 
one to have a majority in both houses of Congress, and thus more leeway to introduce 
reforms. This last point, however, was not to last, as in December 2007 some of the 
legislature members of the Christian Democratic Party defected, thus dissolving the majorities 
of the coalition in Congress. (Freedom House 2010) 
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2. The dimensions of democratic quality 
 
Rule of law 
 
One of the conditions required by the military regime for the liberalisation, which ultimately 
led to the victory of the “no” in the plebiscite, was that the opposition accept the 1980 
Constitution, further impaired by the leyes de amarre (“Chain Laws”) pushed through in the 
last months of the regime. (Valenzuela 1999: 231-232) This meant that, for the beginning, this 
would remain the framework in which the democratic governments would have to act, but 
also that an alteration or the replacement of the Constitution would be very difficult to enact 
due to the barriers included in 1980 and the subsequent amendments by Pinochet (especially 
in 1989). (Linz & Stepan 1996: 206) 
  
“The highest priorities [were] to eliminate the designated senators, to ensure the presidential right to put officers 
into retirement, to change the “immobility” status of Pinochet and his other commanders-in-chief, to restructure 
the composition and mission of the Constitutional Court, to alter Chile’s executive form of presidentialism 
toward a semiparliamentary model, and to have direct elections for municipal offices.” (Linz & Stepan 1996: 
211) 
 
Not until September 2005 did the democratic governments succeed in repealing some of the 
“authoritarian enclaves” (Garretón) contained in the Constitution which impeded the full 
transition to and consolidation of democracy (contrarily to Aylwin’s announcement in August 
1991 that Chilean transition had been completed). As Linz and Stepan (1996: 206-207) point 
out, out of the three components of a completed transition, namely that “[…] government has 
to be in power as a result of a free and popular vote; […] this government has authority to 
generate new policies; […] the executive, legislative, and judicial powers generated by the 
new democracy do not have to share power with other bodies de jure”, by the beginning of 
1994 only the first one had been achieved. The democratic governments saw their plans at an 
intensification of democratisation impeded by the votes of regime supporters in the Senate, 
the National Security Council and in the Constitutional Court. Furthermore, it was not until 
2005 that they also achieved a majority in Congress. This did not, however, preclude caution 
not to distress the right-wing opposition in the sake of stability, and with the lasting fear that 
the military might strike again. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 211) After all, in spite of the victory of 
the “no”, over 40% of the voters had supported the “yes” and were now probably very 
reluctant in accepting the reforms of democratisation. In spite of the slow pace of change, the 
attempt to seek support and compromise within the legal framework and across the political 
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parties did succeed in reducing and marginalising political violence, thus revoking one of the 
fears of the democratic right that the country was going to sink in chaos again. (Rinke 2007: 
183) 
The constitutional amendments introduced and approved under the Lagos government in 2005 
were substantial and a leap forward in the democratisation process. 
 
The presidential term was reduced from eight (Art. 25 (1980)) to four years without the 
possibility of being re-elected consecutively (Art. 25 (2005)).  
The right of the president to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies (Art. 32(5) (1980)) was 
withdrawn from the Constitution. 
The nine unelected seats (Art. 45 (1980)) of the Senate were abolished, making all 38 
members elected for eight-year terms, half of them alternately being renewed every four years 
(Art. 49 (2005)). 
The role of the military as the protector of the Constitution (Art. 90 (1980)) was discarded, 
reducing it to the defence of the fatherland and the national security (Art. 101 (2005)).  
The procedures for removal of the military commanders from office were changed; the 
president no longer needs the approval of the National Security Council in order to remove 
the commanders (Art. 93 (1980)), but instead informs the Chamber of Deputies and Senate of 
his or her decision (Art. 104 (2005)).  
The role of the National Security Council was significantly weakened, reducing it to an 
advisory organ. The members are not predominantly military any more, and the president 
reserves the right to convoke the meetings (Art. 95 (1980); Art. 106 and 107 (2005)). 
However, a constitutional amendment not only needs the approval of three fifths of the 
deputies and senators (Art. 116 (1980)), but alterations pertaining to some chapters require a 
two-thirds majority in each Chamber (Art. 127 (2005)). 
The Constitutional Court was enlarged to ten (Art. 92 (2005)) instead of seven (Art. 81 
(1980)) members, three of which are appointed by the president, four elected by Congress 
(two by the Senate, two nominated by the Chamber of Deputies and approved by the Senate), 
and three elected by the Supreme Court (Art. 92 (2005)). The unremovability of the judges 
entailed that many of the members installed by Pinochet held their tenure far into the 
democratisation and thus represented a stronghold of the military’s and right elites’ interests 
and a further barrier to constitutional change. (Hagopian 2005: 140; Linz & Stepan 1996: 210) 
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The importance of the provisions (and limitations) of the Constitution are significant for 
Chile, as its strong tradition of a rule of law remained unbroken throughout the last century. 
Every regime, as different as they were, struggled to remain within the framework of the 
Constitution and laws, and aspired to adapt the legal framework instead of breaking it for its 
interests and programmes. Even the military regime ultimately endorsed legality over an 
illegal reaction to the plebiscite. (Valenzuela 1999: 230-231) 
The supremacy of the military over the civilian institutions remained a legacy throughout the 
first presidencies, with their interests being very present in the remaining unelected but 
influential institutions. Furthermore, the unremovability of General Pinochet as Chief of the 
Army and of the other Junta members included in the Constitution, and the assumption of 
senatorial and National Security Council seats consolidated their influence for some time into 
democratisation. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 208) This changed gradually at first, but gained 
momentum with the downfall of General Pinochet and the reforms and amendments to the 
Constitution. The retirement and deposition of representatives of the regime have further led 
to a beginning renovation within the military, the officer corps starting to be filled with 
democratically loyal elements. (Diamond et al. 1999: 21; Valenzuela 1999: 234) A historical 
landmark was set in 2003 by Commander-in-Chief General Juan Emilio Cheyre, who 
postulated a “nunca más” (never again) concerning a renewed interference of the military in 
politics. (Rinke 2007: 189) A further important step was the September 2009 Copper Reserve 
Law which repealed the regulation that 10% of the profits of the Copper mining were 
transferred to the military. (Freedom House 2010) 
Furthermore, Chile is an exception in Latin America with its homicide rate (2003-2005: Chile 
5.5; U.S. 5.9) (The Guardian 13.10.2009) and corruption, though present, is not endemic 
(Transparency Corruption Perception Index 2009: 6.7; 25th position out of 180 countries). 
In spite of its involvement during the Pinochet regime and legal disputes over the 
responsibility for human rights violations, the police (the uniformed Carabineros and the 
investigative unit) enjoy a high esteem and image in Chilean society. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 
215) The police are no longer a branch of the Armed Forces (Art. 90 (1980); Art. 101 (2005)) 
and are subjected to the Ministry for Public Security. During the student protests in 2006 there 
were many reported cases of police brutality, leading to the dismissal of the Special Forces 
Commander and his deputy in June 2006. (Freedom House 2009) However, cases involving 
the police still underlie to the jurisdiction of military courts. (Hagopian 2005: 130) 
While some remnants in the Penal Code were tackled in 2005, namely the Criminal Libel Law 
(repeal of Art. 263 of the Penal Code), penalising false allegations of a crime and the use of 
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expressions that might dishonour, discredit or show contempt for another individual, the laws 
criminalising disrespect for or offence of public officials and authorities, and especially the 
Armed Forces and its members (Art. 284 of the Code of Military Justice) still persist. (Human 
Rights Watch 01.2010; 03.2005b) Furthermore, the jurisdiction of military courts in these 
legal matters is highly problematic, as impartiality and independence cannot be guaranteed, 
pre-trial release becomes less feasible, evidence can be kept secret by the prosecution up to 
six months, and testimonies by anonymous witnesses are sufficient for convictions. This has 
especially been problematic in the case of the Anti-Terrorism Law which places common 
crimes (e.g. arson, destruction of machinery and equipment, especially affecting the protests 
of the Mapuche minority) under military jurisdiction. (Human Rights Watch 09.2010) 
 
The legacy of the human rights violations 
 
The chapter of the human rights violations during the Pinochet regime was probably one of 
the most startling in the democratisation process in Chile. The first step had been set in 1978, 
with an Amnesty Law passed by Pinochet which exempted all crimes committed between 
September 1973 and March 1978 from punishment (DL 2191). This provision would be 
influential until the late 1990s when judges finally started allowing prosecutions into human 
rights abuses on the grounds that “forced disappearance” was an on-going crime (as the 
victims had not been found nor their death confirmed) and therefore not in the scope of the 
1978 Amnesty. (Human Rights Watch 2004b; Rinke 2007: 194) There was considerable 
resistance from the right, the military, the judiciary and from groups of civil society which 
had supported Pinochet and did not accept that the crimes should be reviewed. (Hagopian 
2005: 130; Linz & Stepan 1996: 213)  
One of the few cases to be pursued in the 1990s was the one indicting former head of the 
DINA General Manuel Contreras in 1995 of the involvement in the assassination of the 
opposition leader and Minister of Foreign Affairs Orlando Letelier in Washington in 1976. 
(Linz & Stepan 1996: 218; Rinke 2007: 193)  Due to its international implication this case 
had been explicitly exempted from the 1978 Amnesty Law after the U.S. had pressurised the 
regime to convict those responsible. In this case and in others where it was also discontent, 
the military staged acts of intimidation and defiance, such as “abducting” General Contreras 
before eventually bringing him to a military prison, or performing unannounced manoeuvres 
in front of the presidential palace. (Rinke 2007: 192) 
 96 
General Pinochet enjoyed widespread acceptance and remained Commander-in-Chief until 
March 1998, when he voluntarily retired and took up his seat as a senator for life. (Rinke 
2007: 193) The Concertación was reluctant to insist on prosecuting any human rights 
violations by the military, fearing that this step might prompt a coup resurrection. (Diamond, 
Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 21; Rinke 2007: 190) President Aylwin set up a Comisión -acional de 
Verdad y Reconciliación (Truth and Reconciliation Commission) in 1990 with the aim to 
investigate the human rights violations of the military regime. The Commission (in the report 
known as “Rettig Report” after their chairman Raúl Rettig) found 2,279 cases of 
disappearance or death between 1973 and 1990, for which the military and the secret police 
were responsible. (Freedom House 2009; Rinke 2007: 190-191; Codoceo 2007) Another 
Commission on Political Imprisonment and Torture was formed in August 2003 and presided 
by Bishop Sergio Valech, gathering testimonies of thousands of victims of the regime. 
However, the findings did not immediately entail indictments, as the testimonies were to be 
kept secret for 50 years; victims could press charges individually if they wanted. (Hagopian 
2005: 130; Human Rights Watch 11.2004a and 12.2004; Linz & Stepan 1996: 213) A law 
was passed to provide the identified victims and their relatives with an annual pension. 
(Human Rights Watch 11.2004a and 12.2004) As Valenzuela puts it, “Despite President 
Aylwin’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Chile may have acknowledged the truth, but 
it has not found reconciliation.” (1999: 238) 
The turning point was the General’s arrest in London in October 1998 under an international 
extradition order from Spain. Pinochet had travelled to London as a respected and feared 
Senator for a dorsal surgery; but when he was eventually left back to Chile in 2000, officially 
on health grounds, he had been stripped of his immunity and was welcomed as an indicted 
man finally facing responsibility for his deeds. From the beginning, Chile had tried to 
convince London to let the General return; however, initially the reasons were rather 
protective, as the opposition wanted to prevent Pinochet from being convicted. However, by 
the time of the return, the tide had turned, and those who demanded for the General’s 
indictment had gained the upper hand. His claims of impunity were eventually unsuccessful 
with the Supreme Court’s decision to strip him from his immunity, and he was forced to 
resign from his Senator post in July 2002. The military under its new Commander-in-Chief 
General Ricardo Izurieta did not intervene, and even showed willingness to cooperate, 
accepting to participate at a round table (Mesa de Diálogo) with human rights organisations 
and discuss the cases of the “disappeared”. (Rinke 2007: 194) In 2004 Pinochet was indicted 
for two cases of human rights violations and for tax evasion. As the case did not look good for 
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the General, and the latest when he began denying to have learned of the violations his 
subjects were performing in his name, the remaining institutional and cultural actors which 
had been faithful to him began to distance themselves from Pinochet. (Hagopian 2005: 155) 
The proceedings against Pinochet were suspended in July 2001 for health reasons (Pinochet 
had suffered several minor strokes and showed an initiating dementia). (del Campo 2002: 6; 
Rinke 2007: 194) Eventually, in September 2006 the Supreme Court decided that the health 
grounds for the suspension were not sufficient, and cleared the way for the trials to continue. 
They would not, however, be concluded, as General Pinochet passed away in December 2006. 
(Freedom House 2009 and 2010) 
Many members of the military and secret police were indicted and convicted, but there are 
still some cases pending. (see for example Freedom House 2010; Rinke 2007: 196-197) 
 
Horizontal accountability 
 
The left-wing parties and elites had pondered on the causes for the democratic breakdown in 
1973 and had recognised that polarisation and minority governments with a strong presidency 
had contributed to the failure of the political system. This was not so for the right-wing 
parties, who mostly still saw the military coup as a necessary step and the human rights 
violations as minor or as side-effects of a positive change. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 216; 
Valenzuela 1999: 193; 238-239; del Campo 2002: 6) The idea was thus to strengthen 
parliamentarism after the transition. However, once a democratic government came to power, 
these plans were put off, due to the obstructions by the authoritarian enclaves, but also by a 
shift of priority to promote growth and equality, leaving Chile with one of the most powerful 
presidencies in the world. (Hagopian 2005: 134; Rinke 2007: 175) Many of the president’s 
constitutional rights were banned (e.g. dissolving the Chamber of Deputies), while other quite 
powerful ones remained, such as the exclusive initiative for proposing budgetary legislation, 
the high threshold needed to override a presidential veto (two thirds), or the control of the 
legislative agenda declaring that a proposed legislation is urgent; initiatives by individuals or 
by parties are thus limited or at least discouraged, thus ruling out interests of their 
constituents. (Hagopian 2005: 134; 144; Valenzuela 1999: 239)  
The judiciary has seen significant improvement, as the terms of some of the Pinochet 
appointed judges ended and were replaced by democratically loyal ones. During the 
dictatorship, the judiciary had enjoyed independence in return for an acquiescence to the 
authoritarian laws and repealing cases of human rights violations. The Amnesty Law of 1978 
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kept its influence well into the democratisation, roughly until the beginning of the 21st century 
(Hagopian 2005: 135), when courts finally started accepting human rights violations and 
disappearance cases with the justification that these crimes were still ongoing, as the victims 
had not yet been found, dead or alive. The new nomination system for the Supreme Court, 
requiring not only the approval of the president and the Court itself, but also of the Senate 
(Art. 75 (1980); Art. 78 (2005)) and the expansion of its size was important in this sense. 
(Hagopian 2005: 135) In spite of the aforementioned domains in which the military 
jurisdiction is applied also to civilians and in cases of defamation of public or military 
officials, the judiciary has evolved into an independent and efficient institution. 
 
Competition, vertical accountability and responsiveness 
 
Probably the most important lesson that the political parties drew from the authoritarian 
experience was the importance and meaning of consensus, and the danger of competition that 
is too polarised, confrontational and uncompromising. This epiphany was decisive for the 
creation of the movement and later coalition that ultimately led Chile to and through 
democratisation. (Linz & Stepan 1996: 217) The collaboration of a broad spectrum of parties 
of the Centre and the Left contributed strongly to the reduction of political violence, the 
legitimacy of the policies that were carried out and the stability of the still developing 
democracy. However, the necessity of broad support also meant that some more daring (and 
necessary) reforms were not accomplished (Diamond, Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 33; Hagopian 
2005: 145; Rinke 2007: 187), and that the citizens’ support for the parties dwindled (as will be 
discussed below) because of the waning discriminability between party and policy options.   
 
Keeping in mind that 44% of the voters in the 1989 plebiscite did not support a return to 
democracy, the initial enthusiasm for democracy and the high hopes were quickly 
disillusioned, as the pace of reforms was quite slow (due to the remaining authoritarian 
constrictions in most institutions), the economic model was kept without many initial reforms, 
and the mobilisation which had been so decisive for the plebiscite was now counteracted by 
the political elites, who saw demobilisation as a prerequisite for stability and efficiency. 
(Hagopian 2005: 126-127, 145, 153) The strength and predominance of the Concertación also 
meant that an alternation in power of elites with differing programmes was not probable, and 
thus the public opinion on democracy gradually sank throughout the democratisation process 
until 200, but has been rising again since. The decrease was not, however, as significant as 
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turning the tide against democracy, as, overall, citizens appreciated the good economic 
performance, stability and the slow but present reforms. (Diamond, Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 3, 
33; Hagopian 2005: 142) According to Linz, shortly after the transition, in August 1990 
Chileans showed a 75% satisfaction with democracy. (quoted in Hagopian 2005: 146) While 
in 1996 54% of Chileans responded affirmatively to the question whether democracy is 
preferable to any other type of government in the Latinobarómetro survey, this approval 
dropped to 45% in 2001. However, it has been rising ever since, reaching 59% in 2009. (The 
Economist 12.12.2009) Regarding the question whether in certain circumstances an 
authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one, the number of approvals has 
dropped from 19% in 2001 to 11% in 2009. (ibid.) 
An important point made by Hagopian is that while the political elites demobilised their 
voters and strove to find a compromise in the centre which would find the support needed for 
the policies and reforms, citizens were not depoliticised and moderated to the same degree. 
Thus the continuing polarisation (even if not extreme) of the population does not mirror itself 
or find a counterpart in the political parties. The result is not a depoliticisation of citizens, but 
a growing indifference towards the political process. (Hagopian 2005: 145) The pragmatic 
Centrism of the long ruling coalition did not reflect the interests of the leftist citizens, who 
had not profited from the neoliberal economic model and did not find the social reforms 
necessary for an improvement of their situations, resented the long lasting influence of the 
military and the political elites of the Pinochet regime and demanded justice for the human 
rights violation, but also not of the conservative and rightist citizens, who saw their Catholic 
traditions abandoned and the traditionally strong linkages between the party structures and 
their constituents missing. (Hagopian 2005: 153) Furthermore, while reforms of the state 
institutions, of the Constitution and the handling of the human rights violations have been 
important issues throughout the democratisation process, citizens’ concerns seemed to shift to 
more immediate problems such as crime, poverty, health care and education. (Valenzuela 
1999: 236)  
 
One of the first successful reforms to improve vertical accountability after the transition was 
the introduction of municipal elections in 1992. However, governments at the regional 
(intendientes) and provincial level (governors and economic and social advisory councils) are 
still appointed by the president. (Hagopian 2005: 141) Thus Chile remains a highly 
centralised country, with the regions and provinces depending strongly on the central 
government. Furthermore, the elections for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate still follow 
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the “binomial majoritarian” system, which clearly benefits the runner-up party (coalition) and 
does not reflect voter’s preferences14. The two members elected for each district are not 
necessarily the two individuals with most votes, and smaller parties (second runner-up etc.) 
are not at all represented in Congress. (Hagopian 2005: 141) The will of the electorate is thus 
not necessarily reflected in its representation. (Hagopian 2005: 152) 
 
Freedom  
 
With the exception of the laws on defamation which had still not been tackled in 2009, Chile 
is one of the few countries in Latin America to have received the highest mark (1.0) in the 
Freedom of the World rating in 2009. (Freedom House 2009: Freedom of the World) Chile 
upholds the civil and political rights of its citizens, although abuses by the police are subject 
to military jurisdiction, and prosecution in these cases is often abandoned. The laws on 
defamation dent the guarantee of free speech, which is otherwise generally respected. 
The press fares somewhat worse in the Freedom House rating, giving Chile the 63rd place of 
195 countries, with a mark of 29 (“free”). (Freedom House 2009: Freedom of the Press) Most 
of the media are in the possession of a few companies, thus constraining their diversity and 
independence, and the fear of costly battles leads to a self-censorship of content. (Freedom 
House 2010; Hagopian 2005: 142; Rinke 2007: 188-189) A major breakthrough was the Law 
on Access to Public Information inured in April 2009 which strengthened the freedom of 
information already included in the Constitution (Art.19(12) (2005)). 
Although the right to assemble peacefully and of association (Art. 19(13) and (15) (2005)) are 
generally upheld, demonstrations have sometimes been met with exaggerated police violence, 
and some practices such as the replacement of workers during a strike or dismissal threats to 
discourage workers from joining or organising unions have been reported. (Freedom House 
2010) 
During the dictatorship, the indigenous peoples in Chile (especially the biggest group, the 
Mapuche) had suffered from the authoritarian regime’s attempt to suppress the existence of 
different groups, which was contrary to the ideal of a unitary, strong state without 
diversification and fragmentation. Their situation has come to improve since the 
                                                 
14 “The ballot structure provides for open lists; voters indicate a preference for one candidate within a list of up 
to two candidates; all votes for candidates within each list are pooled together to determine the distribution of 
seats among lists; and seats are allocated to those candidates from seat-winning lists in the order of their 
individual vote totals. Both candidates on a list can be selected only if their list more than doubles the vote total 
of the second-place list – otherwise, the top candidate from each of the first two lists is elected.” (Hagopian 
2005: 141) 
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democratisation, with the creation of a “Historical Truth and New Deal Commission” in 1993 
and a Non-Discrimination Law was being considered by the end of 2009 (Freedom House 
2010; Hagopian 2005: 130-131). However, there are still many problems related to their 
claims to ancestral lands and ensuing conflicts with landowners and corporations, the slow 
pace of land transfers and the improving but still widespread poverty of these peoples. 
(Hagopian 2005: 130-131; Rinke 2007: 181-182) 
 
Participation 
 
The combination of the established political elites’ consensual stance and the high threshold 
for political alternation in a coalitional political system has a strong impact on participation. 
The interests and preferences of citizens are more diversified and politicised than the 
programmes offered by the available parties. Furthermore, the link between the citizens and 
the political leaders has been weakened as parties aimed to re-depoliticise and demobilise 
their constituents after the first democratic election, and in between the subsequent ones. The 
result has not been a depoliticisation of citizens, but rather an alienation from the political 
process in the form of waning participation. (Hagopian 2005: 126, 150; Valenzuela 1999: 
236) Abstained citizens thus either are satisfied with the results of the incumbent government 
and the work of the political parties and do not see the need to go to elections, or they are not 
satisfied, but do not find viable alternatives in the political parties’ offers, and thus do not 
believe that their vote would change anything. Even the introduction of compulsory voting 
did not show the intended effects: voting is mandatory only for voters who have registered, 
which does not happen automatically. Consequently, enfranchised citizens who do not register 
are not liable. (Hagopian 2005: 149; Rinke 2007: 187-188) In view that even those who do 
vote do not see their will reflected in the elected institutions due to the binomial majoritarian 
system, and the alienation of the political parties from their constituents, it seems hard to 
predict when the trend of high absenteeism (reaching 16.3% in the 2009 presidential election) 
might stop. 
 
The disengagement of the Chilean electorate is a far-reaching result of the Pinochet regime’s 
policy of individualisation and depoliticisation, leading to lower membership numbers in 
social, religious and political organisations than before the military coup. (Hagopian 2005: 
149) In a neoliberal economy where (to a certain extent) each is responsible for their own 
well-being and wealth, individualism prevails over association. (Hagopian 2005: 150) 
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The group that has most clearly removed itself from the electoral process is the youth. Born 
after the return to democracy, the young adults do not identify themselves with the political 
parties which fail to capture their interests, preferences and ideals. (Hagopian 2005: 149-150, 
152) Furthermore, the social reforms and programmes have not succeeded in reducing the 
high unemployment rate, and the dissatisfaction with the education system (one of the most 
expensive ones in the world) tended to lead to mobilisation in demonstrations, but not in 
electoral participation. (Rinke 2007: 187-188)  
 
Equality 
 
The Concertación governments have continued the neoliberal economic model that Pinochet 
had introduced in Chile and which, despite some setbacks and crises, was seen as quite 
efficient and efficacious in tackling the long-time problems of high inflation and public 
deficit.  
Thanks mainly to its strong export sector (mining (especially copper), agriculture and 
forestry) and foreign investment, Chile has continued faring a steady economic growth (GDP 
growth rate of 3.7% in 2008, -1.7% in 2009, and an estimated 5.3% in 2010), allowing it to 
tackle inflation (from 27.3% in 1990 to an estimated 1.5% in 2009) and public debt (est. 6.2% 
in 2009) and to invest in socio-economic reform programmes. (Rinke 2007: 176-178; CIA 
2011; Valenzuela 1999: 235) At the same time, while Chile’s economy remains vulnerable to 
slumps in copper market prices, external factors (as became evident during the 1999 Asian 
economic crisis, when demand and the price for copper dwindled), the problem of 
sustainability and to ecological costs, it has also been able to create reserves which have 
recently helped it in overcoming the financial and economic crisis beginning in 2008. (Rinke 
2007: 179, 185) 
In line with the export-promoting policies of the CEPAL (ECLAC, The Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean), Chile strove to restore its bi- and 
multilateral economic relations, joining the APEC (Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation), the 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), but precluding a return to the Andean pact, 
because the other members’ tariff policies and levels did not match the more liberal ones 
Chile had achieved. (Barrios 1999: 140 et seq.) For the same reason Chile is associated, but 
not a member of the Mercosur. 
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An important change in the economic and social policies was the restructuring of the 
relationship between the state, the economy and the citizens. Instead of fully withdrawing 
from any influence and interference with the economy and people’s welfare (as the neoliberal 
model had intended), in spite of further privatisations carried out after the transition, the state 
resumed social welfare policies to tackle the exacerbated inequality and the high poverty rate. 
(Rinke 2007: 175) 
The education system had been radically liberalised during the military regime, which led to a 
fragmentation of educational institutions and a steep increase of the fees. State expenditures 
on education have tripled since 1990, and significant investment was made in education 
infrastructure. (Rinke 2007: 181) In the summer of 2006 the situation had peaked to a point 
that the students went to the streets in massive demonstrations, demanding improvements and 
especially a reform which would allow for more affordable fees. (Freedom House 2009 and 
2010) The resurgence of protests in the summer of 2011 shows that these problems have not 
been tackled yet. 
Significant measures and policies were introduced to improve and expand the welfare system, 
with new hospitals being built, the introduction of a pension for poor seniors who fall out of 
the privatised and capitalised pensions system, (Freedom House 2009 and 2010) and a 
number of programmes for the poor, while at the same time keeping public debt within limits. 
However, Chile remains one of the most unequal countries in the world, with a Gini 
coefficient of 52.4 in 2009. (CIA 2011; Hagopian 2005: 125) The introduction of a 
progressive income tax has helped improve the situation a little, but the problem remains 
significant. (Rinke 2007: 179-180) The unemployment rate continues to be fairly high, at 
around 9.6% in 2009, but the percentage of people below the poverty line was significantly 
reduced from 39% in 1990 to 11.5% in 2009. (Hagopian 2005: 138; CIA 2011) Worker’s 
rights have improved significantly, with the introduction of the so-called Acuerdo Marco 
(Framework Agreement), prescribing an agreement between employers and employees on 
wages, minimum wages and pensions, and literacy is almost exhaustive (95.7% in 2002). 
(CIA 2011; Rinke 2007: 179-180) However, the traditionally high levels of union 
membership and organisation have not been attained again in spite of the reactivation of the 
former CUT, and the fragmentation into smaller unions arising from the military regime 
remains an obstacle to a stronger voice of employees’ interests.  
The equality of women has improved significantly in recent years, with the introduction of 
divorce as late as May 2004 (one of the last countries in the world to have banned divorce) 
and the number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies held by women also rising (from 4% of 
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the seats in 1970 to an average of 15 % in 1998; 50% of Bachelet’s cabinet seats). (Diamon, 
Hartlyn & Linz 1999: 32; Hagopian 2005: 138; Freedom House 2009)  
 
Overall it can be said that Chile has shown an impressive performance in the macroeconomic 
factors, but also in the socio-economic ones. In spite of the remaining problems Chile has 
succeeded in improving the life situation of most Chileans, and new transparency laws as well 
as the exposure of financial scandals and corruption are indicators that Chile is improving in 
becoming a more transparent and fair country. 
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Conclusion 
 
 
The word democracy encompasses a broad range of quite diverse concepts which have 
evolved since its emergence in ancient Greece and throughout the centuries. Various currents 
of thought and developments influenced what was meant by democracy, eventually leading to 
a broadening and deepening of the dimensions included in the concept. Proponents of liberal 
and socialist, empirical and normative, formal and substantive understandings of democracy 
have contributed to the enrichment of the discussion on forms of government in general, and 
the merits of democracy in particular. From the different available categorisations and 
indicators for assessing the quality of democracy, the ones developed by Diamond and 
Morlino (2005) were chosen due to their broad coverage of both formal and substantive 
dimensions (rule of law, participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, 
freedom, equality and responsiveness).  
Starting from the first half of the 19th century, the democratisation of an increasing number of 
countries in the world has led to an emergence of far-reaching and diverse theories on the 
causes of and explanations for the development of democratisation in general and in specific 
case studies. Different starting points of these theories and sometimes quite diverging 
conclusions allowed for rich discussions and predictions on the present and future of 
democratic and non-democratic countries alike.  
In the case of Chile, the democratisation process which brought the Pinochet regime to fall 
must be seen in the light of the long preceding democratic tradition of the country. 
Developments and characteristics from the past were determining for the development of the 
authoritarian regime, and thus for the process leading to the redemocratisation: The 
emergence and consolidation of the political parties and state institutions in the first half of 
the 20th century contributed significantly to the stability and efficiency of the Concertación 
government, which was able to concentrate on other areas of policy and reform (one should 
keep in mind the difficulties of other Latin American countries in the democratisation 
processes due to the lack of traditional institutional stability). These characteristics of the pre-
authoritarian legacy posed a great advantage for the quality of democracy, and can be said to 
contribute to the improbability of a relapse to authoritarianism. However, the legacies of the 
past were not all beneficial to the democratic cause: the high levels of mobilisation and 
polarisation ultimately led to the downfall of democracy in the first place (in conjunction with 
other determining factors such as the importance of the Doctrine of National Security, the UP 
social and political reforms, to mention only a few). The result was a development in the other 
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direction, namely the radical depoliticisation and demobilisation of society during the military 
regime, alienating the electorate from the state and later on from the political parties as well. 
This has had repercussions on the democratisation process and the consolidation of 
democracy, as the important vertical accountability and responsiveness dimensions suffer 
from the abstention of the population from the political process on the one hand, and the lack 
of correspondence between the parties’ programmes and the citizens’ assumed interests on the 
other. 
 
In spite of the initial resilience to reforms and the persistence of authoritarian legacies in the 
political system and in society, the more recent changes and measures have proved fruitful in 
contributing to the consolidation of democracy in Chile. In most of the dimensions which 
Diamond and Morlino (2005) discerned as essential for a high-quality democracy, Chile has 
produced successful improvements and showed a resilient, though sometimes hampered, 
determination to strive for better. The traditionally strong rule of law (to which even the 
military regime committed itself) continued to be implemented after the transition. The 
adherence to the laws proved problematic in the sense that the legal framework which 
accompanied the transition had been set by the authoritarian regime, and that the commitment 
to this framework had been one of the conditions for the military’s retreat from power. This 
meant that many important steps and reforms (e.g. the indictment of former human rights 
abusers, the removal of authoritarian enclaves in the law) were not tackled before a 
considerable span of time after the transition had already elapsed, and a few aspects persist 
which still need action (e.g. the laws criminalising disrespect for public officials and Anti-
Terrorism Law).  
The process of tackling the legacy of the human rights violations during the regime was a 
tedious process, which only gained momentum and provided success from the beginning of 
the 21st century, with the arrest of General Pinochet in London as a clear turning point. The 
initiatives at truth finding and reconciliation were marked by desultoriness, as judges and 
politicians only reluctantly abandoned the constraints of the Amnesty Law of 1978 and the 
fear of a renewed intervention of the military receded. Many victims, however, still await 
justice, and not all perpetrators have been identified and indicted yet. 
In the dimension of horizontal accountability the significant power and strength of the 
presidency has not been curtailed in favour of a stronger parliament, contrarily to what had 
been envisaged during the transition. The opportunities and powers for checks and balances 
are thus still limited by the strong position of the president. The judiciary registered 
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considerable improvement in the observance of its function as an organ of horizontal 
accountability as the terms of the judges installed by Pinochet gradually ended and the 
appointment regulations were changed. 
Competition, vertical accountability and responsiveness have shown some very encouraging, 
and also very worrisome developments. On the one hand, the comparatively moderate 
competition between the political parties and the role of consensus has definitely curtailed the 
incidence of political violence and escalation of mobilisation. On the other hand, the lack of 
distinct alternatives and the low probability of alternation in power (important for vertical 
accountability, as a measure of “punishment” for unpopular or unfavourable policies) have led 
to an alienation of the electorate from the political process and elites. The binomial 
majoritarian electoral system remained in place, with the consequence of a distortion and lack 
of reflection of the voters’ will. 
The dimension of freedom has seen significant improvements since the return to democracy. 
While most of the key fundamental freedoms can be found in the Constitution, distorted 
influence (e.g. media are concentrated in the possession of a few owners), unproportionality 
(e.g. exaggerated reactions to demonstrations and assemblies) and the treatment of indigenous 
peoples (e.g. disputes over land traditionally inhabited by the Mapuche) have remained a 
problem to the achievement of good levels of freedom. 
The aforementioned shortcomings in the dimensions of competition, vertical accountability 
and responsiveness have had a considerable influence on the participation of citizens in the 
political process. The alienation from the elites and improbability of alternation in power has 
led to growing rates of absenteeism, especially of the youth. This is not necessarily a 
symptom for the lack of interest or the depoliticisation of society (as had been intended and 
somewhat achieved by the military regime), but of a diminishing representation of the citizens 
and an ensuing turning away to other than the institutionalised political channels. 
Finally, equality has probably remained one of the legacies with most impact on Chilean 
society. The neoliberal policies of the military regime not only changed society and the 
relationship between the state and its citizens radically, but were largely kept (with some 
corrections) throughout the Concertación rule. While Chile fares very well in the 
macroeconomic indicators, the economic success has benefitted only a small stratum of 
society, while the large share of the population has not seen any improvements deriving 
thereof for themselves. The policies and measures to tackle inequality have not shown the 
intended success yet, and important domains such as the educational system and the welfare 
(sp. pensions) system have not been sufficiently targeted. 
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As in every present democracy worldwide, some points remain which reach from not ideal to 
worrisome; the persisting social and economic inequality, the dwindling participation and the 
pending reconciliation between the proponents and opponents of the military regime are only 
some of the more demanding problems that remain on the agenda. 
The legacies from the authoritarian past have largely been tackled, either by the coming of 
age of their representatives, international interference, a shift in the political elites’ confidence 
in the military’s restraint and a new courage (and electoral majorities) to introduce far-
reaching reforms. The military has largely returned to the barracks, and the resurgence of an 
insurgent outcry has become highly unlikely. 
 
After twenty years of Concertación rule, for the first time since the return to democracy a 
candidate of the Right has attained a majority in the presidential election. While the political 
cleavage survived the tumults of revolution, the depoliticisation of society during the 
dictatorship and the strongly consensual phase of the Centre-Left rule, the high abstention 
from vote and the growing alienation of the electorate from the political parties makes any 
simplistic explanation for the shift erroneous. The future holds interesting perspectives for 
Chile, hopefully including a re-approximation of representatives and the represented, and a 
more fruitful offer of alternatives with increasing competition, without, however, escalating 
into exaggerated levels of politicisation. 
 
Looking at the recent democratisation wave in North Africa, democratisation has regained 
actuality – not that it ever ceased to do so, but it has definitely re-entered the public discussion 
in civil society, after having retreated to predominantly scholarly discussions in the last 
decade after the breakdown of the Soviet Union. Much can be learned with the case of the 
Chilean democratisation, but a critical assessment of the successes and shortcomings so far 
remains imperative. Furthermore, comparing past and recent cases of democratisation, it 
becomes clear that despite some similarities, each case is different, and different contexts can 
create different outcomes out of similar situations.  
Summarising, it can be said that democracy has not lost its charm and controversy, and the 
ongoing emergence and struggle for democratisation and consolidation, but also of failures 
and regressions in several parts of the world is a strong indicator that discussion about what 
democracy is, what value it has, how transitions take place and how they should look like, and 
which factors promote consolidation will not become redundant anytime soon. 
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Appendix 
 
Curriculum vitae 
 
Education 
10/04-11/11 University of Vienna, Austria  
Diploma Programme Political Science Studies,  
Major subject Developmental and Peace and Conflict Studies 
▪ Scholarship for Outstanding Performance (2007) 
 
10/04 to present Diploma Programme French Studies 
 
03/06 to present Bachelor English and American Studies 
 
08 - 12/07  University of Oslo, Norway  
Political Science Studies (Master programme)  
Erasmus Exchange Program  
  
02/01 – 06/04  Austrian Grammar School Wenzgasse, Vienna, Austria 
   Graduation with distinction  
 
09/89 – 01/01  German School of Lisbon, Portugal  
 
Relevant work experience 
 
03-07, 09-11/11 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Vienna, Austria 
• Intern, Justice Section 
 
02 – 03/10  Asociación de Voluntarios para Areas Protegidas de Costa Rica, 
San José and Montezuma, Costa Rica 
• Volunteer  
    
Additional skills 
Languages:   
Mother tongues: Portuguese, German (bi-lingual) 
Other languages: 
 Understanding Speaking Writing 
 Listening Reading Spoken interaction  
English fluent fluent fluent fluent 
French fluent fluent fluent fluent 
Spanish fluent fluent fluent fluent 
Norwegian basic basic basic basic 
Japanese basic basic basic basic 
 
Computer literacy:  Microsoft Windows XP and Vista, MS-Office, MS PowerPoint, Adobe  
   Editor, Adobe Reader, Webforce, Siebel, CRM databases (Rexx- 
   Systems, Adam) internet user knowledge 
 
B-driver’s license, 16 hours Red Cross first aid course  
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Summary 
 
The topic of this thesis is an evaluation of the quality of democracy in Chile twenty years after 
the return to democracy. The questions which guided the research were whether, and if so, 
how Chile was able to overcome its remaining institutional and political authoritarian 
legacies; in how far the political, social and economic context has changed or evolved in a 
way that precludes a renewed breakdown of democracy; and finally what kind of democracy 
Chile has reached after twenty years. 
 
The word democracy encompasses a broad range of quite diverse concepts which have 
evolved throughout history, leading to a broadening and deepening of the dimensions implied 
in the word. For the assessment, the dimensions developed by Diamond and Morlino (2005) 
were chosen due to their broad coverage of both formal and substantive aspects (rule of law, 
participation, competition, vertical and horizontal accountability, freedom, equality and 
responsiveness).  
In the case of Chile, the democratisation process which brought the Pinochet regime to fall 
must be seen in the light of the long preceding democratic tradition of the country. The 
emergence and consolidation of the political parties and state institutions in the first half of 
the 20th century contributed significantly to the stability and efficiency of the Concertación 
government.  
However, the legacies of the past were not all beneficial to the democratic cause: the high 
levels of mobilisation and polarisation ultimately led to the downfall of democracy in the first 
place (in conjunction with other determining factors such as the importance of the Doctrine of 
National Security, the UP social and political reforms, to mention only a few). The result was 
the radical depoliticisation and demobilisation of society during the military regime, 
alienating the electorate from the state and later on from the political parties as well.  
 
As in every present democracy worldwide, some points remain which reach from not ideal to 
worrisome. Some of the points identified were the high abstention rate and lack of 
correspondence between party programmes and citizens’ interests; the survival of some last 
vestiges of the authoritarian legal provisions; the still incomplete process of unwinding the 
human rights violations legacy; the weak instruments and provisions of checks and balances 
against the very strong role of the president; the alienation of the electorate from the political 
process due to the insufficient representation of its interests; the persisting restrictions on the 
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freedom of the media and the rights of indigenous peoples; and the continuing strong social 
and economic inequality found in Chilean society. 
The most blatant legacies from the authoritarian past have largely been tackled, either by the 
coming of age of their representatives, international interference, a shift in the political elites’ 
confidence in the military’s restraint and a new courage (and electoral majorities) to introduce 
far-reaching reforms. The military has largely returned to the barracks, and the resurgence of 
an insurgent outcry has become highly unlikely. 
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Zusammenfassung 
 
Das Thema dieser Arbeit ist eine Beurteilung der Qualität der Demokratie in Chile 20 Jahre 
nach dem Beginn der Demokratisierung. Die Forschungsfragen, die die Untersuchung geleitet 
haben, waren ob, und wenn es der Fall ist, wie Chile die verbliebenen institutionellen und 
politischen autoritären Altlasten überwinden konnte; in wie weit sich der politische, soziale 
und wirtschaftliche Kontext derart geändert hat, dass ein erneutes Scheitern der Demokratie 
ausgeschlossen oder unwahrscheinlich ist; und schließlich was für eine Art Demokratie Chile 
nach 20 Jahren erreicht hat. 
Der Begriff Demokratie beinhaltet eine Vielfalt an recht unterschiedlichen Konzepten, welche 
sich entlang der Geschichte entwickelt, und schließlich zu einer zunehmenden Erweiterung 
und Vertiefung der im Wort impliziten Dimensionen geführt haben. Für die vorliegende 
Untersuchung wurden die Dimensionen von Diamon und Morlino (2005) verwendet, da sie 
eine breitflächige Behandlung formaler sowie substantieller Aspekte erlauben 
(Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Mitbestimmung, Wettbewerb, senkrechte und waagerechte 
Verantwortlichkeit, Freiheit, Gleichheit und Umsetzung (responsiveness)). 
Im Falle Chiles muss man den Demokratisierungsprozess, der nach dem Fall des 
Pinochetregimes eingeleitet wurde, im Kontext der langen vorangegangenen demokratischen 
Tradition des Landes untersuchen. Die Entstehung und Konsolidierung der politischen 
Parteien und staatlichen Institutionen in der ersten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts haben 
maßgeblich zur Stabilität und Leistungsfähigkeit der Concertación-Regierung beigetragen. 
Jedoch waren nicht alle Hinterlassenschaften aus der Vergangenheit förderlich für das 
demokratische Anliegen: der hohe Grad an Mobilisierung und Polarisierung führte 
letztendlich zum Zusammenbruch der Demokratie (im Zusammenspiel mit anderen 
ausschlaggebenden Faktoren, wie die Bedeutung der Doktrin der Nationalen Sicherheit, die 
sozialen und politischen Reformen der UP, um nur ein Paar zu nennen). Das Ergebnis war 
eine grundlegende Depolitisierung und Demobilisierung der Gesellschaft während des 
Militärregimes, was eine Distanzierung der Wählerschaft vom Staat und später auch von den 
politischen Parteien zur Folge hatte. 
 
So wie in jeder anderen gegenwärtigen Demokratie weltweit bleiben einige Punkte bestehen, 
welche von nicht ideal bis beunruhigend reichen. Einige der hier identifizierten waren die 
hohe Stimmenthaltung und fehlende Entsprechung der Parteiprogramme mit den Interessen 
der Bürger; der Bestand einiger Überreste des autoritären rechtlichen Rahmens; die weiterhin 
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unvollständige Aufarbeitung der Menschenrechtsverletzungen; die schwachen 
Kontrollmechanismen gegenüber dem starken Präsidenten; die Abwendung der Wählerschaft 
vom politischen Prozess aufgrund der ungenügenden Vertretung und Umsetzung ihrer 
Interessen; die bestehenden Beschränkungen der Medienfreiheit und der Rechte einheimischer 
Völker; und die fortbestehende starke soziale und wirtschaftliche Ungleichheit in der 
chilenischen Gesellschaft. 
Die offensichtlichsten Altlasten aus der autoritären Vergangenheit wurden großteils 
überwunden, entweder durch die Alterung der Vertreter dieser Zeit, internationale 
Einmischung, dem Wandel des Vertrauens der politischen Eliten in die Zurückhaltung des 
Militärs, und durch einen neuen Mut (und Mehrheiten bei Wahlen), weitreichende Reformen 
durchzusetzen. Das Militär ist weitgehend wieder in die Kasernen zurückgekehrt, und ein 
Wiederaufleben eines Aufstandes oder Aufforderung dazu ist mit hoher Sicherheit gebannt. 
 
